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The *Promptuarium argumentorum* (Cologne 1492)

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1. *Introduction*

In the later medieval period, the intellectual landscape was characterized by the multiplication of universities, especially in Middle and Eastern Europe, which thereby changed the educational map and the intellectual climate dramatically. The process was started in the fourteenth century with the foundation of the Universities of Prague (1347-48), Cracow (1364), and Vienna (1365), continued with Heidelberg (1386), Cologne (1388), and Erfurt (1392), and carried on in the fifteenth century with Leipzig (1409), Rostock (1419), Louvain (1425), Basel (1459), and Tübingen (1477), to name only a few of the many new institutions.¹

An important factor contributing to this development was undoubtedly the migration of German academics since the end of the 1370s. The imbroglia of the Schism at the University of Paris forced many German masters and students to leave for Vienna, Heidelberg, or Cologne.²

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¹ On this development, see A. B. Cobban, *The Medieval Universities. Their Development and Organization*, London 1975 (contains a bibliography); F. Seibt, 'Von Prag bis Rostock. Zur Gründung der Universitäten in Mitteleuropa', *Festschrift für Walter Schlesinger*, ed. H. Beumann, vol. 1. Cologne-Vienna 1973, 406-426; H. Koller, *Die Universitätsgründungen des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Salzburger Universitätsreden, 10). Salzburg 1966. For further bibliographical references, see E. Hassinger (ed.), *Bibliographie zur Universitätsgeschichte. Verzeichnis der im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1971 veröffentlichten Literatur*, bearbeitet von E. Stark (Freiburger Beiträge zur Wissenschafts- und Universitätsgeschichte, 1), München 1974. A coherent picture of the sociocultural context in which this process took place is provided by E. Meuthen, *Das 15. Jahrhundert* (Oldenbourg Grundriß der Geschichte, 9), 2nd edition, München 1984 (with extensive bibliography).

² The University's official support of the Avignon Pope Clemens VII made the adherents of the Roman Pope Urban VI object of boycotts and harassments, see among others R. N.

Again, in 1409, nationalistic concerns of the Bohemians to control university politics in Prague caused German academics to depart from there and to go to Leipzig where they helped to establish a new university.³

In addition to and partly in combination with the migrational movement of the Germans was the growing need of national or regional secular rulers and municipalities for well educated scholars who would help them in political and governmental matters as professional civil servants. The accommodation to national or regional interests is especially well documented in the case of the German universities. A great number of the universities were founded by local rulers (Prague, Vienna, Heidelberg, Leipzig) or municipal powers (Cologne, Rostock).⁴

Each new university had its own character, being an agent of distinctive secular powers and influenced by local concerns and geographical constraints. Many universities grew into important centers of learning. Not surprisingly, then, the *studia* that dominated the development of philosophical thinking were no longer Bologna, Oxford or Paris, as they had been before. They now became scattered all over Europe, thus altering the intellectual and cultural scenery significantly and—as we can say in retrospect—decisively.

A second aspect typical of the time is the emergence of rival schools of thought, of which the 'via moderna' and the 'via antiqua', and the conflict between them, the so-called 'Wegestreit', are well-known. The first clash between a 'via modernorum' and a 'via antiquorum' that is mentioned in university documents took place not earlier than 1425, in

Swanson, *Universities, Academics, and the Great Schism* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 3/12), Cambridge 1979; A. E. Bernstein, *Pierre d'Ailly and the Blanchard Affair* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 24), Leiden 1978, esp. 28-59; G. Ritter, *Studien zur Spätscholastik I: Marsilius von Inghen und die Ockhamistische Schule in Deutschland* (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1921, 4. Anh.), Heidelberg 1921, 27-32.

³ On the departure of the Germans from Prague, see F. Šmahel, 'The Kuttenberg Decree and the Withdrawal of the German Schools from Prague in 1409: a Discussion', *History of Universities*, 4 (1984), 153-166. As to Prague, see also P. Moraw, 'Die Universität Prag im Mittelalter. Grundzüge ihrer Geschichte im europäischen Zusammenhang', *Die Universität zu Prag* (Schriften der Sudetendeutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste, 7), München 1986, 9-134. The inception of the University of Leipzig is discussed by the literature mentioned in R. Ch. Schwinges, *Deutsche Universitätsbesucher im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. Studien zur Sozialgeschichte des alten Reiches* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Manx. Abteilung Universalgeschichte, 123), Stuttgart 1986, 108 n. 14. Schwinges gives a detailed account based on statistical research of the numbers of students and their provenance at the German universities in the 15th century.

⁴ E. Meuthen, *Die alte Universität* (Kölner Universitätsgeschichte, 1), Cologne-Vienna 1988, 52-60; A. B. Cobban, *The Medieval Universities*, 119.

Cologne.⁵ At the same time, also in Cologne, within the realist camp itself separate schools developed that were vigorously opposed, as is witnessed by the debates between Albertists and Thomists.⁶ Unlike the schools of thought of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, those of the fifteenth century did not primarily have their origin in contentious philosophical speculations of contemporary scholars or in contesting religious orders, but were rooted in and consolidated by the different philosophical ways in which the officially designated textbooks of the *curriculum* were lectured and commented upon by the masters of the Arts Faculty.⁷

These two developments, the multiplication of universities and the rise of antagonistic schools of thought, are closely interconnected. A number of universities admitted only the teachings of one way, the 'via antiqua' or the 'via moderna', to the exclusion of the other. Others accepted both ways, but housed them in separate buildings (*bursae*).⁸ What had emerged out of intellectual concerns and philosophical debates adopted a visible image in the newly founded institutions of learning: schools of thought were associated with specific universities or with

⁵ A. L. Gabriel, "'Via antiqua' and 'via moderna' and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century", *Antiqui und Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. A. Zimmermann (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 9), Berlin-New York 1974, 439-483, at 439. E. Meuthen, *Die alte Universität*, 172, refers to a document of the Arts Faculty of Cologne of 1414. However, the 1414 document only mentions a conflict concerning different ways of lecturing upon the texts of the syllabus. It distinguishes between the teachings as they have been in the past (*modus legendi, doctrinandi et libros philosophi exponendi qui ab inicio studij assumptus erat*) which is in part according to the logical works of John Buridan and some newly introduced teachings from Paris that have been refuted in earlier times ([*modum, MH*] *de novo a quibusdam parysiensibus introductum et resumptum, quondam spreum, reprobatur et abolitum*). It does not mention a 'via antiquorum' and a 'via modernorum'. Apparently, school consciousness was not yet developed as in 1425. The 1414 document is edited in A. G. Weiler, *Heinrich von Gorkum († 1431). Seine Stellung in der Philosophie und der Theologie des Spätmittelalters*, Hilversum 1962, 57f. On the 'Wegestreit' in Cologne, see most recently H. A. G. Braakhuis, 'School Philosophy and Philosophical Schools. The Semantic-Ontological Views in the Cologne Commentaries on Peter of Spain, and the "Wegestreit"', *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit*, ed. A. Zimmermann (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 20), Berlin-New York 1989, 1-18 (with further relevant literature on p. 2 n. 4).

⁶ On these debates see G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus*, Heft I: *Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus* (Dissertationes historicae, 3), Paris 1933; Heft II: *Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen* (Dissertationes historicae, 5), Rome 1935.

⁷ Again Cologne is an excellent example here, as we will see below. On the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century schools of thought, see W. J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England*, Princeton University Press 1987, 171-192.

⁸ R. Ch. Schwinges, 'Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte spätmittelalterlicher Studentenbursen in Deutschland', *Schulen und Studium im sozialen Wandel des hohen und späten Mittelalters*, ed. J. Fried (Vorträge und Forschungen, 30), Sigmaringen 1986, 527-564, esp. 534; A. L. Gabriel, "'Via antiqua' and 'via moderna'", 439-483.

different *bursae* within a university. As a result, they became an active part of the educational system and thus were able to dominate the intellectual climate for the time to come.

The existence of rival schools of thought in the late medieval period cannot be questioned. Less clear however are the exact tenets of the schools and the points of dispute. To be sure, the nature of universals was a main issue between the 'via moderna' and the 'via antiqua' at the time.⁹ But was the debate over the interpretation of universals strong enough to provoke a split between the two ways that entered into the educational system? And what exactly lay behind the splitting up of the 'via antiqua' into two rival factions, that of the Thomists and that of the Albertists? The official university documents, such as statutes, curricula and condemnations, although they often have been carefully studied in this context, do not sufficiently provide us with relevant information, as it is difficult to abstract from these nonphilosophical documents the exact nature and bearing of the disputes.¹⁰ Therefore, a study of the tenets of the late medieval schools of thought, as we would like to present it here, primarily has to pay due attention to philosophical works which were written within the context of the disputes themselves and which were therefore attuned to the philosophical background and nature of the debates.

At this point, at least two different kinds of philosophical works can be distinguished: firstly, the commentaries on the officially designated texts such as those of the grammarians, the logicians, and Aristotle, that were written and compiled according to the tradition of the Nominalistic, the Albertistic, or the Thomistic school; secondly, the polemical treatises in which the adherents of some school took issue with those of some other.

In Cologne, being the home base of a university that played an important role in the clash between philosophical schools, both kinds of philosophical treatises were published, especially since the first printers settled there in the 1460s.¹¹ What is more, particularly with regard to the

⁹ A. L. Gabriel, "Via antiqua' and 'via moderna'", 442.

¹⁰ See the contribution of Z. Kaluza elsewhere in this volume, which shows that the famous and often discussed condemnation of nominalism in Paris in 1474 and the nominalist answer cannot be taken at face value as reliable sources for the nominalist position at Paris. The documents are discussed in the otherwise important study of A. L. Gabriel, "Via antiqua' and 'via moderna'", 446-450.

¹¹ A listing of all the books that are printed in Cologne in the 15th century is given by E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns bis zum Ende des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Bonn 1903. A

first kind of works mentioned, in Cologne the courses of the arts curriculum were given almost exclusively in the *bursae*, of which the *bursa montana* and the *bursa laurentiana* were the most significant. Each *bursa* had its own course of lectures under the supervision of the regent master.¹² The teachings on logic or on Aristotle thus varied in accordance with the philosophical orientation of the *bursa*, as is documented by the following two examples:

The title page of Gerard of Harderwijk's commentary on the *ars nova* (Cologne 1494) mentions that the author, regent master of the *bursa laurentiana*, follows the teaching methods of his *bursa*, the residence of the followers and defenders of Albert the Great. At the end the work presents itself as a compilation, mainly of the writings of Albert the Great:¹³

Commentaria in quattuor libros novae logicae secundum processum bursae laurentianae Coloniensis, ubi doctrinae Alberti Magni peripateticorum veracissimi interpretis sectatores propagatoresque fidelissimi (...). Comentarii [!] (...) ex diversis et potissimum magni Alberti comentariis [!] collecti.

The same goes for writings that were compiled in the *bursa montana*, then under the directionship of the Thomist Lambert de Monte. An anonymous treatise on the *ars nova* published in Cologne about 1488 ends with the following phrase:¹⁴

Copulata (...) secundum processum et doctrinam magistrorum regentium Colonie in bursa Lamberti de Monte artium magistri et sacre theologie professoris iuxta doctrinam insignis et sancti doctoris Thomae de Aquino.

short history of printing in Cologne is *500 Jahre Buch und Zeitung in Köln*, Köln 1956. See also E. Meuthen, *Die alte Universität*, 111f.

¹² On the *bursae* in Cologne, see Meuthen, 'Die Artesfakultät der alter Kölner Universität', *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter*, ed. A. Zimmermann (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 20), Berlin-New York 1989, 366-393; R. Ch. Schwinges, 'Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte', 545-564. See also the contribution of Meuthen elsewhere in this volume.

¹³ E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, 196f., n. 440. On Gerard of Harderwijk, an Artist, see Meuthen, *Die alte Universität*, 93, 190.

¹⁴ E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, 52f., n. 137. As to Lambert de Monte, see H. L. Ph. Leeuwenberg, 'Lambertus van 's-Heerenbergh (de Monte Domini) († 1499), een Nederlands geleerde aan de Universiteit van Keulen', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 85 (1972), 325-349.

Further examples, and they are numerous, can easily be taken from Ernst Voulliéme's work on the early Cologne printings.¹⁵ As these examples make manifest, each *bursa* kept to its own tradition. Over the years, in the *bursa laurentiana* the books designated for the arts curriculum were studied and lectured upon with the help of the works of Albert the Great, whereas in the *bursa montana* the writings of Thomas Aquinas were used. The massive use of the works of Albert and Thomas is also documented by the library catalogue of 1474, listing at least 456 works in 342 volumes, one third of which contain the writings of the two schoolmen.¹⁶ Not surprisingly then, the *bursa laurentiana* soon became a stronghold of Albertism, while the *bursa montana* was seen as the symbol of the thomistic tradition.

As to the second category of works distinguished above, a number of treatises that were published in Cologne deal explicitly with the debate between Thomists and Albertists. A special case in point is the *Tractatus problematicus* of Heymericus de Campo, written in the mid 1420s. In eighteen elaborate *quaestiones disputatae* it not only reports the controversy between the schools from an Albertistic point of view, but also contributes itself to the debate. Already soon after its publication in 1428 it was considered an important work of reference, as is testified by the many citations to it in other writings throughout the fifteenth century. In addition, mention should be made of the Thomistic response to Heymericus, the *Tractatus concordans* written in 1456 by Gerard of 's-Heerenbergh, as well as of the *Promptuarium argumentorum* (Cologne 1492), the *Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae* (Cologne 1494), and the small treatise *De proprietatibus elementorum* (Cologne 1496). All these works are of great importance for our understanding of the debates between Thomists and Albertists and their philosophical background.¹⁷

¹⁵ E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*. See also A. G. Weiler, *Heinrich von Gorkum*, 110f.

¹⁶ J. Stohlmann, 'Insignis illic bibliotheca asservatur'. Die Kölner Professoren und ihre Bibliothek in der Frühzeit der Universität', *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter*, ed. A. Zimmermann (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 20), Berlin-New York 1989, 433-466, esp. 455-457. For a listing of the works mentioned in the catalogue, see H. Keussen, 'Die alte Kölner Universitätsbibliothek', *Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins* 11 (1929), 138-190, at 163-189 (Anlage 1).

¹⁷ For a discussion of the *Tractatus problematicus* and the *Tractatus concordans*, see G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus* II, and my *Heymeric van de Velde. Eenheid in de tegendelen* (Geschiedenis van de Wijsbegeerte in Nederland, 4), Ambo, Baarn 1990. As to the other works mentioned, see E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, s.v.

Of the works named, the last three are virtually unknown. In this paper it is my intention to study in some detail the anonymous *Promptuarium argumentorum*, written for the young students (*scholares novelli*) of the Arts Faculty.¹⁸ My original interest in this treatise was to see whether it was compiled by Heymericus de Campo, as some of the modern literature suggests. Yet, I have found nothing to support the view that he is the author of the *Promptuarium*, although the work depends on his *Tractatus problematicus* in some points, as we will see below. For the time being, therefore, the author remains anonymous. Also there is no evidence as to exact date of composition, which must be somewhere between the mid 1420s (the date of the *Tractatus*) and 1492 (first edition of the *Promptuarium*).¹⁹

By moving our attention to the *Promptuarium*, we will get an understanding of the different logical and metaphysical notions that shaped the minds of the students in the first years of their training. We will grasp tendencies in late medieval thinking that were closely interwoven with the primary level of teaching and codified in books that were part of the regular *curriculum*. Fifteenth-century thinking is still largely unexplored. Yet, given that that century is on the threshold of the early modern period, treatises like the *Promptuarium* that show us mainstream philosophical thinking deserve close attention. Without going into the complex problem of the extent to which fifteenth-century philosophy taught at Middle and Eastern European universities shaped the thinking of the early modern period, I here would like to contribute to its future solution by investigating the currents of thought as they are present in a treatise written at one of the most important universities of the period, that of Cologne.²⁰

¹⁸ I touched upon the *Promptuarium* in my 'The Thomistic Principle of Individuation in 15th Century Thomistic and Albertistic Sources', *Medioevo* 18 (1992), 327-357. The *Reparationes* will be dealt with in a future study.

¹⁹ The *Promptuarium* is attributed to Heymericus, without any proof, by M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. 2, München 1936, 382; L. Burie, 'Proeve tot inventarisatie van de in handschrift of in druk bewaarde werken van de Leuvense theologieprofessoren uit de xv^e eeuw', *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797*, ed. E. J. M. van Eijl (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 45), Leuven 1977, 215-272, esp. 236. Unfortunately, no manuscripts of the *Promptuarium* seem to have been preserved, which makes the dating of the treatise difficult.

²⁰ On the transition of thinking from the Middle Ages to the early modern period, see among others A. Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century*, New Jersey 1986; J.-L. Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Analogie, création des verités éternelles et fondement*, Paris 1981; B. Jasinowski,

In the following I have sought to focus firstly on the nature of the *Promptuarium*, its readership, its intellectual background, and its relationship to treatises of a similar kind. Next I will discuss three topics dealt with in the *Promptuarium* that provide us with valuable information on the opposition between Albertists and Thomists: viz., the nature of logic, the theory of natural supposition, and the question of existence (*an est*). Finally the importance of the *Promptuarium* for the history of fifteenth century thinking will briefly be evaluated against the background of the evidence put forward in the course of our investigation.

2. The '*Promptuarium argumentorum*'

2.1. Preliminary remarks

The *Promptuarium* is designed as a discussion of 68 theses (*conclusiones*) that are alternately put forward and disputed by two students, Lilius and Spineus.²¹ The theses debated by them deal mainly with problems connected with the textbooks of the *logica vetus* and the *logica nova*.²² Some of the propositions concern the object of logic, others the definition, the universal terms, the subject of the proposition, the proprium, the accident, the genus, the species, or the demonstration.

The work was published by Heinrich Quentell in Cologne at least three times: in 1490-1491 (of this edition only the first part survived), in 1492, and in 1496. Heinrich Quentell was one of the most active printers of his time. Between 1479 and 1500 he produced more than 200 books, among which were not only the writings of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas,

'Leibniz und der Übergang der mittelalterlichen in die moderne Philosophie', *Studia Leibnitiana*, 4 (1972), 253-263.

²¹ The *conclusiones* discussed are grouped together at the end of the *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [kvii^r-v]: "Argumentorum sequuntur nunc conclusiones huius libelli per Lilius et Spineum alternatis vicibus propositae et disputatae (...)" Most of the *conclusiones* are listed in C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, vol. 4, Berlin 1955 (reprint of the 1870 edition), 227, nt. 293. For a complete list, see the appendix below. As is clear from the appendix, there are a few exceptions as to the alternation of the disputants. The meaning of the names Lilius (lily) and Spineus (thorn-bush) seems to indicate that the compiler belonged to the Albertist camp.

²² The works on logic that were part of *curriculum* were divided into the 'old logic' and the 'new logic'. The 'old logic' consisted of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories*, his *On Interpretation*, Boethius's *Liber divisionum*, his *Liber topicorum*, and the *Liber sex principiorum* that was attributed to Gilbert de la Porrée. The works on logic that were translated since the 1130s, viz., Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and the *Sophistical Refutations*, were called the 'new logic'.

and Peter of Spain, but also those of famous masters of the Cologne Arts Faculty, such as Lambertus de Monte, Gerard of Harderwijck, and Johannes of Harderwijck.²³ The fact that the *Promptuarium* was printed three times over a period of six years clearly shows that it had a good reputation and attracted much attention. If we further assume that each edition consisted of approximately 300 books, that in the 1490s the number of students of the Arts Faculty was about 850 each two-and-a-half years, and that not all students were able to meet the expenses of buying books and that they shared books, the *Promptuarium* was in all probability not only produced for the home market in Cologne, but also for markets abroad.²⁴

The two complete editions of 1492 and 1496 are almost identical. Only now and then, the 1496 edition leaves out passages which can be found in the version of 1492.²⁵ Also, the placement of the well-known 'little hand', used to indicate a noteworthy passage, varies in the two editions.

At first sight it is unclear whether these differences reflect a new redaction or are merely the result of inaccuracies during the typesetting process. There is also no hint of any special activity of a corrector for the edition of 1496, different from that of the 1492 version. Both editions refer to the correction process in exactly the same way: *Hoc praesens opusculum elaboratissime copulatum magnaque diligentia correctum impressum est (...)*.²⁶ Given however that these variations only regard omissions and transpositions, and have no bearing on the contents, we may assume that they originated in the printing office and not at the desk of the author or redactor.

According to the title page of the 1492 edition, the *dramatis personae* of our treatise, Lilius and Spineus, each represent a different school of thought: Lilius is characterized as an Albertist whereas Spineus embod-

²³ The three different editions of the *Promptuarium* are described by E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, 430-432, nr. 979-81. On Heinrich Quentell, see E. Voulliéme, *Die deutschen Drucker des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 2nd edition, Berlin 1922, 50; *500 Jahre Buch und Zeitung in Köln*, 23f.; S. Corsten, *Studien zum Kölner Frühdruck. Gesammelte Beiträge 1955-1985*, Köln 1985 (Kölner Arbeiten zum Bibliotheks- und Dokumentationswesen, 7), 233-240. The books published by Quentell are listed in Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, cxvi-cxxvii.

²⁴ As to these numbers, see S. Corsten, *Untersuchungen zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen*, Frankfurt am Main 1988 (Arbeiten und Bibliographien zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen, 5), 163-181, esp. 175.

²⁵ This is the case, among others, in the discussion of the very first proposition. Compare the 1492 edition, fol. Aii^v-Aiii^r, with the 1496 edition, fol. Aii^v.

²⁶ *Promptuarium*, edd. 1492 and 1496, fol. [Kvi^r] (colophon).

ies the Thomistic stand.²⁷ These epigraphs are not used in the printings of 1490-1491 and 1496. Yet, we have no reason to doubt their correctness, as the positions defended by Lilius and Spineus can also be found in other works as typical examples of the Albertistic and Thomistic way of thought. One of these is the *Tractatus problematicus* of Heymericus de Campo referred to above. Of all the questions put forward in that work, five deal with matters of logic. Four of them reappear in the *Promptuarium*, interestingly enough in exactly the same order.²⁸

As the correspondence between the *Tractatus problematicus* and the *Promptuarium* is striking, we will consider the matter in some further detail. Heymericus begins his exposition of the debate between Albertists and Thomists in the *Tractatus problematicus* with the question whether logic is theoretical or practical. The first of the two alternatives, namely that logic is theoretical, is defended by the *albertistae*, while the other is according to the *via Thomae*. In the *Promptuarium*, a similar picture is presented. There Lilius, the Albertist, maintains that logic is theoretical, whereas Spineus, the Thomist, claims it to be practical.²⁹

The same correspondence goes for the three remaining logical questions of the *Tractatus* that parallel those of the *Promptuarium*. Firstly, in the *Tractatus* the Albertists argue that the principle source of individuation is matter alone and not quantity, secondly that the question of whether a subject exists (*an est*), can be proved categorically, and finally that the middle of a scientific proof is the definition of the specific property (*propria passio*) of what is designated by the major term. In the *Promptuarium*, these three positions are all put forward by Lilius, the defender of the Albertistic stand. The opposite view, namely that matter marked by quantity is the complete and proper principle of individuation, that the question of existence can only be determined hypothetically, and that the middle of a scientific proof is not the definition of the specific property of what is designated by the major term but the defini-

²⁷ Unfortunately, the reprint of the 1492 edition, Frankfurt/Main 1992, is without the original titlepage. See however its description by Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, 431, nr. 980: "Promptuarium argumentorum dialogice ordinationum (*sic*) a Lilio Albertista et Spineo Thomista (...)".

²⁸ On the *Tractatus problematicus*, see G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus II*, 23-66; M. J. F. M. Hoenen, *Heymeric van de Velde. Eenheid in de tegengelen*, passim.

²⁹ Compare Heymericus de Campo, *Tractatus Problematicus*, Cologne 1496 (= Hain *4302), Probl. 1, foll. [avi']-bi^v, and *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, Propp. 5-6, foll. [Avii^v]-Bi^r. The problem of whether logic is a speculative or practical science will be further dealt with below.

tion of this entity taken as a whole, all attributed to the Thomists in the *Tractatus*, are maintained in the *Promptuarium* by Spineus.³⁰

Also illuminative for the determination of the intellectual background of the disputants of the *Promptuarium* is a reply of Spineus to Lilius saying that Lilius belongs to those who claim that the science of logic has argumentation (*argumentatio*) as its subject.³¹ This corresponds closely to remarks by Petrus Nigri in his *Clypeus Thomistarum*, a commentary on the *Isagoge* and the *Categoriae* that defends the teachings of Thomas written not later than 1474 in the South of Germany.³² According to Petrus Nigri, the view that argumentation is the subject of logic, which is exactly the position of Lilius, is argued for by Albert the Great.³³ It is contrasted with the view ascribed to Thomas Aquinas that conceptual being (*ens rationis*) is the subject of logic.³⁴ This again matches the position put forward in the *Promptuarium* by Spineus saying that logic is called a rational science because it deals with conceptual being.³⁵

³⁰ Compare Heymericus de Campo, *Tractatus Problematicus*, Probl. 3-5, foll. [biv^v]-[dii^r] with *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, Propp. 56-57, 66-66, 67-68, foll. Ji^r-Jiii^v, Kiii^r-[Kvi^v]. As to the question of existence, see below. Spineus's and Lilius's view on individuation is dealt with in my 'The Thomistic Principle of Individuation', 351-353. The problem of the exact middle of a scientific proof roots in the discussion of Aristotle's *Posterior analytics*, see for example Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in Posteriorum analyticorum*, Lib. II lect. 7, n. 477. On this problem see also L. M. de Rijk, 'Der Streit über das 'medium demonstrationis': Die Frucht eines Mißverständnisses?', *Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns*, ed. K. Jacobi, Leiden 1993 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 38), 449-461.

³¹ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, Prop. 5, fol. [Avii^v] (Spineus): "(...) sed secundum vos logica est de argumentatione tamquam de subiecto."

³² On the nature of the *Clypeus* and for Petrus's biography, see B. K. Vollmann, Art. 'Nigri (Schwartz), Petrus', *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters, Verfasserlexikon*, 2nd ed., vol. 6, Berlin-New York 1987, 1008-1013, at 1008-1011. That the *Clypeus* is a defence of Thomas is explicitly mentioned by the author in his letter of dedication to King Matthias Corvinus (not quoted by Vollmann), *Clypeus Thomistarum*, Venice 1481, *Epistula ad Regem*, fol. a2^r: "(...) inscribo codicem 'Clypeus thomistarum' ea potissimum ratione quod beati Thomae Aquinatis singularem incomparabilemque doctrinam adversus impugnantes quosque defendere nitar."

³³ Petrus Nigri, *Clypeus Thomistarum*, ed. Venice 1481, q. 12, fol. [f5^r]: "Quarta opinio est Alberti quod argumentatio est subiectum logicae."

³⁴ *Ibid.*: "Tertia opinio sancti Thomae quod ens rationis est subiectum in logica."

³⁵ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, prop. 4, fol. [Avii^v] (Spineus): "Non solum dicitur (sc. logica) rationalis ex parte subiecti vel actus quo dirigit rationem, sed etiam quia est circa ens ipsius rationis ad verum et falsum ordinatum."

As these examples testify, Lilius and Spineus defended positions that at the time were labelled as Albertistic and Thomistic.³⁶ More examples of a similar nature will be discussed below. There it will become manifest what the metaphysical background of the theses propounded by two disputants is; also manifest will be the fact that their positions not only differ but are diametrically opposed. What is designed by the anonymous author of the *Promptuarium* as a debate over matters of logic thus gives us valuable information on the specifics of the debates within the realist camp and on the metaphysical assumptions that lay behind them. Yet, before exploring this any further, we should return to the *Promptuarium* and have a closer look at its nature.

2.1. *The Promptuarium as an examination compendium*

Information on the nature of the *Promptuarium* can be obtained from the two-page preface, which begins with a passage from the Book of Judges (Judg. 14.12-13): 'I will now put forth a riddle unto you etc.', thereby indicating that the book's main intention is to let the two disputants, Lilius and Spineus, pose (and answer) a number of intricate questions. As was common practice, the dispute is praised as the most appropriate way to gain complete knowledge and to put one's own ingenuity to the test.

In addition, the anonymous author introduces Lilius and Spineus as students (*scholares*), who engaged themselves in a lively debate each time there were no courses for them to attend: *tempore vacationis convenientis semper*. Also, Lilius is lauded by Spineus as most sagacious in putting forward so-called *communes argumentationes*, that is, arguments that deal with basic notions, as we will see below.

Furthermore, the treatise is presented to the reader as a collection of basic theses, called *conclusiones generales*, which serves to defend successfully each possible position in the debate, regardless of the discipline: *cuiuscumque etiam fuerit facultatis*, so that the disputant can

³⁶ Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, 227, considers the *Promptuarium* to mirror the opposition between Thomists and Scotists, without adducing proof or mentioning any relevant passage or source (as is clear from his footnotes, he used the edition of 1496, which has not the additional 'albertista' and 'thomista' on the titlepage, as noted before). To be sure, in the *Promptuarium*, the position of the *scotistae* is referred to by Lilius (ed. 1492 and 1496, prop. 30, fol. Ei^r), but there is no indication that either Lilius or Spineus is to be considered as an advocate of this school of thought.

promptly respond by giving some basic statements (*ea quae communissima sunt*).

Finally, the name of the treatise, *Promptuarium*, is highlighted and two other, synonymous titles are added: *Thesaurus* and *Sacculus argumentorum*. Also, the anonymous author addresses his readership again. The treatise is compiled, he says, for the young students (*novelli studentes*), to help them to find arguments when they in their role of opponents (*opponendi tempore*) have to satisfy the orders of the *magistri*.³⁷

The most striking and repeatedly used term in the preface is that of the so-called basic notions. As P. Osmund Lewry in an essay on the thirteenth-century examination compendia has pointed out, this term goes back to chapter 11 of Aristotle's *Sophistical refutations*, where the nature of the art of examination is discussed. According to Aristotle, everyone, even the unscientific person, has knowledge of certain common principles, so-called κοινά, or in the latin translations 'communia', that have no particular nature and are not limited to a special sphere, yet are employed by all the arts. These principles can deal with every subject and every art, although knowing them does not make someone an expert of the art in question.³⁸ The passage mentioning the 'communia' was also included in the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, clearly an indication that the term was well-known at the time.³⁹

Interestingly, the notion of the common principles was used in a number of treatises from the thirteenth century that deal with basic questions of the liberal arts. In MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16.390, a manuscript that contains a number of very important logical treatises, a text has survived that in recent times has been described as *De communibus artium liberalium*, and that in its explicit has: *Haec sunt communia*

³⁷ All the above is based on the preface, *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. Aii^{r-v}.

³⁸ Aristotle, *Sophistical refutations*, 11, 172a21-b4; P. O. Lewry, 'Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia from the Faculty of Arts', *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales*, Louvain-La-Neuve 1982 (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales, 2/5), 101-116, esp. 106 n. 9. Cf. also the contribution of Claude Lafleur elsewhere in this volume.

³⁹ See J. Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Louvain-Paris 1974 (Philosophes médiévaux, 17), 332 (13). The term 'communia' or 'communa', yet with a different background, was also used to denote the *bursa*, especially at english universities, see O. Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^e siècle*, Rome 1987 (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 39), 99-102. In Paris it was also employed, and now perhaps in connection with the notion of 'communia' discussed in our paper, in the expression *examinatio in communibus*, as opposed to *examinatio in propriis* or *in cameris*, see Weijers, *Terminologie*, 391.

quibus tenentur respondere licenciandi in artibus. (...) Et ista sufficiant de communibus arcium (?) sciencie logicalis. Amen. The double use of 'communia' as a description of the contents of the treatise clearly shows that it serves as a technical term. The work in question discusses among others the books of the *logica vetus*, beginning with Porphyry's *Isagoge*. There are textual divisions with lemmata and questions about the subject matter of the books.

The same work, although in a revised and abridged version, has been preserved in MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16.617, another manuscript with important logical treatises of the thirteenth century, some of which were formerly possessed by Peter of Limoges. At the end of the manuscript, on fol. 224^v, there is a note naming the owner and describing some of the contents of the codex: *Iste liber est pauperum magistrorum de Sorbona ex legato m. Petri de Lemovicis (...). In quo continentur (...) communia gramatice et logice.*⁴⁰ The first part of the treatise referred to by the note, the *communia logice*, contains questions on the textbooks of the *logica vetus*, beginning with the *Isagoge*, as in the *De communibus artium liberalium*.

With an explicit reference to Aristotle's *Sophistical refutations*, another work from the thirteenth century, the treatise *Quoniam ignoratis communibus* ascribed to Matthew of Orléans, uses the term 'communia' in the opening sentence no fewer than three times: *Quoniam ignoratis communibus necesse est totam artem ignorare, sicut vult Aristoteles in libro Helenchorum (...) propter hoc aliquid de communibus determinare intendimus (...) nec nova et inaudita dicere volumus, sed communes distinctiones intendimus (...).* The work theoretically and fundamentally treats the problem how sophismata should be analyzed and what distinctions should be used in that process. It discusses mainly distinctions that are connected with so-called syncategorematic terms, such as 'si', 'an', and 'omnis', that is, terms that derive their signification from the words that are adjoined to them.⁴¹ Similar terms are discussed in the *Promptuarium*.

⁴⁰ The quotations from the MSS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16.390 and 16.617 are according to Lewry, 'Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia', 107 and 112 n. 28. For the title of the *De communibus artium liberalium*, see L. Delisle, *Inventaire des manuscrits latins conservés à la Bibliothèque nationale sous les numéros 8.823-18.613*, Paris 1863-1871, repr. Hildesheim 1974, 57 (Sorbonne). Compare Claude Lafleur in this volume, esp. his note 42.

⁴¹ The transcription is according to Lewry, 'Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia', 107 n. 11. For a description of the contents of the treatise, see H. A. G. Braakhuis, *De 13de eeuwse tractaten over de syncategorematische termen*, Diss. Leiden 1979, vol. 1. 29-32.

Quoniam ignoratis communibus is preserved in several manuscripts, among which is the MS Ripoll 109, a codex that contains the well-known collection of questions discovered by Grabmann, nowadays referred to as the Barcelona compendium.⁴² This compendium summarizes and discusses the textbooks that were to be read by the arts students in preparation for their examinations. Although the author of the treatise *Quoniam ignoratis communibus* does not present his work as an examination compendium, it clearly has some of the features of such a work, as it is concerned with basic questions and fundamental notions, is addressed to the inexperienced young students and does not come up with new theories but intently sticks to the opinions of known authors: *nec nova et inaudita dicere volumus, sed communes distinctiones que sepe accidunt in sophismatibus sicut posuerunt auctores nostri intendimus, ut possint proficere minores et per hoc ad maiora devenire*.⁴³ The same approach is highlighted by the author of the *Promptuarium*. He also aims at reaching the young students, and the author unequivocally states with a reference to Ecclesiastes (Eccles. 1,10) that what he offers is nothing new but part of the traditional stock of learning: (...) *Fuit itaque mens meae nihil novi suae fictae excogitare, quoniam scribitur Ecclesiastes 1 'Nihil novi sub sole', sed illud quod longis temporibus fuit inventum, hoc (...) nunc est collectum utiliori modo quo iuvenum profectibus expedire videbatur*.⁴⁴

The two other treatises mentioned above, *De communibus artium liberalium* and the *Communia gramatice et logice*, were explicitly designed as examination compendia. Some of their characteristics, especially those of the *De communibus artium liberalium*, can also be found in the *Promptuarium*. We will consider these similarities more closely, as they will give us important information on the nature of the *Promptuarium*.

First, in all the treatises, the author does not consider himself to be an 'author' in the strict sense of the word, but a compiler; that is, he relies on materials written by others, which he arranges and puts together. In

⁴² Recent work on the compendium is that of C. Lafleur, 'Logique et théorie de l'argumentation dans le 'Guide de l'étudiant' (c. 1230-140) du ms. Ripoll 109', *Dialogue* 29 (1990), 335-355, and Lafleur & J. Carrier, *Le 'Guide de l'étudiant' d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des Arts de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, Québec 1992 (Publications du Laboratoire de Philosophie Ancienne et Médiévale de la Faculté de Philosophie de l'Université Laval, 1).

⁴³ The text cited is given as in Lewry, 'Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia', 107 n. 11.

⁴⁴ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. Aii^v.

the *Promptuarium* and the *De communibus*, the word used for this activity is 'colligere', obviously a technical term.⁴⁵

Second, the compiler has put together materials stemming from various textbooks, each of which presents a particular part of the curriculum of the Arts Faculty. *De communibus artium liberalium* consists of three sections, each of which deals with a different discipline: *de logica*, *de grammatica*, and *de quadrivialibus*. Likewise, the treatise *Communiae grammatice et logice* is concerned with two different subject matters: logic and grammar, as is indicated by its title. The author of the Barcelona compendium also emphasizes that in his work he presents materials from a wide range of subjects studied by different disciplines: *<questiones> in diversis facultatibus contente*. Interestingly, this very notion of 'facultas' is also employed by the author of the *Promptuarium*. He remarks, as has been seen, that those who will use the work will be able to respond to questions from all disciplines: *cuiuscumque etiam fuerit facultatis*. Moreover, like the other treatises, the *Promptuarium* does not limit itself to only *one* subject matter, but deals with two different sets of books that were carefully distinguished in the medieval curricula: the *logica vetus* and the *logica nova*. Moreover, at the end of the treatise the author indicates that the work is not yet complete, but is to be followed by a next part dealing with physics.⁴⁶

Third, in the treatise *De communibus artium liberalium* and in the Barcelona compendium there is an explicit mentioning of the compilers's intention, viz., to provide the students with an aid to prepare their examinations. Such remarks allow us, as P. Osmund Lewry has shown, to talk about a specific class or category of texts, namely the examination compendia. The *Promptuarium* seems to belong to the same genre, as its author indicates that the work is compiled to help the students to prepare their part in the disputations, which was in Cologne as elsewhere one of the requirements for earning the degree of baccalarius.⁴⁷ Our au-

⁴⁵ The term is also used in connection with the *reportatio*, where it means to take notes or to edit, see O. Weijers, *Terminologie*, 362 n. 242.

⁴⁶ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [kvi^v]: "(...) sed reservabimus eorum plenariam determinationem usque ad maioris promptuarii completionem, in quo de rebus physicalibus mutuis confabulationibus disputare Deo annuente intendimus." Perhaps the author is referring here to the *Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae* (Cologne 1494) mentioned above?

⁴⁷ As to Cologne, see F. J. von Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln und die spätern Gelehrten-Schulen dieser Stadt*, Erster Theil, Cologne 1855, Anhang (Statutes of the Arts Faculty of 1398), 64: "(...) statuimus quod nullus admittatur ad examen pro gradu Baccalariatus, nisi prius iuraverit in manus Decani vel ejus vicesgerentis, se esse in secundo anno Studii in facultate

thor reports that he felt himself urged to write this compilation by the frequent and weeping requests for arguments by the young students who couldn't reply to the questions that were put forward by the masters as part of the scholarly disputation.⁴⁸ As such, the *Promptuarium* expands and completes the picture of the genre of examination compendia, as, in league with those compendia that summarize and discuss the textbooks, it highlights the other necessary requirement for passing the examination, the disputation.

2.3. '*Thesaurus argumentorum*'

Another clue as to the nature of our treatise is provided by its title, viz., 'Promptuarium', and the two synonyma that are mentioned in the preface: 'Thesaurus' and 'Sacculus argumentorum'. Apparently, the author wants to have his work understood as a handbook, compendium, or collection of arguments.⁴⁹ As such it is comparable to the anonymous *Thesaurus sophismatum*, published in 1495 and 1501 in Cologne, not only with respect to the title but also concerning content. Like the *Promptuarium*, the latter work deals with logic, is shaped as a disputation, and addresses the young students.⁵⁰

The title 'Promptuarium' is also used in a number of other works of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and even later. As these writings show, the title is not restricted to works of logic, but used in different fields. Yet, in all these cases there are some common features. The materials gathered are not the compiler's own work, but collected from different sources, and the book is intended to serve as a work of instruction or reference.

These features can easily be discerned in a medical handbook from the fifteenth century, called *Promptuarium medicinae*, which contains information on a great number of herbs and other subjects that are of importance for the physician, such as a listing of illnesses and their treat-

artium in hac Universitate vel alia famosa, et quater respondisse ordinarie magistris ad Sophismata et ter extraordinarie (...)."

⁴⁸ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. aii^v: "(...) saepius audiui lacrimosas petitiones pro argumentis ut opponendi tempore satisfacerent magistrorum praeceptis."

⁴⁹ According to Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, 1st ed., the literary translation of 'promptuarium' is 'storeroom', 'repository', which is clearly related to the meaning it has in the title of our treatise.

⁵⁰ A description of the titlepage is provided by Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. 4, 225 n. 288.

ment, all of which are conveniently arranged with a table of contents at the beginning and an index at the end, so that the work can easily be consulted. The German title of the book is 'Beredicheyt der artzedige', which again stresses its character as a work of reference.⁵¹

Also in the field of theology the title was used, as is exemplified by the *Promptuarium morale super evangelia festorum totius anni* compiled by Laurentius Beyerlink, printed 1614 in Cologne. In the preface the author presents the work as a motley collection (*florida*) of examples, analogies, and allegories, thereby indicating that the book is not a work of his own but a manual that can be used by those who need a felicitous piece of edifying reading or by preachers who are pressed for appropriate materials to be included in their sermons.⁵² An earlier example is the *Promptuarium morale super evangelia dominicalia* of Thomas Stapletonus, published in 1596. It was the model according to which the *Promptuarium* of Laurentius Beyerlink was designed. Again, the preface shows that the work strictly speaking has no author, but is a compilation, as the reader is urged to enlarge the book with additional texts he has gathered himself or to note down references to passages in other works that are of similar interest.⁵³

Finally, a typical aspect of our *Promptuarium*, viz., its role as a help to those who are engaged in a dispute, can also be found in the *Promptuarium catholicum*, printed many times in the sixteenth century. It is a collection of arguments based on the Scripture used by Catholics to defend their faith against the Protestants.⁵⁴

2.4. 'Disputatio tempore vacationis convenientis'

The *Promptuarium* is set up as a dispute. As this is one of the basic characteristics of the text, it is important to deal also with this feature briefly. The anonymous author refers in the preface to a disputation *tempore vacationis convenientis*. At first sight, this might refer to the so-

⁵¹ For a detailed account of this work, see P. Seidensticker, Art. 'Promptuarium medicinae', *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, 2nd ed., vol. 7, Berlin 1989, 864-867. As to the term 'Beredicheyt', see *Mittel-Niederdeutsches Wörterbuch*, ed. K. Schiller and A. Lübben, Schaan/Liechtenstein 1983 (reprint of the edition of 1875-1881), 6 vols., esp. vol 1, 242a, s.v. beredicheit (*Bereitschaft*).

⁵² Laurentius Beyerlink, *Promptuarium morale super evangelia festorum totius anni*, Cologne 1614, UB Nijmegen 394 c 74, fol. 3^v-4^r.

⁵³ Thomas Stapletonus, *Promptuarium morale super evangelia dominicalia*, Luoduni 1596, UB Nijmegen 800 c 47, fol. xx4.

⁵⁴ *Promptuarium catholicum*, 5th ed., Cologne 1594, UB Nijmegen 758 c 55.

called *disputationes vacanciales*. In Cologne, at the Theological Faculty, these disputations took place during the summer vacations and were held by the baccalarians under the direction of one of the Master of the Arts Faculty who studied theology at that time.⁵⁵ Whether such disputations were part of the Arts program is not clear from the statutes.⁵⁶ Yet, the word 'vacacio' was also used for every period there were no lectures, no matter at what time of the year.⁵⁷ Moreover, the additional 'convenientis' in the author's preface suggests that the days or times the disputants, Lilius and Spineus, were engaged in a debate were not regular and that the debates themselves were private. If the debates were regular and official, adding the word 'fitting' would make no sense, as these debates were obligatory. It therefore seems likely that the setting chosen by our author is *not* that of the *disputationes vacanciales*, but of a private discussion between two fictitious young students who engaged themselves in a debate each time they had no lectures to attend.

2.5. *The sources*

Finally, the question of the sources that have been used by the author of the *Promptuarium* should be touched upon briefly. Does the work report authentic debates, although in a fictitious setting? Some fifteenth century authors drew up accounts of the debates they attended, as is testified, for example, by the notes of Servatius Fankel, edited 1926 by Gabriel M. Löhr. The author of the *Promptuarium* may therefore have used such a work, perhaps even a notebook compiled by himself. Unfortunately, the lack of relevant source material does not allow us to investigate this possibility any further.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ F. J. von Bianco, *Die alte Universität*, Anhang (Statutes of the Theological Faculty), 36f.: "Item ordinamus quod in vacacionibus magnis fiant disputationes per Bacalarios (...) et sit presidens Magister in Artibus secularis et saltem studens in Theologia (...)". See also G. M. Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen an der Universität Köln im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert nach den Angaben des P. Servatius Fankel OP*, Leipzig 1926 (Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland, 21), 17.

⁵⁶ Von Bianco, *Die alte Universität*, Anhang, 59-73 (Statutes of the Arts Faculty of 1398) and 74-77 (Statutes of 1457). As to the Statutes of 1398, see A.-D. v. den Brincken, 'Die Statuten der Kölner Artistenfakultät von 1398', *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit*, ed. A. Zimmermann (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 20), Berlin-New York 1989, 394-414.

⁵⁷ See O. Weijers, *Terminologie*, 318f.

⁵⁸ Another notebook of the period, yet without any bearing to the *Promptuarium*, is that of Johannes Bremis, discussed and partly edited by M. Shank, 'Unless You Believe, You Shall

Notwithstanding the absence of notebooks or other materials of that kind, it can easily be established that there is a connection between the *Promptuarium* and a work that was written in Cologne in the fifteenth century and that has already been referred to above, namely the *Tractatus problematicus* of Heymericus de Campo. A textual comparison of the *Promptuarium* and the *Tractatus* shows that in all the four parallel questions the wording and the sequence of the arguments is almost identical. Yet, as the author of the *Promptuarium* does not mention his sources and thus there is also no explicit reference to the *Tractatus*, the relation between the *Promptuarium* and *Tractatus* may have been only indirect, that is, our author may not have used the *Tractatus* itself, but a work that in its turn used this treatise. This possibility cannot be wholly ruled out, especially since we don't know whether or not he used notebooks like those mentioned earlier. In fact, many fifteenth century students drew *verbatim* on the works of others in the preparation of the questions they had to defend.⁵⁹ Therefore, if our compiler had a notebook at hand, he may have caught the arguments of a disputant who drew upon the *Tractatus*. This however is not a very plausible scenario. The *Tractatus problematicus* was very well-known in fifteenth century Cologne and served as a compendium of Albertism, especially in its opposition to Thomism. Also, in 1485 the Thomistic reply of Gerard of 's-Heerenbergh, the *Tractatus ostendens*, was printed in Cologne, followed in 1496 by a printed edition of the *Tractatus problematicus* itself. If we consider the attention given to the *Tractatus*, from both the Albertistic and the Thomistic sides, it is almost inconceivable that the author of the *Promptuarium*, who in his work describes a disputation between an Albertist and a Thomist, was not acquainted with this source. Therefore, although we cannot rule out the use of a notebook, it is much more probable that he had the *Tractatus problematicus* itself at hand. If so, then we have again an important testimony to the influence of the *Tractatus problematicus*.

Having established the nature of the *Promptuarium argumentatorum* in some detail, let us now turn to a discussion of its content. As was indicated above, we will concentrate on the picture it presents of the

Not Understand'. Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna, Princeton, New Jersey 1988, 205-219.

⁵⁹ A case in point is Thomas de Strampino who in his *principium* of 1442, in the *quaestio determinanda*, anonymously summarized a question of the commentary on the *Sentences* of Marsilius of Inghen, or Georg Schwartz who in *quaestio assignata* of the 1460s word-for-word followed the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas.

Thomistic and Albertistic views on the nature of logic, the theory of natural supposition, and the question of existence.

3. *Matters of logic*

3.1. *The status of logic*

The problem whether logic is a theoretical or a practical science was generally discussed in the commentaries on the *logica vetus* of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was one of the questions that were put forward right at the outset, before dealing with the first treatise of the 'old logic', Porphyry's *Isagoge*. The *Promptuarium* follows the traditional order of the *logica vetus* closely, as has been seen, and also starts with questions concerning the status of logic including those on the theoretical or practical character of the science of reasoning.⁶⁰

The distinction between theoretical and practical sciences goes back to Aristotle. His view on the matter still dominated the framing of the problem in the late Middle Ages. According to Aristotle there are two decisive factors for determining whether knowledge is theoretical or practical: the end that is pursued and the object that is studied. Speculative knowledge is directed towards truth and deals with things that are of necessity and eternal or have the principle of motion in themselves. Practical knowledge on the other hand pursues action and is concerned with human behavior.⁶¹

On the basis of these characteristics, Aristotle classified the different kinds of knowledge in at least two large groups. Natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics were clustered as speculative sciences. Ethics and politics, as they deal with how humans are to act, were regarded as practical.⁶² Unfortunately, Aristotle did not include logic in this scheme. He considered it an all-embracing science like metaphysics, indeed, but

⁶⁰ Compare the questions listed in the appendix. For a discussion of some fourteenth-century views on the status of logic, see S. Ebbesen, 'Is Logic Theoretical or Practical Knowledge?', *Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe Paris-Vienne au XIV^e siècle*, ed. J. Biard, Paris 1991 (*Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, 69), 267-283.

⁶¹ Aristotle, *De anima*, III c. 10, 433a14-15; *Metaphysics*, II c. 1, 993b20-23; *Nicomachean ethics*, VI c. 3-4, 1139b18-1140a23; *Metaphysics*, VI c. 1, 1025b18-28. Aristotle's divisions of knowledge are discussed by W. K. C. Guthrie, *Aristotle. An Encounter*, Cambridge 1981 (*A History of Greek Philosophy*, 6), 130-134.

⁶² Aristotle also distinguishes a third but less important group, the so-called productive sciences (*Metaphysics*, VI c. 1, 1025b25).

one that functioned differently, not as a science in its own right but as a tool for all other disciplines. Thus, in Aristotle's writings the status of logic was unclear. As a result, there was room for discussion and debate whether logic was theoretical or practical, as well as about its place in the arrangement of the sciences.⁶³

One of the authors who contemplated the issue was Avicenna. He mentioned two possible answers. On the one hand, logic could be a tool or instrument of philosophy that teaches how to reason correctly, but not a part of philosophy, as it studies other things than philosophy does. It deals with essences that have being in the human mind, not with essences that exist in themselves or in singular things. On the other hand, logic could be reckoned among the philosophical disciplines, because it is concerned with truth like natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics. In this manner, it is not only a tool for reasoning, but a part of philosophy as well. As these two positions have different understandings of philosophy, Avicenna argued, it is useless to investigate the problem any further.⁶⁴

Much earlier than Avicenna, Boethius dealt with the same question; yet, unlike the Arab philosopher, he tried to bring the two positions together. Logic has as its proper work and goal the discovery (*inventio*) of valid judgment and reasoning, he argued, and only philosophy pursues this end. Therefore logic is part of philosophy. Yet, as logic helps to discover the truth that is searched for by philosophy and offers its work to all the other branches of philosophy, it is a tool or instrument as well.⁶⁵ Thus logic is incorporated in the domain of philosophy, classified as a general science, and given a proper function that is to be distinguished from the functions of other sciences.

That way, Boethius linked the theoretical and practical aspect of logic. Insofar as logic pursues truth, it is part of philosophy and consequently a theoretical science. But as a tool that teaches how to reason

⁶³ A challenge here was the Stoic division of the sciences into logic, physics, and ethics, which clearly considered logic as a science in its own right. The ancient discussion is documented by the fragments edited in K. Hülser, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker. Neue Sammlung der Texte mit deutscher Übersetzung und Kommentaren*, vol. 1, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, § 1.1.3., 22-39.

⁶⁴ Avicenna, *Logica*, pars 1, Venice 1508, reprint Louvain 1961 (*Opera philosophica*), fol. 2^{ra}-v^b. Avicenna's relation to the Aristotelian tradition is discussed in D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Leiden 1988 (*Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, 4).

⁶⁵ Boethius, *Commentaria in Porphyrium*, Lib. I, Paris 1847, reprint Turnhout 1979 (PL 64), 74d-75a. See also K. Hülser, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik*, 36-39.

well, it is practical. From this perspective, the debate between Lilius and Spineus can easily be placed. Both parties recognized that logic has a double nature, theoretical and practical, but they went separate ways concerning which aspect is primary.

For the Albertist Lilius logic is principally (*simpliciter*) a theoretical science, because it involves the intellect, not the will, and so has as its proper goal not action or production but truth.⁶⁶ In one of his arguments he points out that logic can be considered as a tool only if it is taken as *logica utens*, that is to say, as an instrument applied by the other sciences, but not as *logica docens*. In the latter sense, which denotes the genuine meaning of logic, it is an independent and purely speculative undertaking. Therefore, Lilius argues, it can be conceived of as a practical science only in a derivative sense, comparable to the way human speculative knowledge, if it is used as a means to act or to produce something, may be considered practical.⁶⁷

This view was challenged by Spineus, the Thomist. He deemed logic to be primarily practical because it pursues the practice of reasoning. Logic is not so much concerned with knowing truth or falsity, as with knowing how to *yield* truth and falsity. It directs and guides the intellect in producing knowledge and thus can be called *practica intentionalis*, active on the level of concepts, to distinguish it from the other practical sciences that guide human behavior in the outer world and that are labelled *practica realis*.⁶⁸

As has been said, the question at stake was dealt with in many contemporary works on logic. They may help when it comes to explaining the background of the viewpoints defended by the two disputants. One of these works is the commentary on the *Logica vetus* by John Versor, Master of the Arts Faculty in Paris. Versor followed the Boethian stand as he took logic to be both speculative and practical, yet he considered the speculative aspect primary and the practical secondary. Logic is speculative because it searches for truth and tries to separate truth and falsity. That way it parallels the other sciences. But logic also has a

⁶⁶ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. Avii^v (Lilius): "Dicendum quod fit (sc. logica) a nobis per operationem speculativam ipsius intellectus, non autem per operationem ipsius voluntatis."

⁶⁷ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. Aviii^r (Lilius): "(...) principaliter est (sc. logica) speculativa, licet ex consequenti possit ad praxim ordinari, sicut dicitur quod intellectus speculativus sui extensione fit practicus."

⁶⁸ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. Avii^v, and fol. Bi^r (Spineus): "(...) logica non solum ordinatur ad scire, sed ultra cognitionem veritatis dirigit intellectum practicum in productionem sui scibilis (...). Ergo est practica."

practical side. It guides the operations of the human mind which can only be exercised with the help of the will, and with the will the practical aspect comes in. Yet, as these operations lead to truth, logic basically is speculative and only secondarily practical.⁶⁹

Versor refers to Thomas Aquinas for the view that logic is secondarily practical because it steers the human mind. There are some authors, however, Versor adds, who do not fully understand what Thomas means by saying that logic is a science that guides the operations of the mind (*scientia directiva operationum rationis*). They fail to see that Thomas views logic as ultimately directed toward truth, and they take him to defend the position that logic primarily is *practical*. But this reading of Thomas is wrong, Versor says, as for the *doctor sanctus* logic is practical only derivatively.⁷⁰

The rejected reading of Thomas corresponds closely to the view that is put forward by Spineus. But why does Versor rebut this interpretation of Thomas? The answer can be found somewhat earlier in the same question. If Thomas is explained this way, his view would match that of Buridan's. Versor identifies Buridan with the claim that logic is not speculative but *practical* because it guides the mind that reasons and because every science that guides is practical.⁷¹ This means that according to Versor there are contemporary interpreters of Thomas who would like to follow the *doctor sanctus*, but in point of fact defend claims that are not his but Buridan's. The importance of Versor's remark is considerable for our understanding of the position of some of the fifteenth century Thomists. We will come back to this below.

⁶⁹ Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem Aristotelis*, Cologne 1494, reprint Frankfurt/Main 1967, fol. 6^{ra}. For biobibliographical data on Johannes Versor, see *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Ch. B. Schmitt e.a., Cambridge 1988, 839.

⁷⁰ Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem Aristotelis*, ed. 1494, fol. 6^{ra}: "(...) Sed quia huiusmodi operationes non ordinantur nisi ad cognoscendum verum, ideo non debet (sc. logica) propter hoc dici simpliciter practica sed solum secundum quid sive secundum modum. Quod non attendentes quidam dixerunt logicam esse scientiam practicam et hoc probantes per illud dictum doctoris sancti, cum tamen utique fuerit mens doctoris sancti quod propterea sit simpliciter practica eo quod est directiva rationis, sed est practica secundum quid."

⁷¹ Ibidem, fol. 5^{vb}-6^{ra}: "(...) deceptus fuit Buridanus qui motus prima ratione ante oppositum posuit logicam esse scientiam practicam et non speculativam." The 'prima ratio ante oppositum' referred to runs as follows, ibidem, fol. 5^{va}: "Arguitur primo quod sit practica, quia omnis habitus directivus operationum est practicus. Logica est huiusmodi quia dirigit in componendo, dividendo et ratiocinandi, ergo etc." The argument is taken from Buridan's *Quaestiones on Porphyry*, q. 2, as edited by R. Tatarzynski, 'Jan Buridan, Komentarz do Isagogi Porfiriusza', *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 2 (1986), 111-195, esp. 130f.

Versor himself has a different reading of Thomas, as has been seen. His interpretation, however, was not commonly accepted among the Thomists. Gerard of 's-Heerenbergh, for example, holds that for Thomas logic is purely speculative, like the other trivial arts. To corroborate this view, he cites a number of passages from Thomas's writings, most notably from the theological works.⁷² And Petrus Nigri, to mention yet another Thomistic position, claims in his *Clypeus Thomistarum* that logic is neither speculative nor practical because it is not a science in the proper sense of the word. He therefore criticizes the view that logic is speculative. Yet, he adds, if 'science' is taken broadly, logic may be called 'speculative' because it looks for truth. It may also be considered 'practical' if we regard the way it functions.⁷³

As these examples show, the Thomistic writers of the fifteenth century were divided on the matter. It is therefore not easy to pinpoint the place of an author or opinion in the Thomistic tradition. Yet, it is clear so far, that our author (in the guise of Spineus) does not follow any of the Thomists mentioned, but sticks to a view that is in line with that of Buridan.

Let us turn now to Lilius. His position (logic is speculative) is called by John Versor the view of the *expositores Philosophi*, the interpreters of Aristotle. One of the *expositores* whose commentaries were frequently used in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is Albert the Great.⁷⁴ If we now compare the view of Lilius with that of Albert, we see that they are almost identical. According to Albert, logic is part of philosophy that is primarily directed toward truth. He therefore calls it a speculative or contemplative science that teaches *how* and *in what manner* one can

⁷² Gerard of 's-Heerenbergh, *Tractatus ostendens concordiam*, Cologne ca. 1485, UB Tübingen Cd 1809 Inc, fol. AAai^{rb}: "(...) sanctus Thomas manifeste ponit logicam et alias scientias triviales esse speculativas."

⁷³ Petrus Nigri, *Clypeus Thomistarum*, ed. Venice 1481, q. 14, art. 7, fol. h3^{va}: "Dico igitur quod proprie loquendo logica non est scientia, ut superius probatur. Sed largo nomine 'scientiae' potest dici logica 'scientia', non autem proprie."

⁷⁴ I collected some materials concerning the use of Albert as a commentator on Aristotle in the late medieval period in my 'Die Intellektlehre des Johannes Buridan – Ihre Quellen und historisch-doktrinären Bezüge', *John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy*. Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy 'Medium Aevum' (Leiden/Amsterdam, 20-21 June 1991), ed. E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop, Nijmegen 1993 (Artistarium Supplementa, 8), 89-106, and my 'Heymeric van de Velde († 1460) und die Geschichte des Albertismus: Auf der Suche nach den Quellen der albertistischen Intellektlehre des Tractatus Problematicus', *L'empreinte de la pensée. Cultures et philosophies de l'Allemagne médiévale. Sources, développement, diffusion*. Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 1989, ed. A. de Libera, Bergamo 1992 (Quodlibet), 323-352.

proceed toward knowing the thitherto unknown.⁷⁵ Logic, however, also functions as a necessary tool of philosophy. As every science looks for truth, it necessarily needs logic to demonstrate how the unknown can become known. Logic thus has also a practical side, yet only secondarily.⁷⁶ Although Lilius does not refer to Albert on this point, the similarity between their views is striking and shows that his position has roots in the teachings of Albert.

But there is more to be said. As is documented by an anonymous commentary on the *logica nova* that was delivered at the University of Uppsala in the third quarter of the fifteenth century, the position defended by Lilius was regarded as the standpoint of the Albertists. According to the commentary, the Albertists claim that logic principally (*simpliciter*) is a speculative science, which is exactly the position put forward by Lilius; and the commentary also refers to the distinction between *logica docens* and *logica utens* as it was used by Lilius.⁷⁷ Likewise, the anonymous author mentions the Thomistic stand, which is in accordance with the view defended by Lilius that logic is principally practical.⁷⁸ Towards the end of the question, the author again adduces both views and adds their responses to each other in a way that reminds one of the dialogic design of the *Promptuarium* and the *Tractatus problematicus*.⁷⁹ Although the arguments put forward run parallel to those

⁷⁵ Albert the Great, *De praedicabilibus*, Lib. 1 cap. 2, Paris 1890 (ed. Borgnet, 1), 4a: "Est igitur logica una partium philosophiae generaliter dictae, quae omnis admirabilis intendit comprehendere veritatem (...)." and cap. 4, 6b: "(...) logica sit scientia contemplativa, docens qualiter, et per quae devenitur per notum ad ignoti notitiam (...)"

⁷⁶ Ibidem, cap. 3, 5a.

⁷⁷ The relevant question is edited by A. Piltz, *Studium Upsalense. Specimens of the Oldest Lecture Notes Taken in the Mediaeval University of Uppsala*, Uppsala 1977 (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, C/36), n. 44. First Question on the First Book of *Analytica Priora*, 268f: "Sed alia est opinio Albertistarum dicentium logicam in se simpliciter esse speculativam (...), et illa (sc. logica) vocatur communiter logica docens (...). Secundo consideratur ipsa logica ut est quedam noticia communis secundum vsum omni scientie applicabilis. Et hec vocatur logica utens, quia sic ea utimur in adquisicione aliarum scientiarum. Vnde logica utens nichil aliud est nisi quedam applicacio et vsus sciendi factus per logicam (...). Aduertendum tamen, quod in tali applicacione et extensione non est vera practica, quia applicacio et extensio eius ordinantur in scire in aliis scientiis, et sic semper finis logice est scire. Ergo logica potius debet dici speculativa quam practica."

⁷⁸ Ibid., 267: "(...) prima opinio dicit, quod logica simpliciter sit scientia practica, et hoc Thomistarum."

⁷⁹ See e.g. the Thomistic reaction (= prima opinio) to the Albertist view (= secunda opinio), ibid., 269: "Sed quando secunda opinio arguit: 'Illa est scientia speculativa, cuius finis est scire', respondet prima opinio: 'Quo ad finem ultimum omnis scientia speculativa speculatur suum obiectum, sed quo ad finem ultimum ordinat adhuc in proximum et ad opus'."

in the *Promptuarium* and the *Tractatus problematicus*, there are no word-for-word quotations. Rather, the arguments seem to have been phrased independently, without reliance on the two works mentioned. Apparently, they have as their source some other text or a dispute on the issue as it took place at the University of Uppsala in the late fifteenth century. If this last surmise is correct, our anonymous commentary shows that the debate between Thomists and Albertists about the status of logic was not confined to Cologne, where the *Promptuarium* and the *Tractatus Problematicus* originated, but had a much broader impact that went beyond the *bursae* of the Rhine City.

3.2. *Terms and propositions*

The second topic that sheds light on the metaphysical background of the views that are put forward by Lilius and Spineus is that of the meaning and denotation of terms that are used in a proposition. The question at stake here is whether there is a difference between the reference of terms when taken by themselves and when being part of a proposition. To give an example: The word 'man' taken by itself may refer to all human beings, that is, those that were, are, and will be. But does it also refer to all human beings if it is used in the proposition p 'man is a living being'? In medieval times, some authors refused to accept that. According to them the present tense of the verb 'is' in p indicates that 'man' refers only to those human beings who are currently living. Others however claimed that the verb 'is' in p has no existential import because it indicates an essential connection between 'man' and 'living being'. Thus they took 'man' to denote not only those human beings that are, but all in general.⁸⁰

As will be clear, for those who hold that the verb 'is' in p has existential import, the meaning of 'man' is extensional. The general term 'man' refers to a set of particulars, individual human beings, that are currently existing. Supposing that there are no human beings, 'man' has no reference and the proposition p is no longer true. If on the other hand the verb 'is' expresses an essential relationship between subject and predicate, 'man' designates a general nature that is characterized by 'being a living being'. In that case the meaning of 'man' is not extensional but intensional. The relationship between 'man' and 'living being' and thus the

⁸⁰ This is e.g. the position of Peter of Spain. The opposite stand is defended by Ockham, for one.

truth of the proposition *p* holds even if there are no human beings who partake in the general nature of 'man'. The first view may be called 'nominalistic' as it refuses to accept the existence of a general nature as separated from the individuals that share in it. The other can be labelled 'realistic' or 'essentialistic' because it claims the existence of a general nature regardless of its being participated in by some existing particular being(s).

In the *Promptuarium*, there are several passages where the views of Lilius and Spineus separate on exactly this issue. In all of them, Lilius seems to hold the 'essentialistic' view, while Spineus defends the 'nominalistic' claim. We will discuss them in order.

The first of these passages deals with the notion of natural supposition (*suppositio naturalis*). The question at stake here is whether or not a term can have natural supposition when it is used in a proposition. In the *Promptuarium*, Peter of Spain is mentioned as a source for the definition of natural supposition. Let us therefore start with his view on the issue.⁸¹

Peter of Spain defines natural supposition as follows: Natural supposition is the acceptance of a general term for all those things which can participate in the nature that is signified by it, as the term 'man' when taken by itself according to its nature stands for all men, those who have existed, those who exist, and those who will exist.⁸² Hence, natural supposition is a halfway point between *signification* and *accidental supposition*. Signification for Peter arises when the representation of a universal nature or an individual that participates in the universal nature is imposed on a single word such as 'man', while accidental supposition is the acceptance of an already significant term for all those things its contextual adjunct determines, as is the case in 'man exists'.⁸³ Now, natural supposition is unlike *signification* as it is concerned with terms that are

⁸¹ The reference to Peter of Spain is in the *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, at fol. [Bv^f] (Lilius). It is only natural that there is a reference to Peter of Spain here as his *Tractatus* was commonly used as a textbook and widely commented upon in the 15th century. For a listing of the commentaries on the *Tractatus* that appeared in print in the 15th and the early 16th centuries, see J. P. Mullally, *The Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain*, Notre Dame, Indiana 1945 (Publications in Mediaeval Studies, 8), 138-158, nrs. 52-166.

⁸² Peter of Spain, *Tractatus called afterwards Summulae logicales*, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Assen 1972 (Philosophical Texts and Studies, 22), Tract. 6, n. 4, 81: "Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus a quibus aptus natus est participari, ut 'homo' per se sumptus de natura sua supponit pro omnibus hominibus qui fuerunt et qui sunt et qui erunt." On the notion of natural supposition in Peter of Spain, see L. M. de Rijk, 'The Development of Suppositio naturalis in Mediaeval Logic', *Vivarium* 9 (1971), 71-107, esp. 71-80, and id., *La philosophie au moyen âge*, traduit du néerlandais par P. Swiggers, Leiden 1985, 185-188.

⁸³ Peter of Spain, *Tractatus*, Tract. 6, n. 2, 79, and n. 4, 81.

already significant and it is different from *accidental supposition* for its denotation is not restricted by a context, since by definition a term only supposits naturally when taken by itself.

Undoubtedly, the crucial words in Peter's definition are those saying that for a term to have natural supposition it should be taken by itself (*terminus per se sumptus*). Do they imply that a term can supposit naturally only when used outside the context of a proposition or of any other word adjoined to it? On this point modern interpretations are divided. Perhaps the best solution is that proposed by Lambert M. de Rijk. According to him, a term can be said to supposit naturally when it is actually used in a context, but when this context is ignored for the time being. Thus the natural capacity of the term to denote all individuals, which it has in common with signification, is not restricted by the use of other words in the proposition, be they adjectives or predicates, although in fact there is such a context.⁸⁴

In the *Promptuarium* it was the notion of *per se sumptus* that turned out to be problematic too. Lilius is of the opinion that it does not imply that natural supposition occurs only outside a context. He distinguishes between different senses of 'by itselfness' (*perseitas*), the first and second of which do not say that that which is taken by itself cannot be used in a context, while the third means being not conjoined but solitary. Responding to a remark by Spineus saying that *per se* indicates 'not in a proposition', Lilius retorts that when Peter of Spain employed the expression *per se*, it was not the third meaning he had in mind, but the first or second.⁸⁵ This reading of Peter of Spain clearly indicates that for the Albertist Lilius a term can supposit naturally when used in a proposition, a view that is denied by Spineus.

Insight into the Albertistic position on the relationship between a term that supposits naturally and the proposition of which the term is a part is provided by yet another reply of Lilius to Spineus. For the Thomist Spineus, the denotation of the subject of a proposition is always re-

⁸⁴ L. M. de Rijk, *La philosophie au moyen âge*, 187f. (with a discussion of other recent views).

⁸⁵ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [Bv^{r-v}] (Lilius): "Dico quod 'per se' non capitur a Petro Hispano secundum quod idem est quod 'solitarie', sicut exponitur secundum quosdam tertius modus perseitatis, sed ut accipitur 'per se' secundum primum vel secundum modum perseitatis." The reference here is perhaps to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Bk 5, cap. 18, 1022a24-36, where five senses of 'by itself' (καθ' αὐτό) are distinguished, among which are the following three: 1. that which belongs to a thing in virtue of its essence, 2. all that which is present in the 'what', 3. that which is considered apart by itself (τὸ κεχωρισμένον καθ' αὐτό). The last one implies solitariness whereas the first and the second do not.

stricted by the predicate that is joined to it, so that the subject refers in accordance with what is expressed by the proposition as a whole, that is, the *forma totius propositionis*. Otherwise, Spineus argues, one cannot explain the obvious, viz., that there is a difference between the denotation of a term when used in a proposition and when used by itself. Thus, being a part of a proposition, a term cannot supposit naturally, as to supposit naturally implies that the extension is not restricted.⁸⁶

Taking issue with this argument, Lilius claimed that the *forma propositionis* does *not* (always) restrict the extension of the subject in such a way that it cannot any longer be taken to stand for all those things it would refer to by virtue of its signification.⁸⁷ Some predicates, he added clarifying his position, do not limit the actual extension of the subject, e.g., when the predicate expresses something that is included in the essence of the subject, as in the proposition 'man is an animal'. In that case the denotation of the subject is not restricted, as the predicate is part of the signification or connotation of the word that is used as the subject. On the other hand, if the predicate applies to the subject only accidentally, then it limits the extension of the subject, as in the proposition 'man is white'. Here 'man' refers only to those human beings who are white. This however does not mean, he remarks, that in every case the predicate restricts the denotation of the subject. In other words, for Lilius the context does not always limit the reference of terms.⁸⁸

A similar opposition between Lilius and Spineus lies at the bottom of their analysis of the proposition p 'man is an animal'. According to Spineus, 'man' denotes only those human beings who currently exist, as the verb 'is' is in the present tense. Lilius however takes the verb 'is' to be atemporal. Consequently, he claims that 'man' refers to all human beings who exist, have existed, or will exist. The verb 'is' does not entail existence, but expresses an essential connection between subject and predicate. The proposition p is true, not because of the existence of an individual that can be called both 'man' and 'animal', but because the

⁸⁶ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [Bv^v] (Spineus). A similar position is put forward in an anonymous Thomistic commentary on Peter of Spain used at the *bursa montana* (the Thomistic school), see H. A. G. Braakhuis, 'School Philosophy', 9.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem* (Lilius): "Dicendum quod quamvis stat sub forma totius propositionis, tamen illa non tollit neque restringit terminum secundum rem, quin pro omnibus accipiat ad quae sua significatio se extendat."

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, foll. [Bv^v]-[Bviⁱ] (Lilius).

essence of 'man' includes the essence of 'animal'. The verb 'is' has no existential import but conveys essential being.⁸⁹

The different views on natural supposition can now easily be delineated. For Spineus the use of a word in a context always restricts its denotation. Therefore, natural supposition is only possible when the term is not used in a (propositional) context. In this way, natural supposition resembles signification, as both leave the context aside. Spineus contrasts natural supposition with accidental supposition, the latter of which concerns a term used in a (propositional) context. The word 'accidental' here means that the context itself is accidental or contingent. The denotation of 'man' can be restricted by joining the term to different predicates, but none of these is such that the joining cannot be otherwise, even in case of the proposition 'man is an animal'. Although in reality there is an essential connection between subject and predicate, on the propositional level this connection is only contingent, as it is merely a linking of words. Spineus thus sharply distinguishes between real being on the one hand, and propositional or conceptual being on the other. On the propositional level there are no *types*, but only *tokens*. This makes it senseless to retain natural supposition within the context of the proposition.

By contrast, Lilius does *not* separate natural from accidental supposition by seeing whether or not the term is used in a context. A term can have natural supposition even when used in a proposition. If the predicate says what is included in the nature of the subject, the subject has natural supposition. On the other hand, if it expresses what is only accidentally connected with the subject, the subject supposits accidentally. Lilius makes no distinction between the level of reality and that of the proposition. What is essentially connected at the level of reality is also essentially related at the propositional level. Thus for him natural supposition is possible when a term is used in a proposition.

If we now in conclusion compare Lilius's view with that of his fellow Albertist Gerard of Harderwijk, there is a remarkable difference. Gerard denies that a term can have natural supposition in a proposition.

⁸⁹ Ibidem, fol. [Bv"] (Lilius): "Dicendum quod in talibus propositionibus 'est' absolvitur a tempore. Ergo non restringit ad praesentes. Et propterea in illis propositionibus, que sunt de 'est' tertio adiacente, 'est' dicitur esse essentiae et non esse existentiae." 'Est' as *tertium adiacens* means the copula, as in 'homo est animal'. By contrast, 'est' as *secundum adiacens* indicates *existens*, as in 'man is'. Compare G. Nuchelmans, *Secundum/tertium adiacens. Vicissitudes of a Logical Distinction*, Amsterdam 1992 (Mededelingen van de Afdeling Letterkunde. Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 55/10).

It has natural supposition only when taken by itself, not when it is subjected to a predicate or any other adjunct, be it essential or accidental. In a dubium he criticizes the opposite stand, which is identical with that of Lilius—a stand based on the following three claims: 1. In the proposition *p* ‘man is an animal’ the subject ‘man’ is taken by itself, according to the first and second way of ‘by itselfness’, 2. The predicate of *p* is part of the definition ‘man’ and thus expresses its nature, 3. The subject of *p* stand for all human beings, present, past, and future, who partake in the form ‘man’. Therefore it supposits naturally.⁹⁰ Similar arguments were put forward by Lilius, as has been seen. Gerard rebuts them by saying that a proposition is always restrictive and thus always limits the denotation of the subject. The being of a term is incomplex, while the form of a proposition necessarily is complex. Therefore, when a term is used in a proposition, it is situated by the complexity of the proposition and consequently it no longer retains its original liberty to denote exhaustively.⁹¹ Thus Gerard clearly departs from the view of his fellow-Albertist Lilius and takes a stand which comes close to that of the Thomist Spineus. Apparently, among the Albertists there was no consensus on natural supposition.

3.3. The question of existence

The third and final item we would like to discuss concerns the question whether the existence of some singular thing *T* can be demonstrated categorically, that is, in a strict and absolute sense. It is dealt with in the *Promptuarium* towards the very end. The issue goes back to the second book of the *Posterior analytics*, where Aristotle lists four kinds of questions that one can ask to gain knowledge of a subject: the question of fact, τὸ ὄντι (does the sun suffer eclipse?), the question of reason, τὸ διότι (why does the sun suffer eclipse?), the question of existence, εἰ ἔστι (does a centaur or a god exist?), and the question of essence, τί ἔστι (what is a centaur or a god?).⁹² In the scholastic literature, these questions came to be known as the questions *quia*, *propter quid*, *an est*

⁹⁰ See the text as cited by L. M. de Rijk in ‘The Development of Suppositio naturalis in Mediaeval Logic (2)’, *Vivarium* 11 (1973), 43–79, esp. 70.

⁹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 70f: “(...) non accipitur terminus naturaliter nisi extra propositionem. Et ideo simpliciter verum est in propositione nullum terminum supponere naturaliter.”

⁹² Aristotle, *Posterior analytics*, II c. 1, 89b23–35.

(or *si est*), and *quid*. The question at stake in the *Promptuarium* is the third, the question of existence or *an est*.

In the commentaries on the *Posterior analytics*, this passage was elaborately discussed. Albert the Great, for one, distinguished between the question of *fact* and of *reason* on the one hand and that of *existence* and of *essence* on the other. The former have to do with propositions, while the latter are concerned with singular things. In Albert's view, therefore, the question *an est* treats the existence of a particular being. It is posed when it is uncertain whether the thing in question has being or not, be it a centaur or a God.⁹³

In the course of his investigation, Albert quotes Alfarabius and Avicenna, who were both of the opinion that the question of existence (*an est*) can only be answered hypothetically, not categorically.⁹⁴ According to Avicenna, being (*esse*) must be deduced from the being of the First Cause, which causes all being without having been caused. Otherwise there is no demonstration involved. Yet, the being of the First Cause is unknown to us and cannot be grasped by the concepts that are used in a demonstration, as it is wholly transcendent. As a consequence, the question of existence cannot be decided categorically, but only hypothetically: if we assume that the First Cause has caused T, T exists. The same opinion is forwarded by the Thomist Spineus, who likewise thinks that the question cannot be answered categorically, but only hypothetically. A different stand, however, is taken by the Albertist Lilius. He claims that the question can be decided categorically, and thus he strongly opposes the view of Spineus. Before discussing these contentions, however, it is necessary to have a short look at yet another commentary on the *Posterior analytics*, that of Thomas Aquinas.

Following Aristotle, Thomas stresses that in all the four questions we are asking for a cause or a medium on the basis of which the questions can be decided. The question of existence is no exception to that rule. If we pose that question, we immediately are looking for a medium M which determines whether a thing T does exist or not. In other words, the question 'si est T' implies the question 'si est M': is there or is there not a cause for T. If the existence of a cause can be ascertained, then the question of existence of T can also be answered.⁹⁵

⁹³ Albert the Great, *Analytica posteriora*, Lib. II, tract. 1, cap. 1, Paris 1890 (ed. Borgnet, 2), 155-158.

⁹⁴ Ibidem, 156f.

⁹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *In Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lib. II, lect. 1 n. 412, ed. R. M. Spiazzi, Turin 1955, 323b.

Now, the discussion between Lilius and Spineus is all about this medium or cause. According to Spineus it is impossible to give an absolute and necessary inference from a medium where existence is involved. The following three considerations are adduced, concentrating on the contingency of the individual thing that is caused:

Firstly, the question of existence deals with singular, contingent things. It is however problematic, Spineus argues, whether such things can be known at all and whether they admit of demonstration. Knowledge is directed towards the universal, not the singular, which can only be apprehended by the senses, as is testified by the famous words of Boethius 'sensus est singularium'. Consequently there can be no strict proof of the existence of some particular thing.⁹⁶

Next there is the problem of mutability. Only necessary and immutable things can be the object of demonstrable knowledge. The singular however is contingent and mutable, as it may or may not happen. How therefore can its existence be demonstratively inferred from its cause? If it could be proved, the contingent would no longer be contingent but necessary, which would make the question 'an est' superfluous, as the necessary exists at all times or necessarily exists from time to time, as in the case of the solar eclipse.⁹⁷

Finally, Spineus remarks, it is impossible to deduce the existence of a singular, individual thing from a cause in a necessary and demonstrative manner, as the *esse existentiae* of singular things is linked with matter, which is the root of contingency (*radix contingentiae*). Therefore, the proof of the existence of a singular thing, which has to include matter as a cause, can never be strict and absolute, as there is no necessary connection between matter and the existence of this or that individual thing.⁹⁸

Founding himself on these thoughts, Spineus concludes that it is impossible to give a categorical answer to the question of existence. As he sees it, there is a fundamental difference between the *necessary and im-*

⁹⁶ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [Kiii'] (Spineus): "Esse existentiae in singularibus est contingens. eo quod singularia sunt corruptibilia. Ergo non sunt scibilia nec demonstrabilia, ex eo quod demonstratio facit scire. Et hoc confirmatur, quia secundum Boethium 'sensus est singularium' in quo non potest esse aliqua scientia." Compare *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval*, ed. J. Hamesse, 319 (93), which has the exact wording 'sensus est singularium'.

⁹⁷ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [Kiii'] (Spineus): "Demonstratio est incorruptibile et impermutabile. Sed hoc esse principale est permutabile. Ergo non est demonstrabile, et per consequens nec scibile."

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, fol. [Kiii'] (Spineus).

mutable world that is the object of knowledge and proof on the one hand and the *contingent* domain of the senses on the other. As a result, the singular, which belongs to the domain of contingency, cannot be taken as an object of full-blown knowledge; and thus its existence cannot be demonstratively deduced from the being of an earlier cause or medium.

The opposite view is asserted by Lilius, as has already been noted. According to him, the singular can be known by the intellect, not directly but indirectly. The intellect can reflect on its experience, knowing that it is derived from sense data, which are singular. In that manner, the intellect has knowledge of the singular, which as being known does admit of demonstration.⁹⁹

As to the problem of contingency and mutability, he distinguishes between two kinds of existential being. On the one hand there is actual individual existence, which is contingent and mutable, as it is concerned with the existence of *this* of *that* singular thing (*esse existentiae actuale in singularibus determinatis et signatis*), while on the other there is the existence not of this of that individual, but of individuals in general. This second form of existential being is not contingent, and thus can be known. It does not bear on the existence of Socrates or Plato, but on individuals of the human species generally. The human species is such that its individuals can exist and indeed do exist. There exists a possibile existential connection (*habitus* or *aptitudo*) between 'man' and 'being', which is sure and lasting and thus allows for necessary proof.¹⁰⁰

Regarding the problem of deducibility, Lilius claims that existential being (*esse existentiae*) can be deduced from the causality of the First Cause, which by its goodness bestows being on all creatures.¹⁰¹ That it can indeed be inferred is clarified as follows. Existential being (*esse existentiae*) is not linked with matter, as Spineus thinks it to be, but with form. Existential being is thus on a par with essential being (*esse essen-*

⁹⁹ *Promptuarium*, ed. 1492, fol. [Kiii^r] (Lilius): "Dicendum quod singularia non sunt scibilia per intellectum secundum se consideratum quo intelliguntur universalis et abstracta. Sciuntur tamen per intellectum reflexum ad sensum."

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem* (Lilius): "Dicendum quod esse existentiae actuale in singularibus determinatis et signatis est contingens, quae contingentia tollit stabilitatem et scientiam. Tamen esse existentiae in singularibus vage designatis non est contingens, sed scibile appropinquans scibilibus veris per hoc quod ratio in illis invenit unam immobilem habitudinem inter extrema, et sic fundat ibi demonstrationis rationem." and *ibidem*, fol. [Kiii^v] (Lilius).

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, fol. [Kiii^r] (Lilius): "Dicendum quod simpliciter loquendo non potest ostendi (sc. esse existentiae) per primam causam in ratione formae, sed ostenditur per medium primae causae in quantum est causa propter quid, non absolute (quia sic est infinita, cui nullus effectus potest proportionari), sed secundum respectum quo per suam bonitatem confert rebus diversis diversum et limitatum esse."

tiae), as it is the form (*forma*) or essence (*essentia*) which gives being (*existentia*) to the singular. Consequently, when essential being can be demonstratively derived, existential being also can.¹⁰²

More than any other problem in the *Promptuarium*, the question of existence touches on the metaphysical background of the position of Lilius. Though man may be in fact unable to know everything, everything is essentially intelligible. On this ground, philosophy as the intellectual reflection on the structure of reality is given a *raison d' être* that is radically opposed to that professed by Spineus: everything in reality may become an object of rational reflection. All being is intelligible and can be deduced from the being of the first principle.

According to our treatise, as we have seen, the Albertists claim that the question 'an est' can be answered categorically, while the Thomists say it can only be decided hypothetically. The same can be found in the *Tractatus problematicus* of Heymericus de Campo. In the work of the Thomist Gerard of 's-Heerenbergh, however, a different picture is presented, opposed to that of the *Promptuarium* and the *Tractatus problematicus*. He takes issue with the claim, as put forward by Heymericus, that Albert the Great did defend the view that the question *an est* could be solved categorically while Thomas Aquinas did not. According to Gerard, things are just the other way around. Thomas Aquinas held that the question of existence could be answered categorically, not Albert the Great.¹⁰³ The precise reasons for this claim *contra* Heymericus and the *Tractatus problematicus* are unclear. But his critique reveals that, in fifteenth century Cologne, opinions were divided over the teachings of Albert and Thomas and over what was to be taken as the Albertistic or Thomistic stand.

¹⁰² Ibidem, fol. [Kv^r] (Lilius): "Idem sunt esse essentiae et existentiae. Sed esse essentiae potest proprie dicta demonstratione demonstrari. Ergo etiam esse existentiae." On the identification of 'esse' and 'existentia' among the Albertists, see e.g. G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus* I, 37-90. In the high middle ages, the most important protagonist of the notion of 'esse essentiae' was Henry of Ghent, compare S. P. Marone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, Cambridge, Mass. 1985 (Speculum Anniversary Monographs, 11), 105-129.

¹⁰³ Ibidem, fol. AAaiii^{va}: "(...) non reperiō sanctum Thomam dicere quaestionem 'an est' non esse terminabilem vel demonstrabilem nisi hypothetice, sed hoc ponit Albertus venerabilis (...)."

4. Conclusion

In the preceding we have sought to concentrate on the differing opinions about the nature of logic as they were put forward by two significant protagonists of the *via antiqua*, the Albertists and the Thomists. As has become manifest, their approach to logic is dissimilar and based on opposite metaphysical assumptions. For the Albertists (Lilius in the *Promptuarium*) the *truth* of logic prevails over the *making* of truth, the universal is more important than the singular, and the essence and existence of the individual are thought of as being completely deducible from the First Cause, which is the ideal of a *mathesis universalis*. The Thomists on the other hand (Spineus in the *Promptuarium*) highlight the *practical* side of logic—not truth but the process of *reaching* truth. They let the individual prevail over the universal, and existence over essence, and they deny that the existence of a singular can be demonstratively inferred from the cause. Unlike the Albertists, they do not let the individual be determined by its universal nature, but accept its contingency and changeability. The Thomists thus seem to prefer a ‘bottom up’ approach, while the Albertists keep to a ‘top down’ analysis, to use a modern distinction.

The Thomists share this way of doing philosophy with many nominalistic authors, especially where contingency and concern for the individual are involved. If there is truth in Versor’s remarks on the interpretation of Thomas discussed above, some Thomists were considered to be following Buridan in their understanding of the status of logic. Modern research has also pointed out that there are interesting similarities between Nominalism and the Thomists at Cologne in regard to the nature of the universal.¹⁰⁴ This seems to indicate that the antithesis of Nominalism in the fifteenth century was not so much Thomism as Albertism, with its neglect of the contingent singular and its stress on the universal nature.

What is presented as a debate over matters of logic is in point of fact a conflict between opposing schools of thought that found its way into the classroom and the disputation hall. The works of the *logica vetus* and

¹⁰⁴ H. A. G. Braakhuis, ‘Heymeric van de Velde (a Campo), denker op een kruispunt van wegen. De ‘logische’ kwestie uit zijn ‘Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam’, *Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte*, 75 (1983), 13–24, esp. 18–20. See also S. Włodek, ‘Albert le Grand et les Albertistes du XV^e siècle. Le problème des universaux’, *Albert der Große. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung*, ed. A. Zimmermann, Berlin 1981 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 14), 193–207, esp. 197.

logica nova were not lectured upon impartially, as we have seen, but in conformity with the intellectual heritage and the specific doctrinal focus that were tied to the traditions of the Albertistic and Thomistic schools. Students studied and reproduced the arguments belonging to these schools as early as the very first years of their university education. As a result, the late medieval schools of thought were built on solid foundations, which may explain their success that lasted well into the sixteenth century.

The *Promptuarium* has shown that in the camp of the *via antiqua* itself opinions were divided and sometimes even diametrically opposed. To have preserved the materials of the discussion in detail is the significance of the treatise. As such the *Promptuarium* is an important source for our understanding of the intricacies of late medieval thought, and for our understanding of the contribution of that thought to a period that was to give birth to modern philosophy.

APPENDIX

The appendix lists all the propositions that appear on the last two pages of the 1492 and 1496 editions. The numbering is ours. We also added the foliation according to the 1492 edition in order to convey the reader the length of the discussion devoted to each of the propositions. The propositions are compared with those that are given in the text and omitted words are added where necessary. Propositions put forward by Lilius are in *italics*, while those defended by Spineus are in normal type.¹⁰⁵

(1492 and 1496: Kvii^r) Argumentorum sequuntur nunc conclusiones huius libelli per Liliū et Spineum alternatis vicibus propositae et disputatae, quarum prima est ista:

- <1> *Logica est principaliter de secundis intentionibus* – (Aii^v)
- <2> *Logica est principaliter de primis intentionibus* – (Aiv^r)
- <3> *Secundae intentiones sunt subiective in intellectu* – (Avi^r)
- <4> *Logica est scientia rationalis* – (Avi^v)
- <5> *Logica est scientia simpliciter speculativa* – (Avii^v)
- <6> *Logica est scientia simpliciter practica* – (Aviii^v)
- <7> *Definitio intelligitur unico actu intelligendi* – (Bi^r)
- <8> *Definitio non potest unico actu intelligendi intelligi* – (Bi^v)
- <9> *Definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse rei* – (Bii^r)
- <10> *Definitio et definitum sunt idem substantialiter* – (Biii^v)
- <11> *Definitio et definitum sunt realiter distincta* – (Biv^r)
- <12> *Totum essentiale non dicit tertiam entitatem distinctam* – (Biv^v)
- <13> *Terminus in propositione positus potest supponere naturaliter* – (Bv^r)
- <14> *Terminus in propositione positus non¹⁰⁶ potest supponere naturaliter* – (Bvi^r)
- <15> *Signa universalis sunt inventa ad dicendum modum termini communis secundum esse quod habent in suppositis* – (Bvi^v)
- <16> *Signum universale est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad praedicatum* – (Ci^r)
- <17> *Hoc signum 'omnis' <non> potest teneri collective et distributive simul* – (Ci^r)
- <18> *Hoc signum 'omnis' non requirit plura appellata* – (Cii^r)
- <19> *Signum universale non distribuit terminum communem in supposita per accidens* – (Ciii^r)
- <20> *Terminus communis unica distributione <non> distribuit in supposita praesentia, praeterita et futura* – (Ciii^v)

¹⁰⁵ In the 1496 edition the proposition <1> is not explicitly attributed to Lilius. Also proposition <36> in both the 1492 and 1496 edition is not expressly ascribed to Spineus, but only labelled as a corollarium to proposition <35>, which however is defended by Spineus. The same goes for proposition <49>, which is not attributed to Lilius, but named a corollarium to proposition <48> put forward by Lilius.

¹⁰⁶ non] om. 1492.

- <21> *Ens est unius rationis ad substantiam et accidens* – (Civ^v)
- <22> *Ens, unum, verum, et bonum habent se sicut subiectum et propria passio* – (Cv^v)
- <23> *Passiones entis non sunt realiter ab ipso distinctae* – (Cvi^v)
- <24> *Subiectum est causa effectiva suarum passionum* – (Di^r)
- <25> *Subiectum et sua propria passio sunt simul* – (Dii^r)
- <26> *Illorum quae sunt eadem unum est proprium* – (Diii^r)
- <27> *Proprium est unum praedicabile dialecticum* – (Diii^v)
- <28> *<Proprium non habet annexum>* – (Div^v)
- <29> *Proprium est quod soli inest et conversim praedicatur de re* – (Dv^v)
- <30> *Separatio¹⁰⁷ passionis a subiecto non implicat contradictionem* – (Dvi^v)
- <31> *Accidens est unum praedicatum dialecticum* – (Ei^r)
- <32> *Magis et minus est annexum accidentis* – (Eii^r)
- <33> *Accidens bene et convenienter potest definiri* – (Eiii^r)
- <34> *Inhaerentia est de essentia ipsius accidentis* – (Evi^v)
- <35> *Accidens et suum subiectum sunt unum numero per accidens* – (Fii^r)
- <36> *Ex unione subiecti et accidentis non fit aliquod tertium ab utroque distinctum* – (Fiii^r)
- <37> *<Accidens in concreto designatum per se directe non est in genere sed solum secundario et ex consequenti per attributionem>* – (Fiv^v)
- <38> *Accidentia concretionis designata significant aggregatum ex forma et subiecto* – (Fv^r)
- <39> *Latitudo graduum in forma specifica componibilium in eadem parte subiecti est praecise causa suscipiendi magis et minus* – (Fvi^r)
- <40> (1492: Kvii^v) *Genus potest convenientissime definiri sic: 'Genus est etc.'* – (Gi^v)
- <41> (1496: Kvii^v) *Genus principalius definitur pro re et non pro intentione* – (Giii^r)
- <42> *Genus principalius definitur pro intentione et non pro re* – (Gv^r)
- <43> *Illa quae sunt eadem genere non identificantur simpliciter* – (Gvi^r)
- <44> *Genus <non> praedicatur de specie denominative* – (Gvi^v)
- <45> *Genus dicit totam essentiam speciei* – (Hi^r)
- <46> *Genus <non> potest in una specie salvari* – (Hi^v)
- <47> *Genus <non> est unum unitate reali* – (Hii^v)
- <48> *Genus est aliquod unum secundum rationem* – (Hiii^r)
- <49> *Si species est ad aliquid, etiam ipsum genus est ad aliquid* – (Hiii^r)
- <50> *Genus necessario ponitur in definitione quidditativa speciei* – (Hiii^v)
- <51> *Differentia generalis est annexum ipsius generis* – (Hiv^r)
- <52> *Differentia necessario ponitur in definitione speciei* – (Hiv^v)
- <53> *Intellectus speciei ex genere et differentia constitutae est simplex* – (Hv^r)
- <54> *Differentia praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale* – (Hv^v)
- <55> *Differentia ultima est unum praedicabile ab aliis distinctum* – (Hvi^v)

¹⁰⁷ separatio] separatio 1496.

- <56> *Materia se sola est individuationis principium* – (Ji^r)
 - <57> *Materia quantitate assignata est individuationis principium* – (Jii^v)
 - <58> *Individuum est quod praedicatur de uno solo* – (Jiii^v)
 - <59> *Aliquis homo est prima substantia* – (Jiiii^r)
 - <60> *Species praedicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid est* – (Jv^r)
 - <61> *Deus non est in*¹⁰⁸ *aliquo praedicamento* – (Jvi^v)
 - <62> *Locus et superficies non sunt distinctae quantitates specificae* – (Ki^v)
 - <63> *Superficies et locus sunt duae species quantitatis ab invicem distinctae* – (Ki^v)
 - <64> *Actualis separatio relationis a suo fundamento implicat contradictionem* – (Kii^v)
 - <65> *Quaestio 'si est' potest demonstrari etiam categorice* – (Kiii^r)
 - <66> *Quaestio 'si est' non est demonstrabilis aut solum demonstrabitur hypothetice* – (Kiii^v)
 - <67> *Medium demonstrationis potissime est definitio subiecti* – (Kv^r)
 - <68> *Medium demonstrationis potissime est definitio ipsius passionis* – (Kv^v)
- Finitur registrum.

¹⁰⁸ in] *om.* 1492.