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Its evaluation in Arab, Turkish and Israeli histories,
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The aim of this article is to analyse the scholarly and journalistic literature dealing with late Ottoman rule in Palestine (1840–1918) by Arab, Turkish and Israeli historians writing between 1970 and 1990. The ‘parties’ that were directly involved in the history of Ottoman Palestine were the Arabs as the numerically preponderant population, the Ottomans as sovereigns, and the Jews both as a small indigenous minority and also as a group of immigrants. The ‘successor’ states of these parties, the Arab states and the stateless Palestinians, Turkey and Israel regard themselves as the trustees of their ‘own’ histories, a position that is more or less adopted by their respective historians.

The broader interest of the analysis is the question of the civilizational impact of Ottoman rule and the extent to which Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century influenced the changes that Palestine has undergone in the last 150 years. The focus here is on the interpretations given by historians to the attitude of the Ottoman government towards early Zionist immigration to Palestine. In the intrusion of European imperialism and European-style nationalisms and the Zionist immigration, the Arab, Turkish and Israeli historians have found a common point of debate. They are not far removed from the ‘overheated ethnocentrism’ brought forth by the Israeli–Arab conflict after 1948.¹ Underlying the description of Ottoman Palestine the endeavour to make an early claim on post-Ottoman history can be detected.

Histories Written by Arabs

The central theme of modern Arab histories, the ‘classical nationalist-secular histories’, is Arab nationalism. Arab historians adopted from the West the argumentative patterns of a national interpretation of history and saw in the rise of the nation state the most important and worthy object of research. Arab historians focused either on the period of a pre-Ottoman,

purely Arab-Islamic past or on the late Ottoman period, as a period of failure which implied the inevitable rise of the modern nation states.² A kind of 'histoire sainte'³ was created. All peaks of Arab history were credited to the Arab nation, all low points were blamed on the Persians, Turks, or Europeans. The inherent advantage of Arab nationalism was its great mobilizing force which helped to transform the humiliation of one's own ethnic-national group into an ideology of revolt. The nationalist-secular approach was taken up in the 1970s and 1980s by historians such as Abdullatif Tibawi (1910–1981), 'Abdal'aziz Duri (1917–), Sulayman Musa (1920–), 'Abdalkarim Ghara'iba (1923–), Naji 'Allush (1935–), Rashid Ismail Khalidi (1948–).

In the case of Palestine several fields of research were subordinated to Arab nationalism: Turkish nationalism and centralism after 1908; the Zionist movement and its intrusion into Palestine since 1882; European penetration since the nineteenth century. The most important question in all these fields was the extent to which they contributed to the 'awakening' of Arab, or more specifically, Palestinian-Arab nationalism.

Arab nationalist-secular historians interpreted the past with a teleologically tinged view, searching for harbingers of Arab nationhood. After the Second World War historians continued to emphasize the continuity of the fight against Zionism. Emotionalized expressions like *ar-ra'i al-'amm* (public opinion), and more rarely *ar-ra'i al-'arabi* (Arab [public] opinion) are closely linked to *yaqza* (wakefulness, vigilance).⁴ Being awake is the first condition for the existence of a politically active population – the first and fundamental representative of that consciousness. Fundamental to these terms is the concept of an entity which is partially withdrawn from historical change and which even acquires a personal character. Arab consciousness steps on the political stage as an *actor*.⁵ During the struggle it develops its character completely.⁶ The other upholders of the *ra'i al-'amm* are journalists and writers, who represent the most forceful and visible expression of public opinion.⁷ The publicist Najib Nassar (1862–1948) and his journal *al-Karmil* (published in Haifa) are treated as prototypes of this 'Palestinian Arab awareness'.⁸ Najib Nassar's political evolution is seen as representative 'of that of numerous other Arab political and intellectual figures during this period.'⁹ Because Arab historians attribute supreme credibility and objectivity to Arab journalism, they have no reservations about using it as a reliable source. Citations are integrated directly into the argumentation without comment or correction. Khairieh Kasmieh (1937–), whose work on Zionist activities is based mainly on contemporary publicistic work,¹⁰ stresses the centrality of this source in the attempt to understand the history of the Ottoman period.¹¹

Why is Arab journalism so important for these historians? Firstly, it seems to document how early and intensive the resistance against Zionism was. Furthermore, the Arab press before the First World War is the only genuinely Arab source; it is even regarded as the only source *per se*. The inherent danger of this view is obvious: historians tend to corroborate their own opinions with those of the press.¹² Analogous to the exaltation of the Arab source material is the debasing of other, particularly Zionist sources.¹³ A further reason for the importance of the Arab press may simply be that it is the most easily accessible and utilized source, next to the archival sources of the British Foreign Office. Historians like Khairieh Kasmieh and Hassan 'Ali Hallaq (1946–) use both types of source in a kind of double-decker argumentation: whereas factual history is based on British archival material, the history of intellectual trends and ideas is supported by Arab press material. This direct and uncritical reliance on Arab press material is revealing in another regard: such an argumentation seems to derive from the underlying assumption that Arab consciousness and Arab resistance against Zionism are provided with an unchanging identity which is communicable to any Arab living in later periods.

The most common argument in Arab anti-Zionist literature is that Zionism is an appendix of imperialism and lacks any ideological originality. Common terms for the imperialist-Zionist strategy of usurpation are *matami'* (ambitious designs, schemes), *mukhattatat* (plans, strategies) and *ghazw* (incursion, aggression).¹⁴ Quite a few historians extend their rejection of Zionism beyond the Middle East and contest the legitimacy of Zionism even in the European context. They try to show that the Jews themselves are responsible for the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe.¹⁵

Research on Ottoman rule was also aligned to the premises of Arab nationalism. In the first half of the twentieth century the traditionally negative image of the Turk was transformed into a new secularist and nationalist view: Turkish despotism was to become the main, if not the only, reason for the *inhitat* (decline) of the Arab world.¹⁶ In the 1960s, when the nationalist-secularist approach flourished, historians such as Sati' al-Husri (1880–1968), Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza (1887–1984), Tawfiq 'Ali Barru (1913–), 'Abdalkarim Ghara'iba demonstrated a critical, even negative attitude towards the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman heritage was considered ambiguous at best. For a certain period Ottoman rule had protected the Arab world against European imperialism but had also pushed it into economic and cultural isolation. Ottoman rule as *istila'* (illegitimate conquest, seizure) was finally blasted off as a thin veneer by the awakening Arab nationalism. This attitude finds in the 1970s and 1980s its continuation in the reserved vocabulary of authors such as N. 'Allush, Kh. Kasmieh and S. Musa who preferred terms like *ad-dawla al-'uthmaniyya* (Ottoman state), *sulta*

(sovereign power, authority) and *saltana* (sultanate) to a personalizing view (Abdülhamid, the Sultan etc.).¹⁷ The claim that Turks were responsible for the degeneration of the Arab world and the Turkish–Arab confrontation at the end of Ottoman rule has been perpetuated by such authors as T. ‘A. Barru in *Al-Qadiyya al-‘arabiyya fi l-harb al-‘alamiyya al-ula* (The Arab Question during the First World War), published in 1989. But another group of Arab historians paved the way to a revised view of Ottoman rule when they recognized the importance of Ottoman archival sources. Representatives of this group are Layla as-Sabbagh (1924–), ‘Abdalkarim Rafiq (1931–), Butrus Abu-Manneh (1932–), Wajih Kawtharani, ‘Abdal-‘aziz Muhammad ‘Awad, Adel Manna and Beshara Doumani (1957–).

In the 1960s the Egyptian historian Muhammad Anis spoke in his monograph *Ad-Dawla al-‘uthmaniyya* (1965) of *basamat* (imprints), of the long-lasting traces left by Ottoman rule. Albert Hourani attracted attention in 1974 when he pointed out ‘how deep the Ottoman impress went and how lasting is the unity it has imposed on many different countries and peoples.’¹⁸ Whereas earlier historians had refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, latter-day historians adopted a more differentiated approach, questioning the extent of legitimacy. In Syrian historiography for example the terms *ihtilal* (occupation, with the connotation of illegitimate usurpation) and *futuh* (conquests, with the connotation of not definitely positive, but at least somehow legitimate rule) are weighed off against one another.¹⁹ The Tunisian historian Abdeljelil Temimi (1938–), who pleads for a revision of Arab historiography on the Ottoman Empire, recommends replacing the term *isti‘mar* (colonization) with *wujud ‘uthmani* (Ottoman presence).²⁰

Nationalist-secular historians stripped Islam to a varying extent of its religious meaning and reconceived it as a cultural heritage. Naji ‘Allush characterized Islam as a mere device for legitimizing the ruling order and attributed meaning and usefulness to the Caliphate only insofar as it protected the Arab world against the West for a certain period.

In the 1970s and 1980s a quite different approach gained far-reaching acceptance. The ‘Islamicizing-revisionist’ approach stresses the Islamic character of Arab history and culture. It is definitely not a new theory, having long stood in opposition to the nationalist interpretation of history. The *salafiyya*-movement, represented by intellectuals like Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) or Rashid Rida (1865–1935) can be regarded as a precursor of this approach, which was continued after the Second World War in the Neo-*salafiyya*, including such journalists as Anwar al-Jundi (1906–). Islamicizing authors do not dismiss the positions of classical nationalist-secular historiography about Arab identity and resistance against

contention.⁴⁸ Hassan Hallaq characterizes Abdülhamid's negative reply as the 'peak of the Ottoman resistance against Jewish colonisation'.⁴⁹ Certain authors obviously regard the rhetorically impressive utterance as an anticipatory *anti-Balfour Declaration*.

The deposition of Abdülhamid II has been one of the central themes in Islamicizing-revisionist historiography since the beginning of the 1970s.⁵⁰ An alliance of European states, the Zionist movement, Freemasons, *Dönmes* (crypto-Jews) and Young Turks had arranged the deposition of Abdülhamid and brought about the fall of the last bastion against the imperialist-Zionist designs of expansion. Nationalist-secular historians like Zeine Nouraddin Zeine (1909–), Tawfiq Barru, Muhammad Salim or Suhayla ar-Rimawi⁵¹ also supported the thesis of a Zionist-crypto-Jewish-Young Turk collaboration or even conspiracy. But it did not form the core of their argumentation. The extent of conspiracy was limited to the contacts between pro-Zionist *Dönmes* and Young Turks.

For proof of the conspiracy revisionist historians very often draw on the reports by the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Gerard Lowther, and particularly on a report from May 1910.⁵² The fact that Lowther described Germany as the driving force of this conspiracy is ignored. Rather, Great Britain is cast into the part of the imperialist villain, with Great Britain and the Zionists urging the Young Turks to topple Abdülhamid. Both had their reasons: Great Britain wanted to bring about the fall of Abdülhamid because of his collaboration with the Germans, the Zionists because of his intransigence in the question of Zionist-Jewish immigration to Palestine. Hassan 'Ali Hallaq's *Mawqif ad-dawla al-'uthmaniyya min al-haraka as-sahyuniyya, 1897–1909* (The Ottoman attitude towards the Zionist movement, 1978) develops this thesis in its most complete form. His monograph, explicitly devoted to the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the Zionist movement, does not, however, deal with the structure of Ottoman rule either in Istanbul or in Palestine. The reader is left in the dark as to how Ottoman decisions were made, how they were carried out. The Ottoman Empire as system of rule remains a *black box*. Because works like those of Hallaq are based rather exclusively on the existing secondary literature, they do not provide a deeper insight. After an exhaustive presentation of the diplomatic activities of the Zionist movement, Hallaq confines himself to the frequent statement that the 'Sublime Porte did not alter its attitude towards Zionist plans and Jewish immigration'.⁵³ That the author exposes Zionist diplomatic activities ignoring their factual effects on the situation in Palestine, very likely reflects the fact that he consulted only secondary literature.⁵⁴

Obviously, the aim of Islamicizing-revisionist literature is to show that Abdülhamid promoted an Islamism which presupposes the leading role of

the Arabs. The conspiracy of Young Turks, Freemasons and Zionists against Abdülhamid and his downfall usher in the phase of Young Turk rule. The Young Turks bear the whole responsibility for Arab–Turkish alienation and the first successes of the Zionist movement.

Histories Written by Turks

The founders of the Turkish republic in 1923 propagated a patriotic nationalism, designed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Although contrary to historical truth, their declaration of Anatolia as the ancient homeland of the Turks was politically farsighted. Official and semi-official historiography adopted Anatolia as the heartland of the Turks and Ottomans. The history of the Ottomans in the Arab world was ignored or seen as an aberration. Representative of this early attitude is the biographical account of Falih Rıfkı Atay (1894–1971), *Zeytindağı* (The Mount of Olives, 1957), first published in 1932. Projecting the Kemalist ideology retrospectively, he argued that the Turks should have concentrated all their energies on Anatolia instead of acting as clumsy imperialists.⁵⁵ Remarkably, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Zionist immigration to Palestine was of no concern to Atay.⁵⁶

In the 1940s the Ottoman Empire, discredited as an *ancien régime* in the first years of the Turkish Republic, became the main object of Turkish histories, but only as part of general Turkish history, embedded between the Seljuks and the Turkish Republic. The dominating institution in Turkish republican history writing became the *Türk Tarih Kurumu*, the association of Turkish historians, founded in 1931. The numerous works that were published by the *Türk Tarih Kurumu* could be labelled as ‘imperial history’. They were written from a hegemonial, central perspective, Istanbul being the centre of the Ottoman Empire. The standard works of this time attributed significance to the Arab areas only in the period after 1913, i.e. after the final loss of the European domains. No mention is made of the complex issue of Zionism, Palestine and the Jews. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1891–1980) in his ten-volume study *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi* (History of the Turkish Revolution) (1940–67) deals extensively with European colonial history and mentions in this context the Zionist foundation congress in Basel 1897, i.e. as part of European history and not as a political factor in Ottoman history.⁵⁷ Enver Ziya Karal (1906–81) who wrote the fifth through eighth volumes of the encyclopaedic *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ottoman History) (1947–62)⁵⁸ speaks only cursorily of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire and Palestine. Again Zionism is perceived neither as an autonomous political actor nor as an aggressive and subversive factor in the Ottoman Empire. The semi-official histories up to the 1970s with their nationalist-patriotic and secular orientation, which included an anti-Arab attitude, saw Palestine and

the Zionist movement only as marginal factors in late Ottoman history.

In the course of political pluralization in Turkey since the 1950s history writing diversified and intensified, often turning to marginal fields of research. Both the urge to integrate the Ottoman Empire as a legitimate and essential part of Turkish history and, more particularly, the political *rapprochement* with the Arab world after the Israeli–Arab war of 1967 led to a reassessment of Turkish–Arab relations. Since the 1980s quite a few authors have disputed the charge that the Turks alone were responsible for the Turkish–Arab rift in the course of the First World War. Nevertheless they want to put an end to the reciprocal accusations of guilt. Historians such as Halil İnalcık (1916–), Kemal Karpat (1926–), Ömer Kürkçüoğlu (1946–) have commented on Turkish–Arab relations; historians such as Engin D. Akarlı (1945–) and İlber Ortaylı (1947–) have analysed the efficiency and merits of the Ottoman regime in the Arab world. In step with the *rapprochement* with the Arab world the number of works dealing with the Palestinian question has increased. Authors like Türküya Ataöv (1932–), İrfan Acar, M. Lutfullah Karaman and Said Şamil have generally adopted the Arab anti-Zionist position.⁵⁹

Another field of research opened up when the debates concerning the status of non-Muslim communities in the empire, the *millet*s, intensified, particularly with regard to the transformation of the *millet* system during the nineteenth century. Zionist–Jewish immigration to Palestine has gained some significance in the context of the status of Ottoman Jews. Historians like Bilal Eryılmaz (1950–) and Gülnihal Bozkurt (1953–) have dealt with this question. Yet, only one Turkish historian, Mim Kemal Öke (1955–), has devoted a greater part of his research directly to the subject of the Ottoman Empire as an opponent of the Zionist movement.

Islamicizing literature in Turkey is likewise no longer a marginal field of study. The primary concern of this apologetic, sometimes aggressive literature is the defence of the Ottoman Empire. Closely linked with a positive characterization of Abdülhamid II is the change in the assessment of Zionism. As in Arab Islamicizing-revisionist historiography, Zionism is viewed as a conspiracy of Freemasons, Dönmes, Ottoman Jews and Young Turks to deliver Palestine to the Zionists. An outstanding representative of this school is Cevat Rifat Atilhan (1892–1967/69?) who wrote about 70 books on the influence of Jews, Freemasons and other ‘destructive forces’ in the Ottoman Empire. The journalists Cemal Anadol and Lütfü Akdoğan are of a similar orientation. These writers cultivate a laicistic-turkistic, even Atatürkistic, stance, combined with a more or less manifest Islamicizing diction. Hikmet Tanyu (1918–), Salih Özcan and Ziya Uygur, who taught in the theological faculties of Turkish universities, cultivated a turkistic argumentation with an Islamicizing tone. Less extreme are the works of

Samiha Ayverdi (1906–93) and Yılmaz Öztuna (1930–). All these authors might be categorized as advocates of a ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ (*Türk-Islam sentezi*).

Halil Berktaş (1947–) depicts Turkish history writing around 1935 in a threefold manner: ‘It resisted European imperialism, it turned against the old regime of the Ottoman Empire and fought against the competing nationalisms of those who disputed Turkey’s rank in the region.’⁶⁰ Turkish historians still seem to cling to this world view. Mim Kemal Öke, for example, argues that the whole of the Western world, blinded by the topos of the ‘terrible Turk’, believed in the false Armenian arguments.⁶¹ If one looks more closely at this ‘defensive self-image’ of Turkish history it splits into two parts. On the one hand the historical achievements of the Ottoman Empire are defended. Under the common Ottoman umbrella the different peoples found protection; the Arabs were protected from European colonialism. Despite its most heterogeneous ethnic and religious composition the Ottoman Empire afforded a life in peace and tolerance.⁶² This positive self-image stands in juxtaposition to the image of a Turkish nation pestered and almost brought to its knees by European imperialism, a nation in the first line of nations that successfully resisted imperialism. These two self-images can easily co-exist. Yet, how shall the transition from the first to the second be explained? The transformation of the Ottoman *millet* system into a pattern of opposing nations is indicative of this change. At the beginning there is a kind of Ottoman-Islamic *contrat social*, the ‘classical’ relationship between the Sultan and the *dhimmi*. The European politics of penetration and usurpation however destroys the harmonious and stable power structure and leads to the torn and conflict-laden character of today’s Middle East. In comparison to present-day inter-communal conflicts the Ottoman achievements in providing tolerance and harmony can be re-assessed.⁶³ This exceedingly positive judgement is not convincing, however, because it implies that European politics single-handedly and intentionally destroyed the *millet* system.

The refutation of historical responsibility is cloaked in a call for objectivity, even ‘truth’ in Turkish historical research. M.K. Öke compares the position of Turkish historiography in the debate about the Armenian question with the fate of Kepler and Galileo. Only time will show who is right – the truth will be revealed by Turkish efforts.⁶⁴ Öke’s interpretation of objectivity takes its cue from Atatürk’s exhortation to assume a critical position towards Western scholars and to use a ‘national filter’.⁶⁵ The Turkish histories of Palestine are dedicated to the same concern.⁶⁶

Histories Written by Israelis

Since 1948 Israeli historians have had a close bond with European and

particularly Anglo-American historical tradition. The *curricula vitae* of the outstanding Israeli historians show that almost without exception they were either born in Europe or completed parts of their education at Western universities. Thus Israeli historical writing fits well into the discourse of Western scholarship. The division of labour among Israeli historians seems to render a clearer structure than among their Arab or Turkish counterparts. The research on the Yishuv and Eretz-Israel, devoted to inner-Jewish history in Palestine, forms a large and eminent field. Part of this field is made up of studies, which are orientated towards geographic-historical research. This group, represented by authors such as Yehoshua Ben-Arieh (1928–) and Ruth Kark (1941–), is characterized by a broader approach and the integration of socio-economic methods. A second field is those parts of Oriental and Ottoman studies that deal with Palestine.

Certain terms occupy a central position in Israel's historical consciousness. These are highly emotional and entirely positive terms which are not only important for understanding Israeli history, but they also illuminate the self-image connected with these terms. The term *Eretz Yisra'el* (Land Israel) is not only the Hebrew word for 'Palestine', but, so to speak, the 'counter term' to 'Palestine'. It expresses the Jewish character of Palestine and must be understood as 'homeland Israel'. The '*aliya*', the 'going-up' (to Jerusalem), is more than mere immigration.⁶⁷ Basically the Aliyah is conceived as an uninterrupted line of immigrations ('*aliyot*') since the beginning of the Jewish diaspora, but in today's usage it stands for the Jewish-Zionist immigration waves since 1882. The term *yishuv* (inhabited place, and secondarily population) not only signifies the Jewish population in Palestine, but also implies the enrootedness of the Jewish population.⁶⁸ Present-day terminology differentiates between the 'old Yishuv' (*yishuv yashan*), the small Jewish community in pre-Zionist Palestine, and the 'new Yishuv' (*yishuv hadash*), who were Zionist immigrants. The often encountered term *yishuv yehudi* (Jewish Yishuv) is actually a pleonasm, because the Arab population is never described as 'Arab Yishuv', but as 'Arab', 'Muslim', 'Christian' or 'local' population (*ukhlusiya 'aravit*, *ukhlusiya muslemit*, *ukhlusiya nosrit*, *ukhlusiya meqomit*).

Early Zionist historians did not distinguish between scientific research and political activity. Ben-Ziyon Dinur (1883–?) for example saw himself as a serious historian and at the same time a propagator of the Zionist idea.⁶⁹ The 'Jerusalem School', formed by important scholars at the Hebrew University in the 1920s, aimed to build up a national self-image as opposed to traditional self-perception as a religious community. Contrary to the Eurocentric Jewish historians of Europe, they proposed that Eretz Israel should become the focus. Not the differences but the homogeneity of the different diasporas should be stressed.⁷⁰ The fundamental concern, however,

was to establish the 'unity of Jewish history' (*ahadutah shel ha-historiya ha-yehudit*) and the 'continuity' (*rezifut*) and 'centrality' (*merkaziyut*) of the Jewish population in Palestine over 2000 years. In the 1930s and 1940s Zionist historians wrote several memoranda in which they tried to prove the unbroken contact of the Jewish people to Palestine during the Middle Ages and the early modern age.⁷¹ The schema of a threefold rhythm in Jewish history, developed by Dinur, expresses clearly the teleology of Zionism: the existence of a people with a land is followed by exile which ends with the successful return to Eretz Israel.⁷²

In the newly founded State of Israel, historians overcame their Eurocentric and Yishuv-centred approaches respectively and turned their attention to the Jewish diasporas outside Europe and Israel. Historians also abandoned the previous tone of suffering and studiousness in favour of heroically minded history.⁷³ This change in focus was magnified by the massive immigration of Oriental Jews to Israel and was reflected in the foundation of institutes like the Makhon Ben-Zvi le-heqer Qehillot Yisra'el ba-mizrah (Ben-Zvi-Institute for the Research in Jewish Communities of Oriental Countries) in 1948.

Historians such as Yizhak Ben-Zvi (1884–1963) and Shmuel Ettinger (1919–1990?) pursued the classical Zionist dogmata of the continuity and singularity of the Yishuv.⁷⁴ Ben-Zvi's oeuvre is in this regard representative. This well-known historian and former president of the State of Israel wanted to prove the originality of Jewish agriculture in Palestine. He believed Jewish agriculture to be preserved in Arab Fellahs whom he considered to be partially descendants of ancient Jewish farmers.⁷⁵

A sub-branch inside national-orientated Yishuv studies tries to legitimize the Zionist movement on a national-religious basis. Zionism is described as a seamless continuation of the preceding religious-minded immigration waves. Representatives of this orientation are Chaim Zeev Hirschberg (1903–74) and Mordechai Eliav (1920–), who both carry on the classical Zionist concept of *merkaziyut* and *rezifut*, but see the beginning of modern Jewish history in Palestine in the immigrations of the eighteenth century.⁷⁶ Eliav sees the nationalism of the new Yishuv as developing out of the traditional holding onto Eretz Israel (*ziqa*) by the old Yishuv. His understanding of Jewish history as a tight-rope walk between destruction and redemption repeats the periodization of Ben-Zion Dinur. With the beginning of the British Mandate the third and last phase sets in – the restitution of the Jewish homeland to its rightful owners. This view of Palestine as the scene of Jewish return makes it a 'receptacle ... bound to feature as capable to receive; a fortiori, as being empty and at the same time fit to accommodate those who would come.'⁷⁷

Historians such as Gabriel Baer (1919–82), Isaiah Friedman (1921–),

Jacob Landau (1924–), Shimon Shamir (1933–), Moshe Ma'oz (1935–) and Amnon Cohen (1936–) work in a field where historical, Oriental and Ottoman studies combine. For example, the early oeuvre of Moshe Ma'oz at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s is still heavily influenced in perspective by Yishuv studies, but his work belongs to Ottoman studies with regard to source material. In contrast to Yishuv studies, which are mostly written in Hebrew, these historical studies address an international research community. Uriel Heyd (1913–68), who founded Ottoman studies in Israel, exercised a strong influence on the following generations.⁷⁸ Among his students were Amnon Cohen and Alexander Carmel (1931–). Well-known representatives of Israeli Ottoman studies today are David Kushner (1938–) and Haim Gerber (1945–). The beginning of a collaboration between the three fields, Yishuv studies, history and Ottoman studies, could be dated with the conference 'The History of Palestine and its Jewish Population during the Ottoman Period' at the Hebrew University in summer 1970.⁷⁹

The close bonds with international, particularly Anglo-American, historians makes Israeli historical writing fit easily into Western discourse, a fact which is judged positively by Israel Kolatt (1927–). As an offshoot of studies in the Western world, the study of history in Israel is endowed 'with a respectful attitude to facts, an appreciation of analysis based on documentary evidence, and a rejection of any self-serving myths ... Israeli historiography functions in a free society ...'⁸⁰ Yaakov Shavit (1944–) shares the opinion that 'Israeli research is free of ideological inhibitions or apologetics.' The towering objectivity of studies in Israel stems not only from the high scientific standard, but also from the right to exclusive representation. Therefore only Israeli historians can give a comprehensive view of Palestine's history: 'Thus, it is Israeli research that has made the largest contribution to the writing of the history of the non-Jewish groups and population that lived in the land from antiquity to modern times.'⁸¹ Zionism as a messianic ideology turned into a secular nationalist movement thus seems still to affect parts of present-day Israeli historical writing. The teleological attitude inherent in classical Zionist ideology can also be discerned in the work of Yehoshua Ben-Arieh. In his opinion Zionist settlement, beginning with the 1880s, exerted the most dominating influence on the country's geography. Although the Zionist stamp on the country would not become visible before the British Mandate, the foundations were laid in Ottoman times, particularly in the agricultural domain. 'Any systematic study of events in the latter years of Ottoman rule in Palestine, from a point of view of historical geography, must give prime consideration to the early stages of Zionist settlement to understand subsequent developments.'⁸²

Current Israeli historiography is generally distinguished by its scientific and careful procedure. Nevertheless it might be rewarding to examine whether and to what extent the effects of classical Zionist ideology persevere in Israeli historical writing. An important dividing line in the history of the Jewish people in Eretz Israel and the diaspora is the beginning of the First Aliyah in the year 1882. The periodization according to the Aliyot shows the influence of European history – the first and second Aliyahs were both triggered by pogroms in Tsarist Russia. The Aliyot-orientated periodization between 1882 and 1914 is still dominant in Israeli and international historiography about Palestine. Important socio-economic changes from the end of the Egyptian occupation 1839–40 until the First World War were subordinated to processes that were real or imaginary forerunners of the Aliyah. Because agriculture was conceived as the basis of the new Zionist-Jewish society in Palestine, its development was carefully charted. The independent rise of a capitalist economy in Palestine that was connected with the integration of non-Zionist, even non-Jewish economic segments was ignored. Meanwhile, the beginning of the First Aliyah is accorded a more differentiated assessment: a large number of the immigrants in the first two Aliyot stood in the tradition of religious immigration; the old Yishuv grew and passed through a phase of modernization as did all Jewish communities at that time.⁸³ However, the First Aliyah has not lost its ideological importance completely.⁸⁴

The image of a turn of history, the restoration of Palestine to a Jewish Eretz Israel, together with its integration into the European world, is subliminally reproduced in current Israeli histories: An 'exterior view' (Palestine as an Ottoman province with all its faults and underdevelopment) is combined with an 'interior view', in which Jewish-Zionist history unfolds. The pre-Zionist period is characterized by the term 'backwater', that signifies the remoteness of Palestine and its neglect by the authorities during the Ottoman period. This assessment acquires an unwarranted absoluteness through the normative language employed in Israeli and pro-Israeli histories.⁸⁵

The change from the exterior to the interior perspective corresponding to the transformation from Ottoman rule to the beginning of European domination, accompanied by Zionist immigration, is conceived as a *peripeteia*.⁸⁶ Thanks to European and Zionist efforts Palestine awakens from its agony and establishes contact to the world economy in a, so to speak, natural and self-evident process.⁸⁷ The building up of oppositions, such as Yehoshua Ben-Arieh's contrasting the desolation of Old Jerusalem with the order and cleanliness of New Jerusalem,⁸⁸ serves to illustrate the achievements of the Zionist movement, although the rise of modern quarters was common to all cities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The

so-called desertification thesis takes to extremes this comparison between pre-Zionist Palestine and the revived Palestine under the Zionists. This thesis, which has long since fallen into disuse in serious Israeli historiography, maintains that Palestine under Islamic rule and the Ottomans desertified and was no longer cultivated in most areas. More recently the topos has been nonetheless repeated by the pro-Israeli authors David Landes (1924–) and Joan Peters.⁸⁹

Certain Israeli historians use a comparable device in the characterization of Palestine's different population groups. The Palestinian population is usually subdivided according to a religious classification, as Muslims, Christians and Jews. This is certainly useful. Ottoman administration, e.g. in providing demographical surveys, also categorized population in this manner.

Mordechai Eliav's monograph about the Yishuv in the nineteenth subdivides Palestinian population in a horizontal and vertical direction.⁹⁰ Both ways of categorization disregard the Arabs as a factor. The horizontal categorization describes communities like Muslims, Christians and Druzes. Christians are described as being for the greater part 'old-established inhabitants who speak Arabic and do not differ in their way of living and their trades from their neighbors, the Muslims' (p.14). The vertical categorization divides the population along social affiliations: like Bedouins, fellahs, townsmen, again Druzes and a small stratum of Turkish officers and civil servants (compare p.11: *ha-ukhlusiya nihlaqa le-bedviyim (nodadim) u-le-toshave qeva' ba-qefarim u-va-'arim*). The term 'Arab' itself is not used in the introduction (pp.xi–xv) and in the chapter about Palestine's population (*toshavey ha-arez*) (pp.10–15). It is employed merely as an attribute (compare pp.11–12, 275–6: Arabic language, Arab towns, Arab notables). The Arab population is generally described as the 'local population' (p.xii: *ukhlusiyat ha-arez*; p.11: *ha-ukhlusiya ha-meqomit she hayta be-rova muslemit-sunit*; p.441: *ukhlusiya meqomit*; p.448: *ha-ukhlusiya ha-lo-yehudit*).

In her monograph Jaffa, Ruth Kark does not once use the term 'Arab' itself (except in a citation, p.16) until p.52.⁹¹ Again 'Arabness' appears only in the form of attributes or composites: p.15: 'Arab-Muslim regions of Asia'; p.31: 'Arabic and Turkish notables'; p.32: 'Greek-orthodox Arabs'; p.42: 'Arabic language'; p.45: 'Arab kaymakam'; p.51: 'Arab elite'. The Palestinian population of the 19th century is categorized on p.43 as 'foreigners, Jews and local Arabs'. More frequent, however, is the categorization of the Arab population according to religious criteria: p.16: 'Muslims and non-Muslims alike'; p.20: 'Muslim and Christian inhabitants'; p.22: 'Muslim population'. In the chapter 'Demographic and Social Features' (pp.156–203) the population is categorized into the three groups

'Muslim community', 'Christian community' and 'The Jews' (pp.6, 18, 20 respectively). The activities of the European missionaries are integrated into the chapter about the Christian community.⁹² Categorizing according to denomination places Christian Arabs closer to Christian Europeans than to Muslim Arabs. It is certainly inaccurate to subsume Muslims and Christians under the heading 'Arabs' without mentioning the internal frictions. But it is even less appropriate to separate Muslims and Christians into completely different categories. The Arab population, never described as Arabs, is referred to as *local Arabs*. The term insinuates that the Arabs do not belong to Palestine, but that a small group out of the total number of Arabs accidentally lives in this place. The categorization according to religious communities ignores the ethnic existence of the Arabs. Quite the contrary, the twin meaning of 'Jew' as a religious communitarian *and* ethnic term confers on the Jewish population in Palestine a more concrete and comprehensive reality.

This tendency in Israeli history and political science to *fragmentize* the others has been repeatedly criticized, for example by G.W. Bowersock in his assessment of intentional biases in Israeli studies of classical antiquity. He particularly objects to the attempt to describe Palestine as a fragmented area before the unification under the Romans.⁹³ Alexander Schölch criticized the tendency of Israeli political scientists to describe the Palestinians as a fundamentally fragmented and underdeveloped society that was modernized and homogenized by the Jewish state.⁹⁴

The corruption of the Ottoman authorities in Palestine is frequently stressed.⁹⁵ The advantages of such an argument are obvious: first the Ottoman regime is discredited; secondly the Zionists' disrespect of Ottoman restrictions can be characterized as legitimate.

The teleological interpretation of history, dominant in classical Zionist historical writing, has been modified by the more subtle conception of historical evidence. In dichotomizing between a pre-Zionist period of agony and a Zionist period, Jewish-Zionist immigration becomes the prime mover of progress, or at least a natural concomitant of Western influence and Palestine's integration into the world economy. The fragmentation of Palestine's population profiles the Jews as the most homogeneous group. Israeli histories of Palestine before the First World War vacillate between an classical Orientalist perception (Ottoman Palestine as a region of the Middle East) and a national-historical view (Eretz Israel as part of Israel's early history). We may describe the tendencies to dichotomize and fragmentize the Arabs and to discredit the Ottoman rule as Orientalist devices, while the interior history of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement in Palestine is made part of Israeli national history.

MONOPOLIZATION AND EXCLUSION

Different procedures regulate the definition and classification of one's own history. One of these procedures is the employment of the complementary mechanisms of monopolization and exclusion.

This procedure is manifest in the question of the authenticity of other nationalisms. A nationalism seems to be genuine if it is the independent outcome of a national consciousness and if it can claim to have recruited national forces. But are the claims of Arabism, Turkism and Zionism mutually exclusive? Many historians share the view, rarely explicitly expressed, that the authenticity of only one of these nationalisms confers the 'right of primogeniture'.

Historians such as Kemal Karpat object that the theories of nationalism, developed in accordance with European history, have been transposed onto the Middle East without further examination.⁹⁶ William Haddad also demands a revision of the Eurocentric view that sees in the emergence of nations in the Middle East an unavoidable and even desirable process.⁹⁷ Both objections have in common that one's 'own', 'real' history of the Middle East has not been sufficiently taken into consideration. Certainly, Europe penetrated the Middle East not only in the form of imperialism and economic expansion, but also with ideological concepts, one of the most important being nationalism. But even if nationalism was brought by European imperialism – does it not seem obvious that regional protagonists adopted this new nationalism because it was so seductive as an integrative force? Many historians working on the Middle East and Palestine are primarily concerned with tracing the emergence of its nationalisms. They are very easily trapped by one of the paradoxes – one might say also 'self-serving fallacies' of nationalism: the temptation to extend the history of an imagined nation into a pre-national community or entity. Arabism, Turkism and Zionism, even if they may have existed in embryonic form before the intrusion of European nationalism, were 'enslaved' by the dominating model of European nationalism.⁹⁸ One would have to ask whether European intellectual concepts *induced* similar but modified concepts in the Middle East or whether they were *imposed* on the Middle East without corresponding to the given circumstances.

The history of Zionism is quite uncontested in two regards: Zionism arose in a European context, and it collided subsequently with Arab nationalism in Palestine. There is a lack of consensus, however, on the extent to which the European context was influential, on the authenticity of Zionism and the nature of the clash. David Landes stresses that, even without European-Jewish influence, Zionism would have been created by endogenous forces within the Yishuv. The 'traditional' view of history

only a limited amount of duties on the Arabs and was, because it lacked a nationalist ideology, of a fundamentally tolerant nature. Its successor, however, the regime of the Young Turks, wanted to push through its new conception of uniformity and homogeneity, the principle of *cuius regio, eius lingua*. But as Gellner says: 'It is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a wilful cultural *Machtbedürfniss*; it is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism.'¹⁰⁴ The revealing remarks of Youssef Choueri (1948–) about the effects of the Tanzimat corroborate Gellner's assessment. Ottoman reform policies considerably influenced the emergence of Arab national consciousness. The concept of a fatherland with definite borders and a distinct history and identity came into being in the Arab world in the 1850s and was indebted to the Ottoman reforms: 'The theoretical pronouncements and practical measures, generated by the Tanzimat period, made the transition to the adoption of a particular notion of the nation-state possible.'¹⁰⁵

Another subtle version of the procedure of monopolization and exclusion is the claim of objectivity. Arab,¹⁰⁶ Turkish¹⁰⁷ and Israeli historians often stress that they strive for objectivity. That may be laudable, but does not guarantee objectivity. Even the disclosure of one's premises – a self-critical and sovereign act – does not overcome deep-lying subjective attitudes. The quality of works where the claim of objectivity is pronounced ranges from the incredibly miserable efforts of Hikmet Tanyu to the sincerity of Abdeljelil Temimi. Historians who emphasize their own efforts to be objective often assert their intention to correct other interpretations, subjective and distorted by personal interests as they are.

Quite often the historian sides with one of the historical actors, without necessarily renouncing his own claims to objectivity. Such partiality alone need not prevent a dialogue with other parties. It is when historians systematically reject and exclude other historiographies that they block mutual reception. Even several decades after the end of classical colonialism, David Gordon's assessment still rules: 'And history as science is to be rewritten in combat against the pretended scientific history of the colonizer, a history whose ideological bias is to be revealed by the use of the same historical methods the colonizer employs against the colonized.'¹⁰⁸ Topoi are retorted with anti-topoi.¹⁰⁹ Historians explicitly refute other histories on behalf of their own nation's struggle against colonization and usurpation. But such an attitude denies the relevance of other factors and exempts the historians from responsibility for their own work.

In this context it is relevant that the existing literature has become so abundant. The plethora of secondary literature ostensibly authorizes selectivity. But obviously there exists a *canon of selectivity* so that a

selection of certain titles is absorbed again and again. Many historians, particularly Arab, are convinced that all the knowledge gained by their own historians is irrefutably correct. In order for these findings to affect political consciousness and action, they need only to be disseminated to a satisfactory degree. Progress in research is attained when this canon is absorbed (and to a small or minimal extent enlarged) and handed down. Thus a corpus comes into being that perpetuates itself relentlessly while at the same time withdrawing from those common aspects of debate that are communicable to the others.¹¹⁰ This circumstance is all the more valid as secondary literature itself tends to be abused to purvey ideologies and to make selective argumentation easy. In this way primary sources cease to have a 'rectifying effect' on scholarship. Thus, two things seemingly so far apart as the claim for objectivity and the selective use of secondary works are both subjugated to the complementary procedures of monopolization and exclusion.

Other procedures of splitting history into binary equations are such oppositions as determinism–non-determinism and continuity–discontinuity. The anti-empirical concept of determinism is the belief that historical processes are shaped by human beings, yet without free will. An associated concept is the belief that the more an event can be explained as unavoidable the nearer the historian is to the truth. Closely related to the deterministic explanation is the idea of a teleological development that unavoidably leads to the last step of history. A final failure, therefore, is a priori excluded because – against all appearances – history progresses unswervingly on its way. In such a view empirical verification will always remain superficial: 'Teleology is a form of faith capable of neither confirmation nor refutation by any kind of experience; the notions of evidence, proof, probability and so on, are wholly unapplicable to it.' A variation of this teleological view is the image of a 'timeless, permanent, transcendent reality'. Intellectual images are in this way reified, even personalized as actors and movers of history. In the course of this small treatise the reader has already encountered specimens of such a 'metaphysical' approach. Classical Zionist historical writing took an overtly teleological view of Jewish history as progressing towards fulfilment in the form of the State of Israel. When Arab historians constructed an Arab (or Islamic-Arab) 'consciousness' which was located beyond history, they displayed a great affinity to the view of a 'self-consistent, eternal, ultimate structure of reality'.¹¹¹

Alongside such clear concepts determining the character of the argumentation as a whole, one can find in most studies fragments of determinist explanation. These fragments are mostly linked with an 'idealistic-voluntaristic' complement. With the help of these two *per se*

opposing procedures, responsibility and innocence *vis-à-vis* the past are determined. Deterministic concepts assume that the more an event can be characterized as inevitable the less it can be challenged and the less responsibility can be attributed to any of the participating actors. Voluntaristic explanation can assign guilt but also merit. If both concepts are combined the following differentiation can arise: 'other' history is mostly characterized as determinate; one's own positive history described as self-determined, self-accomplished. History can also be split into voluntaristic and deterministic periods: the belief in the conspiracy of European imperial states bases on the image that the actors agreed voluntarily on a common politics of infiltration and destruction. The actual process of destruction, however, is a mechanical process that is impossible to stop. In these conspiracy models responsibility can be assigned easily because of the conspiratorial agreement at the beginning. The deterministic process, however, can be neither subdued nor resisted.

The concept of an inescapable historical development surfaces particularly in two questions: the Turkish-Arab alienation during the First World War and the inevitable success of the Zionist movement. In his account of the Turkish-Arab alienation Ömer Kürkçüoğlu uses the term *kaçınılmaz* (unavoidable).¹¹² The belief that the Turkish-Arab bond had to dissolve furnishes remarkable advantages in the present-day political argumentation: the emergence of the Turkish and Arab nation states as inevitable events cannot be criticized. After the historical period of necessary alienation is completed one can turn to each other again without mutual reproach.

The Zionist idea was originally a 'utopia'. Did not Armenian nationalism, which originally wanted to establish itself as Zionism in the Ottoman domain, have the same chances as Zionism? As Alexander Schölch remarks, Zionism was only one of the movements that aimed at the 'restoration' or 'colonization' of Palestine. Its success beyond the others, which was not assured until the Mandate period, was a 'result of the constellation in World War I and the partial identity of interest of British imperialism and the Zionist movement'.¹¹³

Another procedure of monopolization and exclusion is the claim or the denial of continuity. Here, one is asserting one's own legitimacy and disqualifying the others'. Some historians go to extremes. Rafiq an-Natsha condenses the time of Ottoman decline into the period which stretches from the year 1871 (death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha) to 1876 (Abdülhamid's accession to the throne). Under Abdülhamid decline had already progressed too far to alter the course.¹¹⁴ An-Natsha, who wants to integrate the Ottoman Empire into the universal history of a forceful Islam, is anxious to ascertain a very brief period of transition from the powerful Islamic-Ottoman Empire

to an entity endangered by European aggression.

Generally, the most simple procedure is to extend the periods in history that are regarded as positive and to condense negative periods. In the same way one will either reduce the other's history to short disruptive periods of continuity or deny any continuity. Arab historians writing about the origins of Jewish culture vary this scheme somewhat. In their eyes the negatively defined diaspora, devoid as it is of national consciousness, creates a disposition to vagrancy. The period of the diaspora is enormously extended. Periods of Jewish presence in Palestine get reduced to short intermezzi. The continuity of Jewish presence in Palestine and Jewish claims on Palestine are cut off. In contrast, Arab presence in Palestine is significantly expanded. The Israelites thus are late-comers and aspirants of minor right. In Walid Khalidi's view Palestinians at the turn of the century saw themselves not only as the descendants of the Arab conquerors but also as descendants of the 'indigenous peoples who had lived in the country since time immemorial including the ancient Hebrews and the Canaanites before them.'¹¹⁵ An antipode of, however, considerably less quality to Khalidi's book is Joan Peters' monograph *From Time Immemorial*. Published one year later it explicitly aims to defeat the thesis of Arab and other historians that the refugees of 1948 were Palestinians 'excluded from plots of land inhabited by them from time immemorial'.¹¹⁶

Israeli and Arab historians, however, concur in their view that the period since 1882 has been shaped by the Zionist-Arab confrontation and in their concern to analyse the effects of Zionist politics. The end of Ottoman rule represents in Arab and Israeli historiography the beginning of the modern history of Palestine and Israel. One example of this orientation is the otherwise balanced and detailed article by Sabir Musa about the Ottoman land reforms. The introductory segment places the analysed period completely into the context of the later success of Zionism. A perspective that would take into account other possible developments is excluded right from the start.¹¹⁷ The Zionist-Arab confrontation at the end of the nineteenth century is embedded in different contexts. Israeli and pro-Israeli historians tend to interpret the clashes as a continuation of traditional Arab disregard and of sporadic Arab and Ottoman repressions.¹¹⁸ The Lebanese historian Hassan 'Ali Hallaq, however, characterizes the attacks of Bedouins on Safad in the sixteenth century as being in the tradition of the later Zionist-Arab confrontation in the nineteenth century.¹¹⁹

The procedures of monopolization and exclusion are founded to a large extent on selective perception. Foreign and disturbing elements, even when as a whole not related, are subsumed under a negative conglomerate that can be excluded. From unrelated entities similar elements (or those regarded as similar) are extracted and then interpreted as a compact single positive

entity. Accessory or even inseparable parts of these extracted elements are simply ignored. The polarizing procedure of monopolization/exclusion allows but one adversary. That generally implies either that two or more adversaries are subsumed into one conglomerate or that all adversaries except one are ignored. Arab proponents of conspiracy theories divide the Ottoman past into a positive part (Ottoman-Islamic Empire with the inclusion of Abdülhamid) and into a far smaller, but extremely negative part (the Young Turks) that is assigned to a Zionist-imperialist conglomerate. Israeli historians generally perceive Ottoman rule as a *quantité négligeable*. In the description of the Palestinian Jews' sufferings during the First World War, Ottoman rule becomes the hostile counterpart whereas the Arab population disappears. Cemal Pasha's regime receives extremely negative evaluation in Israeli and Arab historiography. There seems to be more at stake than the wish to describe the depressing time of the First World War in Palestine and to have the sufferings of one's own community acknowledged. Arab and Israeli historians dispute (of course not in direct communication) which population group suffered more under Cemal Pasha's harsh rule.¹²⁰ The end of Ottoman rule is the starting point for the British Mandate and the aggravated Zionist-Arab conflict. Whoever can claim to have suffered more under Ottoman rule believes he has strengthened his claim to national self-realization.¹²¹ Even in Turkish historiography the rule of the Young Turks receives a partially negative treatment. The fight for independence after the First World War and the resulting Turkish Republic belong to the canon of an unconditionally positive history. The Ottoman Empire, despite all its degenerative aspects, receives a positive judgement. The regime of the Young Turks serves as a short, condensed period of transition which absorbs all negative aspects of Turkish history. The Young Turks' rule ruins the Ottoman Empire and makes the Turkish Republic an inevitable solution.

CONCLUSION

Certainly it is difficult to speak of *one* Arab history. Historians in the Arab world have different views and their research runs the gamut of quality. Arab historiography as a whole, however, views the period 1840–1918 as the period in which Arab and Palestinian national consciousness finally crystallized in the fight against European-imperialist penetration, the nascent Zionist movement, and Ottoman rule. More distinctly than in Turkish or Israeli historiography one can perceive a double-fold argumentation. On the one hand nationalism is interpreted as an act of self-defence which emerges as a morally incontestable response to foreign aggression. On the other hand it is helpful in the contest of competing

historical claims, to fix a very early national 'awakening' in order to strengthen the case for a nation state. The most obvious examples of this argumentation are to be found in the debate about the genuineness of Zionism. Whoever is able to prove an original national consciousness acquires the right to just allocation in the quota regulations of world history. Zionism, therefore, is conceived as a purely complementary force of European imperialism and, therefore, a profoundly immoral movement. Arab nationalism is understood in an idealistic line of argumentation as a primogenitary national identity which meets the challenge of Zionism and European imperialism in an act of completely self-aware and continuous defence. Bearers of resistance and consciousness are not the discredited elites of the Ottoman period, but the 'people' and the intellectuals (writers, publicists, poets).

The Islamicizing-revisionist tendency, that is mostly of a propagandist nature and has gained ground since the 1970s, deviates from the nationalist-secular positions in two regards. Arab nationalism is in its view only a variant of the Islamic-Arab *umma*. Secondly, it integrates the Ottoman Empire (excluding the Young Turks) as an Islamic-Arab-Ottoman creation (devoid of Turkish elements) into the positive heritage of the *umma*. This holistic view leads to a polarizing interpretation of history and a high proneness to conspiracy theories. The continuity of the Islamic-Ottoman Empire, that finds its apotheosis with Hamidian rule, lasts until 1908. Abdülhamid was brought down by an enormous conspirational coalition. The enmity between Turks and Arabs after 1908 derives from the actions of the Young Turks who were infiltrated by Zionists and Freemasons. The Young Turks' repressive policies and particularly Cemal Pasha's terror regime pushed the Arabs into the arms of the Britains. Therefore, neither Arabs nor Turks are responsible for the failure of the Arab-Turkish symbiosis but rather the puppet regime of the Young Turks who are either atheists or Dönmes. Young Turks as the stooges of Zionists and European imperialists have driven the Arabs into a constant *nakba* (catastrophe) since the end of the First World War. This line of argument possesses undreamt-of advantages: all negative (and remarkably ahistorical) elements can be stuffed into the short period 1908–18. The Turks can be either exonerated or blamed depending on whether the Young Turks are characterized as part of the Ottoman-Turkish heritage or not. In this way a canon emerges that has considerable inner strength but that brings itself into discredit historiographically.

Turkish histories defend the 'Palestinian case' only to a small extent. Palestine is part of imperial Ottoman history. In the works of Turkish historians since the 1970s the following position has become dominant: the very good status of the non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire is

the litmus paper that proves the merits and the efforts of the Ottoman Empire. Zionist immigration, because it was supported by European imperialism, is conceived as an intrusion into 'Ottoman-Jewish coexistence' and was thus resisted by the Ottomans. The attitude of the Ottomans towards the Zionist movement seems to have become more relevant because its treatment can lead two self-images to converge: the image of the Ottoman imperium that acted in the tradition of 'tolerance' and 'liberality', built the harmonious *millet* system and allowed the immigration of Jews fleeing from anti-Semitic Europe, and the Turkish nation state that emerged in the fight against imperialists and other adversaries. Most historians would accept that this transformation certainly took place: from an imperial and multi-ethnic power to the defensive and fragile structure out of which Turkey would emerge as the core element. What is missing, however, is the admission that the Ottoman Empire in its first centuries acted very similarly to the European powers that would become dominant in the nineteenth century. Its simultaneous role as multinational imperium and anti-imperial nation corresponds less to reality than to historians' efforts to find a satisfying transformation from the first to the second image. Turkish historians want to defend their past and the legitimacy of their territorial possessions.

Israeli histories are characterized by a certain division of labour. The Yishuv-studies that devote themselves to the internal national history tend to marginalize the Arab population and reduce Ottoman rule to a process of fading away. By contrast Zionist-Jewish immigration and the concomitant European penetration are taken as inevitable and positive elements. Jewish immigration and the Ottoman restrictions against it form part of the Jewish-Zionist fight for national self-assertion. Geographic-historical studies, political histories and Ottoman studies follow, in decreasing intensity, these argumentative lines. The dichotomization between a pre-Zionist Palestine, doomed to stagnation, and the sudden beginning of Zionist immigration and European intrusion, the fragmentation of the non-Jewish population in Palestine, and the discrediting of Ottoman rule seem to be Orientalist interpretations of the 'exterior' history of Palestine. The 'interior' view of Jewish-Zionist history, however, forms part of the national history and hagiography. The developments evident in the establishment of the State of Israel are traced back to the nineteenth century on slender threads. Israeli historiography therefore acquires the advantage of writing about a Jewish history that was finally positive (in Palestine!) and which has only to be confirmed as such.

The aim of this small treatise has been to show how a relatively marginal historical issue – the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards Zionist

immigration – can yield clues about the respective interpretative positions of Arab, Turkish and Israeli historians. The views of the historians are often not only contradictory, but incompatible. While they do adopt certain elements of consensus shared by the international research community, they use these findings not as a basis for research work but as new bricks in the argumentative walls they build up around their histories. Many Turkish and Arab historians see their work still as an act of historical rectification of Western academic studies, particularly Oriental Studies. Israeli historians embed the study of Zionism in a deterministic background shaped by the teleology of classical Zionist writing. That Arab historians are involved in a struggle to revise history and even the past itself perhaps explains the distinctly idealistic character of their writing. Turkish historians have only an indirect link to the history of Palestine. Yet, the Palestinian question represents for them the chance to integrate two opposing self-images (a powerful empire and an anti-imperial nation state).

If an historical consensus does emerge it is hoped that it will not be based on false premises about respective motivations and goals. The Turkish-Arab *rapprochement*, as being forged by the Islamicizing-revisionist historians, indicates that historical issues may not be resolved but only reformulated for new political ends.

NOTES

1. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze.
2. Rifāat Abou-El-Haj, 'The Social Uses of the Past. Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.14 (1982), p.188.
3. Maxime Rodinson, 'Développement et structure de l'arabisme', in M. Rodinson, *Marxisme et monde musulman* (Paris 1972), p.599.
4. For example, for frequent use: Hassan 'Ali Hallaq, *Mawqif ad-dawla al-'uthmaniyya min al-haraka as-sahyuniyya, 1897–1909* (Beirut 1978), pp.228, 229 (2x), 231, 235, 240, 248, 255. There exist some subvariants: Khairieh Kasmieh, 'Najib Nassar fi jaridatihi al-Karmil (1909–1914), ahad ruwwad munahadat as-sahyuniyya', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, Vol.23 (1973) [=1973a], p.112: 'ar-ra'i al-mahalli' or pp.109, 110: 'ar-ra'i al-'amm al-'arabi fi l-kharij' = 'the public opinion outside of Palestine'; Suhayla ar-Rimawi, 'Ar-Ruwwad al-'arab wa-l-qadiyya al-filastiniyya', *Qadaya 'arabiyya*, Vol.7, No.11 (1980), p.162: 'ar-ra'i al-'amm ash-sha'bi'. The term 'ar-ra'i al-'amm' is generally reserved for the Palestinian or Arab population. Only Khairieh Kasmieh refers several times to an 'Ottoman public opinion': Kh. Kasmieh, *An-Nashat as-sahyuni fi sh-sharq al-'arabi wa-sadaduha 1908–1918* (Beirut, 1973) [=1973b], pp.120, 124, 130: 'ar-ra'i al-'amm al-'uthmani' or 'ar-ra'i al-'amm at-turki'.
5. As examples might be given: Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), p.3: 'Ar-ra'i al-'arabi yutabi'u tatawwur...', p.3: 'al-wa'i al-'arabi qad adraka'.
6. Kh. Kasmieh (1973a), p.119: The 'shabiba', who are the 'qiyadat ar-ra'i al-'amm' take upon themselves the resistance against the the Zionist danger; Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), p.87: 'wa-ma'a anna ar-ra'i al-'amm kana muttafiqa 'ala khuturat al-mas'ala as-sahyuniyya'; Naji 'Allush, *Al-Haraka al-wataniyya al-filastiniyya amama al-yahud wa-s-sahyuniyya, 1882–1948* (Beirut, 1974), pp.88ff: the Palestinian people (*sha'b filastini*) and the Arab

- consciousness (*al-wa'i al-'arabi*) are from the start the antagonists of the Zionist movement; H. Hallaq (1978), p.233: 'wa'i al-fallah al-filastini wa-yaqzatuhi li-l-khatr as-sahyuni'; Rafiq an-Natsha, *Sultan 'Abd al-hamid ath-thani wa-Filastin. As-Sultan alladhi khasara 'arshahu min ajl Filastin* (Cairo, 1990), p.176: Arab protest against Zionist immigration in the year, 1900 'adullu dalalatan qati'atan 'ala l-wa'i al-filastini al-mubakkir', similar p.177.
7. Examples given: Kh. Kasmieh, *An-Nashat as-sahyuni* (1973b), p.68: they are the 'tanbih ar-ra'i al-'amm'; S. ar-Rimawi (1980), p.162: 'hamlat at-taw'iya bi-l-khatr as-sahyuni' by the press; Rashid Khalidi, 'The Role of the Press in the Early Arab Reaction to Zionism', *Peuples Méditerranées*, Vol.20 (1982), p.106: 'The press played a major role in this development of the Arab attitude to Zionism...'; Muhammad 'Abdalqadir, *Nakbat al-umma al-'arabiyya bi-suqut al-khilafa al-'uthmaniyya: dirasa li-l-qadiyya al-'arabiyya fi khamsin 'aman, 1875-1915* (Cairo, 1985), p.47: 'as-sahafa la'abat dawran hamman fi iqaz ash-shu'ur al-watani'.
 8. S. Seikaly, 'Unequal fortunes: The Arabs of Palestine and the Jews during World War I', in W. al-Qadi (ed.), *Studia Arabica et Islamica* (Beirut, 1981), p.402; Kh. Kasmieh, 'Al-Muqawama al-'arabiyya li-s-sahyuniyya awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani, 1908-1917: al-ittijahat ar-ra'isiyya', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine*, Vol.29-30 (1983), p.387, footnote 68, equates 'ar-ra'i al-'amm' with the journal al-Karmil.
 9. R. Khalidi (1982), p.109.
 10. Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), particularly pp.69-80, 99ff, 114f, 136-46, 154-75, 175-90.
 11. Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), pp.67, 87.
 12. Example given: H. Hallaq (1978), p.323: The Arab newspapers of that time confirm that the reproaches of a collaboration between Jews, Zionists, Freemasons and Young Turks are true.
 13. Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), p.4 and H. Hallaq (1978), p.12, value the monograph of Neville Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1977), as fundamentally subjective and partial, because the author used the Zionist archives in Jerusalem.
 14. N. 'Allush (1974), passim: 'matami' sahyuniyya'; N. 'Allush, *Al-Haraka al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya. Nushu'uha, tatawwuruha, ittijahatuha* (Beirut, 1975), p.16: 'ghazawat al-isti'mar al-gharbi' at the beginning of the nineteenth century; S. ar-Rimawi (1980), p.160: 'al-matami' as-sahyuniyya', p.161: 'mukhattatatum as-sahyuniyya'.
 15. Tawfiq 'Ali Barru, *Al-Qadiyya al-'arabiyya fi l-harb al-'alamiyya al-ula, 1914-1918* (Damascus, 1989 [1965]), p.316, makes the Jews responsible for the persecutions because of their unwillingness to integrate and their retreat into the ghettos; one finds an attenuated version of this argument in 'Abdal'aziz Muhammad 'Awad, 'Hijrat al-Yahud ila Filastin wa-mawqif ad-dawla al-'uthmaniyya minha', *Majallat al-kulliyat al-adab*, Vol.3, No.3 (Riyadh, 1973/74), p.156, where he enumerates five reasons for the failed integration of the Jews, only two of which are not of their own doing.
 16. Ulrich Haarmann, 'Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity. The Arab Image of the Turk from the 'Abbasids to modern Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.20, No.2 (1988), p.187.
 17. N. 'Allush (1974), pp.77, 109; Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), passim.
 18. Albert Hourani, *The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East* (London, 1974), p.2; likewise Muhammed Yousef Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York, 1988), p.44.
 19. Ulrike Freitag, *Geschichtsschreibung in Syrien, 1920-1990. Zwischen Wissenschaft und Ideologie* (Hamburg, 1991), pp.230f.
 20. Abdeljelil Temimi, 'Arabes et Turcs dans le cadre de l'Empire ottoman', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine*, Vol.17-18 (1980), pp.76, 92.
 21. See for example H. Hallaq (1978), pp.59, 125, 136, 274, 340; R. an-Natsha, *Al-Isti'mar wa-Filastin: Isra'il wa-mashru' isti'mari* (Amman, 1984), pp.3ff.
 22. H. Hallaq (1978), pp.35, 46ff, 87; 'Abdal'aziz Muhammad ash-Shinnawi, *Ad-Dawla al-'uthmaniyya dawla islamiyya muflara 'alayha* (Cairo, 1980-83), p.1481; R. an-Natsha, *Al-Islam wa-Filastin. Muhadara* (Beirut, 1981), pp.53ff; R. an-Natsha (1984), pp.3, 55.

23. H. Hallaq (1978), pp.27f, 33f, 44, 46, 85, 106, 239, 286; Urhan Muhammad 'Ali, *As-Sultan 'Abd alhamid ath-thani. Hay atuhu wa-ahdath 'ahdihi* (Ar-Ramadi, Iraq, 1987), pp.247f; but see the objective argumentation by 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), p.974.
24. For example R. an-Natsha (1990), pp.93, 102.
25. M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.171.
26. R. an-Natsha (1981), p.61.
27. For example: H. Hallaq (1978), pp.121, 142, 145, 179, 216, 232, 267; M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), pp.15, 38, 205, 210, 212; Muhammad Harb, *As-Sultan 'Abd alhamid ath-thani: akhir as-salatin al-'uthmaniyyin al-kibar, 1842-1918* (Damascus, 1990), pp.113-62 passim.
28. For example: Ahmad Sidqi ad-Dajjani, 'Hartzil wa-'Abd alhamid', *Qadaya 'arabiyya*, Vol.2, No.1 (1975), pp.80, 87, 91; H. Hallaq (1978), p.61: 'mu'amara duwaliyya', pp.255 and 263-346 passim: 'mu'amarat sahyuniyya'; 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), pp.985, 992, 996; M. Harb (1990), pp.60, 77, 235, 279. Extremely often in R. an-Natsha (1990), 'mu'amarat': pp.14, 33, 46, 51, 53, 60, 182; 'ta'amur': pp.14, 33, 56, 91, 170, 181, 185; 'ta'amaru': p.24; 'muta'amiruna': p.60; 'dasa'is': pp.53, 56; 'makida, maka'id': pp.56, 58.
29. H. Hallaq (1978), p.268: 'al-wa'i al-islami'; M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.48: 'al-wa'i al-'arabi al-islami'.
30. M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.39: 'fa-kanat al-yaqza al-qawmiyya hiya al-istijaba li-tilka at-tahaddiyat'.
31. M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.28 and further below: Arab nationalism is "ala mustawa arfa' wa-'umq hadari ab'ad' than European nationalisms.
32. This is the title of a chapter in 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), p.25; compare also M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.62: The Arab population saw the Ottomans not as 'conquerors and aggressors, but as brothers in belief and as protectors of the dar al-islam', similar pp.38, 169.
33. 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), pp.26, 953, 961.
34. Ibid., pp.184, 690, 862.
35. M. Harb (1990), p.13.
36. M. Harb, *Al-'Uthmaniyyun: fi t-tarikh wa-l-hadara* (Damascus, 1989), p.31; and see p.169: Also the Maghreb waits for the Ottoman Empire as protector against the crusading West.
37. M. Harb (1990), p.242.
38. H. Hallaq (1978), p.38. Compare also terms like 'al 'uthman' (pp.11, 68), 'dawlat al-khilafa al-islamiyya' (p.63).
39. Example given: N. 'Allush (1974), pp.77-80; Kh. Kasmieh (1973b), p.65.
40. H. Hallaq (1978), pp.70, 72, 73, 90, 92, 118, 251, 275, 292 with terms like 'al-idara al-fasida', 'an-nizam al-'uthmani al-fasid', 'az-zulm wa-l-fasad 'an al-'arab' and 'ijra'at ta'assufiyya'; U. 'Ali (1987), p.260.
41. For example H. Hallaq (1978), pp.46, 90, 98, 113, 143, 147, 179, 305; p.208: Reşid Bey, mutasarrif of Jerusalem (1904-1906), 'alladhi khada' li-shahwat al-mal as-sahyuni'.
42. A. ad-Dajjani (1975), pp.79-88: passim; 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), p.1023: Abdülhamid is "adil muslim 'uthmani"; M. Harb (1990), pp.32f: Abdülhamid is the paragon of a good Muslim and treats his political foes with mercy; and p.70: The Ottoman people calls Abdülhamid 'al-ab al-haqiqi li-l-umma'.
43. Two examples may suffice: M. Harb (1990), p.130; R. an-Natsha (1981), p.56.
44. R. an-Natsha (1990), p.165; M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.67; U. 'Ali (1987), p.11.
45. M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.63: Abdülhamid reigns with *yad hazima*; 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), pp.5ff; M. Harb (1990), pp.44, 46: compares Abdülhamid's *hukm fardi* to the *hukm diktaturi* of the Young Turks.
46. H. Hallaq (1978), p.227; R. an-Natsha (1990), p.46.
47. 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), pp.985-1000 regards Abdülhamid's intransigent attitude towards Herzl's designs as one of the achievements (*khadamat*) of Ottoman rule.
48. Theodor Herzl, *Briefe und Tagebücher. Zionistisches Tagebuch* (Berlin, 1983), Vol.2, pp.367f.
49. H. Hallaq (1978), p.116.
50. Sa'id al-Afghani, 'Sabab khal' as-sultan 'Abd alhamid', *Majallat al-'arabi*, Vol.169 (1972), seems to be one of the first authors who took up the old topos; R. an-Natsha (1990), p.183;

- U. 'Ali (1987), p.289 and H. Hallaq (1978), pp.359–62 have recourse to al-Afghani.
51. Zeine Nouraddin Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Westport, Conn., 1981 [1958]), p.70; T. Barru (1989), pp.319ff, 327; Muhammad 'Abdarra'uf Salim, *Tarikh al-haraka as-sahyuniyya al-haditha, 1897–1918: Qism 1: tatawwur al-haraka as-sahyuniyya al-haditha hatta tasrih Balfur* (Cairo, 1974), p.185; S. ar-Rimawi (1980), pp.162, 165, 167.
 52. H. Hallaq (1978), pp.309f, 312, 316f, 319, 324, 329, 330; R. an-Natsha (1990), pp.122ff; M. 'Abdalqadir (1985), p.93; 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980), p.1002; U. 'Ali (1987), pp.293–312 reproduces the complete text, already translated by Tawfiq Husayn in *Afaq 'arabiyya*, Vol.5, No.9. (1987).
 53. H. Hallaq (1978), pp.145, 146, 158, 159, 163, 164, 169, 170, 182. The whole of the third chapter (pp.121–201) above the period 1897–1904 is divided according to the periodization in Herzl's diary. Also in the fourth chapter (pp.203–62), that deals with the period after Herzl's death, the Zionist movement functions as the prime actor.
 54. Islamicizing-revisionist authors frequently refer to such works in English as Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, 1961; Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (3rd ed., 1949); Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 1961; Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine* (1973). Rarely N. Mandel's *Arabs and Zionism* (1977) is used, not at all the works of Alexander Schölch.
 55. Atay, *Zeyindağı*, p.41.
 56. Another autobiography, about the years, 1916 and, 1917 at the Sinai- and Palestinian front, was written by a former colonel of the Ottoman cavalry, Şerif Güralp. Despite the title *Benî İsrâil Filistin'e Nasıl Döndü* (How the Israelites returned to Palestine) (1957) he gives only cursory mention to the Jews in Palestine (pp.90–7).
 57. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, Vol.1, No.1 (1940), pp.119f.
 58. The ninth volume has appeared posthumously in 1996.
 59. Türkkiye Ataöv, 'Filistin sorununun ardındaki gerçek: İsrail'in kuruluşuna kadar', *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.25, No.3 (Ankara, 1970), pp.29–66; Türkkiye Ataöv, 'The Palestine Question and Turkey', *Türk-Arap İlişkileri = Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations*, Vol.1 (Ankara, 1986), pp.203–20; İrfan C. Acar, *Lübnan bunalımı ve Filistin sorunu* (Ankara, 1989); M. Lutfullah Karaman, *Uluslararası ilişkiler çıkmazında Filistin sorunu* (Istanbul, 1991); Said Şamil, *Yahudi dâvâsı ve Filistin* (Istanbul, 1991).
 60. Halil Berktaş, 'Der Aufstieg und die gegenwärtige Krise der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung in der Türkei', *Periplus. Jahrbuch für außereuropäische Geschichte*, Vol.1 (1991), p.103.
 61. Mim Kemal Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi, 1914–1923* (Istanbul, 1986), p.v.
 62. For example, Kemal Karpat, 'Remarks on MESA and Nation and Nationality in the Middle East', *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, Vol.20 (1986), p.9: 'The Ottoman state was probably the most perfect Islamic state ever to come into existence'; Bilal Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüslim Teb'anın Yönetimi* (Istanbul, 1990), p.12: 'This state disposed of a social structure that can be almost called "federation of nations"'; Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasal Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukukî Durumu* (Ankara, 1989), p.ix.
 63. M. Öke (1986), p.283.
 64. Ibid., p.vi.
 65. Ibid., p.ix uses the term 'millî süzgeç'. In the English edition (*The Armenian Question*, Oxford, 1988, p.5), we find the term translated as 'national view point'.
 66. See for example Mim Kemal Öke, *II. Abdülhamid, Siyonistler ve Filistin Meselesi, 1876–1909* (Istanbul, 1981), pp.12, 15.
 67. B.-Z. Dinur, 'The Historical Foundations of the Rebirth of Israel', in Louis Finkelstein (ed.): *The Jews. Their History, Culture and Religion*, Vol.1 (1955), pp.454e-f: '...the land was one to which people "went up" (Aliyah), not one to which people merely immigrated'.
 68. B.-Z. Dinur (1955), p.454c defines the Yishuv as 'permanent settlement born out of a realization of continuous possession, of ownership'.
 69. Jacob Barnai, 'Megamot be-heqer ha-yishuv ha-yehudi be-Erez Yisra'el be-yamey ha-

- baynayim ve-tahilat ha-'et he-hadasha', *Cathedra*, Vol.42 (1986), p.110.
70. Shmuel Ettinger, 'Ziyon ve-ha-mehqar ha-histori be-zmanenu', *Ziyon*, Vol.50 (1985), pp.9-15.
 71. For example, M. Avi-Yona, Y. Ben-Zvi *et al.*, *The Historical Connection of the Jewish People with Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1936); General Council (Vaad Leumi) of the Jewish Community of Palestine: *Historical Survey on the Continuity of Jewish Settlement in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1946).
 72. Explicit also in Arthur Hertzberg, 'Jewish Modernity. Homegrown or Imposed? The View of Jewish Historians', in Shimon Shamir (ed.), *Self-Views in Historical Perspective in Egypt and Israel* (Tel Aviv, 1981), p.75.
 73. Salo W. Baron, 'Newer Emphases in Jewish History', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol.25 (1963), p.238ff.
 74. A further example is the popularized anthology by D. Ben-Gurion, *The Jews in Their Land* (London, 1966).
 75. J. Barnai (1986), p.104. Explicitly formulated in Yizhak Ben-Zvi, *Erez-Yisra'el ve-yishuvah bimey ha-shilton ha-'othmani* (Jerusalem, 1975 [1955]), p.400.
 76. J. Barnai (1986), pp.114, 117-19. Compare also Mordechai Eliav, *Erez Yisra'el u-yishuvah ba-me'a ha-y't*, 1777-1917 (Jerusalem, 1978), p.XIff.
 77. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Sociology of the Middle East. A Stocktaking and Interpretation* (Leiden, 1971), p.244.
 78. J. Barnai (1986), p.114 and Aharon Layish, 'Uriel Heyd's Contribution to the Study of Legal, Religious and Political History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey', *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin*, Vol.9, No.1 (1982), pp.35-54.
 79. The contributions were published by M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975).
 80. Israel Kolatt, 'Reflections on the Historiography of Zionism and the Yishuv', *Jerusalem Cathedra*, Vol.1 (1981), pp.317f.
 81. Yaakov Shavit, 'Eretz-Israel Research: Development and Trends. Sacred History, National History, History', *Jewish Book Annual*, Vol.44 (1986-87), p.28.
 82. Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, *The Rediscovery of the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century* (Jerusalem, 1979), p.230.
 83. See Israel Bartal, 'Old Yishuv and New Yishuv. Image and Reality', *Jerusalem Cathedra*, Vol.1 (1981), pp.216, 229; p.220 refers Bartal to the unjustified opposition of a stagnating Jerusalem and a blossoming Jaffa, thanks to Zionist immigration.
 84. S. Ettinger and I. Bartal, 'The First Aliyah. Ideological Roots and Practical Accomplishments', *Jerusalem Cathedra*, Vol.2 (1982), p.223 finish an article with the following phrase: 'Despite the paucity of its real accomplishments, the First Aliyah expressed a turning point in the history both of the Jewish community in Palestine and of the Jewish people as a whole.'
 85. The 'back-water' term generally appears on the first or on one of the first pages of a treatise or chapter, examples: Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine* (Oxford, 1968), p.v: the Egyptian occupation implies the end of 'centuries of confusion and backwardness...'; Isaiah Friedman, *Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 1897-1918* (Oxford, 1977), p.23: 'The country became notorious for its backwardness'; Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (London, 1978), p.14: 'backwater of a putrefying Empire'; Y. Ben-Arieh (1979), p.11: 'At the beginning of the 19th century Palestine was but a derelict province of the decaying Ottoman Empire'; idem, *Jerusalem: Old City* (Jerusalem, 1984), p.104: The first sentence in the chapter that deals with the Ottoman rule runs: 'For hundreds of years after the end of the Crusader period, Jerusalem, like the Holy Land as a whole, was a backwater', further: p.398; Vol.2, p.459; Arnold Blumberg, *Zion before Zionism, 1838-1880* (Syracuse, NY, 1985), p.48: 'Europeans represented an enclave of civilization surrounded by a backwater of barbarism'; David Landes, 'Passionate Pilgrims and Others: Visitors to the Holy Land in the 19th Century', in M. Davis (ed.), *With Eyes Toward Zion* (New York, 1986), p.5; Jacob Landau, 'The United States and the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century', in M. Sharon (ed.), *The Holy Land in History and Thought* (Leiden, 1988), p.274. The corresponding terms in Hebrew are to be found for

- example in M. Eliav, *Erez Yisra'el* (1978), p.xii: 'provinziya zanuha u-haseret hashivut' (deserted and unimportant province), p.1: 'mahoz nidah u-mepaggeret' (remote and backward area), again p.11: 'provinziya nidehet'.
86. See, for example, Usiel Schmelz, 'Some Demographic Peculiarities of the Jews of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century', in M. Ma'oz (1975), p.119; M. Ma'oz, 'Yerushalayim be-me'a ha-shanim ha-aharonot la-shilton ha-turki-'ottomani', in Menachem Friedman (ed.), *Praqim be-toldot ha-yishuv ha-yehudi birushalayim* (Jerusalem, 1973), p.260; Y. Ben-Arieh (1979), p.11; J. Landau, *Abdul-Hamid's Palestine* (London, 1979), p.9 and peripeteia at p.17.
 87. Introductory sentence by Ruth Kark, 'Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa', in David Kushner, *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period. Political, Social and Economic Transformation* (Leiden, 1986), p.46; compare also the first sentence in R. Kark, 'Transportation in Nineteenth-Century Palestine: Reintroduction of the Wheel', in R. Kark (ed.), *The Land that Became Israel. Studies in Historical Geography* (New Haven, 1990), pp.57-76; as a third example see the beginning of R. Kark's article 'Ha-Qehilla ha-yehudit be-Yaffo be-sof tequfat ha-shilton ha-'othmani', *Cathedra*, Vol.16 (1980), p.13.
 88. Y. Ben-Arieh, 'Hitpathut ha-'arim be-Erez-Yisra'el', in Y. Ben-Arieh and I. Bartal (eds.), *Ha-Historiya shel Erez-Yisra'el*, Vol.8: *Shilhey ha-tequfa ha-'ottomanii* (Jerusalem, 1983), p.85.
 89. David Landes, 'Palestine before the Zionists', *Commentary*, Vol.61, No.2 (1976), p.48ff and somehow attenuated also in D. Landes (1986), p.10f; J. Peters, *From Time Immemorial. The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine* (New York, 1985), pp.157-161.
 90. Mordechai Eliav, *Erez Yisra'el ve-yishuvah ba-me'a ha-19* (1978).
 91. Ruth Kark, *A City in Evolution* (1990).
 92. Similar in Y. Ben-Arieh (1984), pp.107, 139; idem, *Jerusalem: The New City* (1986), pp.452-8.
 93. G.W. Bowersock, 'Palestine: Ancient History and Modern Politics', in Edward Said (ed.), *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* (London, 1988), p.186.
 94. In his introduction to A. Schölch (ed.), *Palestinians over the Green Line: Studies on the Relations between Palestinians on Both Sides of the 1949 Armistice Line since 1967* (London, 1983), p.11; he refers here to J. Landau, *The Arabs in Israel. A Political Study* (London, 1969).
 95. For example, N. Mandel (1977), pp.3, 19, 36; I. Friedman (1977), p.30: 'Even Muslim Arabs were reported to be prepossessed by one idea ... the hope of deliverance from the rapacious rule of the Turkish pashas'; M. Eliav (1978), p.254; Yehuda Slutsky, 'Israel. State of (Historical Survey)', *Encyclopedia Judaica*, Vol.9 (1971), p.325; Alexander Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas in der türkischen Zeit, 1516-1918* (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp.63f; S. Schama (1978), pp.76 and 169: corruption is part of common-day life in the Ottoman Empire; J. Landau (1979), p.24; Avner Levi, 'Ha-'aliya ha-yehudit le-Erez-Yisra'el lefi ha-masmakhim shel 'Ali Ekrem, mutazarriif Yerushalayim', *Cathedra*, Vol.12 (1980), p.173; Yaakov Ro'i, 'The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs, 1908-1914', in E. Kedourie and S.G. Haim (eds.), *Israel and Palestine in the 19th and 20th centuries* (London, 1982), p.19; R. Kark (1986), p.55; Yossi Katz, 'Paths of Zionist Political Action in Turkey 1882-1914. The Plan for Jewish Settlement in Turkey in the Young Turk Era', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No.1 (1987), p.118; David Kushner, 'The Ottoman Governors of Jerusalem, 1864-1914', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.23 (1987), pp.280, 282; R. Kark (1990), pp.31, 50.
 96. K. Karpat (1986), p.7.
 97. William Haddad, 'Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire', in W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald (eds.), *Nationalism in a Non-National State* (Columbus, 1977), p.4.
 98. Georg Elwert, 'Nationalismus und Ethnizität. Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Vol.3 (1989), p.457.
 99. D. Landes (1976), p.55.

100. This argumentation is of course not restricted to Arab historians alone; see for instance examples in England analysed by Michael Billig, 'Anti-Semitic Themes and the British Far Left: Some Social-Psychological Observations on Indirect Aspects of Conspiracy Tradition', in Carl Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy* (New York, 1987), citation on p.130.
101. R. Abou-El-Haj (1982), p.188.
102. Youssef M. Choueri, *Arab History and the Nation-State: A Study in Modern Arab Historiography, 1820–1980* (London, 1989), p.190.
103. As example see the emphatic article of Tarif Khalidi, 'Palestinian Historiography, 1900–1948', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.10, No.3 (1981), pp.59–76.
104. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (New York, 1991 [1983]), p.46.
105. Y. Choueri (1989), citation on p.197.
106. As examples: 'A. 'Awad, 'Mutasarrafiyat al-Quds awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, Vol.4 (1971), p.138, footnote 1: 'bi-ruh al-i'tidal wa-l-insaf wa-an usajil al-haqa'iq kama hiyya duna at-tahazzub'; H. Hallaq (1979), p.23: 'uslub 'ilmi wa-watha'iqi'; 'A. ash-Shinnawi (1980–1983), pp.5, 1028: 'dirasa 'ilmiyya mawdu'iyya muhayada'; T. Barro (1989), p.10: 'Other serious works do not exist.'; A. Temimi in his foreword to the first number (1990) of his new journal *Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies*. – Compare also the claim for the exclusive right to treat Islamic (and therefore also Ottoman) history by Islamicizing-revisionist historians, such as Muhammad Harb (1989), p.8.
107. H. Tanyu, *Tarih boyunca Yahudiler ve Türkler* (Istanbul, 1976), Vol.1, p.10; compare also the first number of the journal *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations* (1986) and see also above.
108. D.C. Gordon, *Self-Determination and History in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ, 1971), p.8.
109. A particularly evident example is H. Hallaq (1978), pp.141, 142, 244, 256, 342, who counters the Zionist desertification topos with the contention that the Zionists are responsible for Palestine's economic stagnation and degeneration.
110. The abundant and reiterative work of R. an-Natsha and C.R. Atilhan are in this regard representative.
111. Isaiah Berlin, *Historical Inevitability* (London, 1959), citations on p.14, 17.
112. Ömer Kürkcüoğlu, *Osmanlı Devletine karı Arap baumsızlık hareketi, 1908–1916* (Ankara, 1982), p.249, 250, 252. Compare also Mim Kemal Öke, *Siyonizm ve Filistin Sorunu, 1840–1914* (1982), p.208: The Young Turks are forced by the course of events to pursue a nationalist line.
113. A. Schölch, *Palästina im Umbruch 1856–1882. Untersuchungen zur wirtschaftlichen und sozio-politischen Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1986), p.4.
114. R. an-Natsha (1990), p.46.
115. Walid Khalidi, *Before their Diaspora. A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876–1948* (Washington, DC, 1984), p.32.
116. J. Peters (1985), p.4.
117. S. Musa, 'Nizam milkiyyat al-aradi fi Filastin fi awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, Vol.95 (1979), p.75.
118. M. Ma'oz (1973), passim; idem, 'Yerushalayim he-hadasha: temurot politiyot ve-hevratyot', in Eli Shaltiel (ed.), *Praqim be-toldot Yerushalayim ba-zaman he-hadash* (Jerusalem, 1981), p.76; M. Eliav (1978), p.XII; Zalman Shazar in D. Ben-Gurion (1974), p.6; taken to its extremes in J. Peters (1985), p.205.
119. H. Hallaq (1978), p.230: 'rudud al-fi'l al-'arabiyya didda al-yahud'.
120. As counterparts see M. Eliav, 'Me'orbutam shel nazigey Germaniya ve-Ostriya be-eru'ey, 1918 be-Erez-Yisra'el', *Cathedra*, Vol.48 (1988), p.90; and idem (1978), p.442, I. Friedman, 'Germaniya ve-ha-zionut, 1897–1918', *Cathedra*, Vol.16 (1980), p.29; on the Arab side Kh. Kasmieh (1983), p.390; S. Seikaly (1981), p.403ff; M. Salim (1974), p.199.
121. Whether Jews or Arabs in Palestine during the First World War did suffer more severely under Djemal Pasha's repression does not concern Turkish historians. But B. Eryilmaz (1990), p.198, is convinced that the Turks suffered more than the Armenians.