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PETER ABELARD'S INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MEANING AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SPEECH SIGN 'EST'*

Although Peter Abelard was the most distinguished teacher of logic of his time, a logic understood to be the science of argumentative discourse, he was not destined to found a new philosophical tradition. The historical situation offers at least a partial explanation – the pace of philosophical and theological research was so brisk in the twelfth century that many of the established schools enjoyed life spans of at most two or three generations of teachers. The restlessness of the times is embodied to a special degree in Abelard.¹ His writings include commentaries, in many cases several to a work, on the logical works of Aristotle and Porphyry then available, handed down in the form of Boethius' translations, and on Boethius' own logical works. Abelard has to take a number of positions into consideration here: several commentaries on Aristotle by ancient scholars, by Boethius, and by Abelard's own predecessors and teachers, and furthermore the grammatical theories of Priscian and those deriving from Abelard's contemporaries. He discovers with distinctive acumen that the tradition he is examining is disunited and full of tensions on basic questions. It is in the analysis and discussion of these tensions that he finds the field of his own philosophical research. He expects to reach solutions by intensifying the controversies, not by seeking harmony. Thus he traces argument and counter-argument in great thoroughness of detail and from a dizzying succession of points of view, abandoning theses and offering countertheses. What his students could learn from him was not so much a particular theory as his method of formulating and discussing problems.

The situation is much the same for us. If we turn to Abelard in our inquiry into the logic and semantics of the speech sign 'est', we must discover anew the questions which concerned him. In the first part of this paper, I will sketch some of the discussions conducted by Abelard in order to make clear in what contexts he found himself confronting questions on the variations of meaning, function, or use of the expression 'est'. In the second part, I will group various theses which Abelard deals with appropriately. It is my intention to plot out the full range of the theories discussed and to mark points of conflict. In the third and final part, I will make some cautious comments on the deeper current of unity

to be observed in Abelard's reflections, a current perhaps more easily discernible to the modern eye than it was to Abelard himself.

I. DISCUSSIONS

1. *The Distinction between 'per se significative' and 'co-significative' Words and the Question to Which of These Two Classes the Copulative 'est' Should Be Assigned*

In his commentary on the second chapter of *Peri Hermeneias*, Abelard discusses the fact that Aristotle treated only nouns and verbs, disregarding prepositions and conjunctions.² Nouns and verbs are '*per se significative*', meaningful in and of themselves: each individual noun or verb has a meaning which can be explicated. But prepositions and conjunctions are also elements of language which convey something – in contradistinction to single letters or syllables. The difficulty is to arrive at a precise determination of what they convey.³

Some authors want to attribute meaning to prepositions and conjunctions when they are uttered alone, abstracted from all context. Yet compared with the way in which nouns and verbs have meaning, there is something uncertain, even vague, about them. Only when brought together with other words do they develop full, definitive meaning.⁴

Abelard raises the objection that this view is incapable of providing an adequate criterion for distinguishing nouns and verbs from prepositions and conjunctions. For it can be maintained that the meaning of nouns and verbs is also less definitive when they are uttered in the abstract, that in discourse the understanding (*intellectus*) of each word is made more precise by the other words in context.⁵ Abelard tends toward the view of other authors, according to whom prepositions and conjunctions uttered in the abstract convey absolutely nothing. They function as speech signs only when used together with other words, words which are meaningful in and of themselves.⁶

What do we conceive of when we hear such 'co-significative' words used together with significative words in a particular context? Abelard finds that it is not difficult to paraphrase what most prepositions indicate. They deal with relations of direction, proximity, possession, or origin, for example. In the case of some conjunctions, however, 'if' and 'and', for example,

it is not easy to specify what they signify or what image of which particular thing our understanding of them is based upon. For if they have meaning, they can be understood,

and to this end, there must be a thing or the image of a thing for our conception (*intellectus*) to be based upon. But what sort of a thing or construction of the mind do we conceive of when we use 'if' or 'and'? Does it belong to the category of substance or to that of quality or to some other category? It must belong to one of them if we are to be able to have a proper conception of it.⁷

It is likewise difficult to specify what is signified by the adverb of negation when it is placed before a connective.⁸

Abelard inserts here a discussion of the copula, stating that a theory of affirmative and negative statements expressing predication is an indispensable prerequisite for any theory of the joining together of such statements.⁹ Do '*est*' and '*non est*' have significative function when they serve as copulas?

In the first part of the discussion Abelard seems to lean toward a positive answer to this question. 'An animal endowed with reason' and 'an animal which is not endowed with reason' are complex expressions which we understand as denoting something. If we join the two terms, each of which signifies something existent, with the verb '*est*' – '*animal rationale est animal irrationale*' – the result is a false statement. If we add a negating word, the result is a new statement which is true. Now if we can use the copula to join two denoting terms such that the result is a false understanding (*intellectus*), and if we can make a true understanding out of a false one by employing a negating word, then it seems that the copula and the negating word must have *per se* significative function.¹⁰

Nonetheless, Abelard makes it clear in the second part of the discussion that he does not share this view. With vigor he proposes a thesis of his own: '*est*' used as copula does not have significative function it has affirmative function. '*Non est*' has negating function. Although '*est*' and '*non est*'

do not constitute conceptions, they cause a joining or separating in the mind of the things of which the mind does have conceptions. Nonetheless, although they cause, they do not signify joining or separating, because they do not themselves constitute conceptions; rather they simply cause this joining or separating of conceptions. And so there are three acts involved in the understanding of a statement, namely the conceptions of the parts and the joining or separating of them. It is not inconsistent for that act which is not in itself a conception to be a part of the understanding of the full statement.¹¹

According to the thesis thus proposed, the copula '*est*' is merely a connecting sign in affirmative statements or a sign of separation when used with a negating word. The hearer is directed to join the conception of the first term with that of the second or to separate the two conceptions from each other. The validity of the thesis is not demonstrated here, neither

by direct proof nor indirectly by refuting the counterthesis. No attack is made on the view first discussed. Abelard merely shows its ineffectuality: the joining and separating functions can be understood without deriving them from the significative function. Yet Abelard fails to say why the theory he has proposed is preferable to the traditional one. He takes up the theme of conjunctions once again and comes to the conclusion that

just as '*est*' and '*non est*' are appropriate for joining and separating and not for signifying, '*si*' and '*non si*' join and separate utterances which are appropriate for signifying something, but do not signify anything themselves. For they do not contain conceptions of anything, whether true or imaginary, but merely direct the mind to a particular manner of conceiving of other things.¹²

The essays in this book investigate whether the word 'to be' is indeed ambiguous, as is assumed in most modern discussions of logic. The first discussion sketched from Abelard's writings teaches that caution is required at the outset, in the formulation of the question itself. If asked whether the word 'to be' always conveys the same thing or whether it conveys different things according to context and use, Abelard would surely have been unable to favor either alternative. For this formulation of the question assumes that '*est*' has a significative function wherever it is employed, an assumption which Abelard does not share. In at least one use, namely when '*est*' stands between two terms as the copula, it has connective function but no content, and is to be reckoned among the logical functors,¹³ the so-called *syncategoremata*.¹⁴

This thesis was obviously not uncontroversial in Abelard's time. Abelard shares the following assumptions with his discussion partners:

(1) A word has significative function if and only if it conveys something.

(2) Every noun or verb has a categorial content which it conveys. (They are thus categorematic words.)

(3) The copula does not have a definite categorial content to convey.

How the negative thesis (3) could be reformulated in the affirmative is a matter of dispute.

(3a) The copula can convey every categorial content in an indefinite manner. Which definite content is meant can be determined in context from the terms between which the copula is placed.

(3b) The copula has no content to convey. It indicates that that which the predicate term conveys is to be joined with that which the subject term conveys.

2. Theories on What Verbs Signify and the Question of What the Word 'Esse' Signifies

A. Aristotle's Criterium for Verbs: *Consignificatio Temporis*. 'Esse' as a Linguistic Device for the Verbalization of Nouns

It is evident from the expositions of Abelard's *Logica* '*Ingredientibus*'¹⁵ and *Dialectica*¹⁶ that the theory of kinds of words was a central theme in his time. In these works Abelard seeks to work out his own position on a question on which many a debate had already taken place.

Following remarks by Priscian,¹⁷ grammarians had attempted to distinguish different kinds of words using the criterium of meaning. They had manifestly taken the Aristotelian doctrine of categories as their starting point. Each category was thought of as forming a distinct semantic range. In Abelard's writings the viability of this theory is debated only as it applies to the verb. It can be inferred that the category of substance encompassed only nouns, that of quantity numerals, that of quality adjectives, etc. and that there was contention as to whether the theory was actually able to describe language adequately.

The theory teaches that the verb is a word which signifies an action or a being-acted-upon.¹⁸ In the discussion the objection is made that the theory does not do justice to the full complexity of language. As counter-evidence, verbs such as 'lies' (as in the sentence 'Cologne lies on the Rhine'), 'live', 'have', and 'be' are cited. The reaction to this objection is indicative of the kind of theory being sought. The validity of the thesis is defended by drawing special distinctions. The object is obviously not to make an empirical, descriptive statement as to the meaning of most verbs but to find a criterium which allows verbs to be distinguished from other kinds of words. The defenders reply that the examples cited do indeed signify something other than an action or a being-acted-upon, they signify something which must be ascribed to other categories. Since the meaning of these words is heterogeneous, they contain a semantic ambiguity. But the different meanings, it is maintained, must be ascribed to the different uses of the words. The words mentioned are used either in the verbal or in the nominative function. In the verbal function they signify either an action (active form) or a being-acted-upon (passive form), and as such (called expressions of action) they have temporal meaning (tense). In the nominative function, however, they signify something belonging to another category (for example, that of being-in-

a-position, of having, or of substance); thus as expressions of states they have no temporal connotation.¹⁹

Abelard considers this theory to be inadequate. With delight he parades the distinctions which had been elaborated in its defense and un-masks them as mere *ad hoc* contrivances. This becomes evident in the passage on 'esse' in particular. To be able to subsume this verb under the general thesis that verbs denote an action or a being-acted-upon the following auxiliary theses had been asserted:²⁰

(A) When used in the verbal function, 'esse' signifies something which falls under the categories of action or being-acted-upon. In contradistinction to all other verbs, however, 'esse' signifies no definite action or being-acted-upon. It stands equivocally for any and every action or being-acted-upon. Abelard reports that the grammarians had taught that 'I am' "has the strength of say 'I love' or 'I read', or 'I run' or 'I am loved' or 'I am read' etc.". It seems that, as a matter of fact, they did teach that 'I am' signifies all acting and being-acted-upon *confuse* and none *prae*cise in the verbal function.²¹

(B) When used in the substantive function, 'esse' signifies existence. Now one can maintain that not only substances have an existence, one can also assert that accidents, say a quality such as a particular color are to be found. Thus in this use too, 'esse' stands equivocally (or *confuse*) for the existence of things falling under one of the various categories.

As far as Abelard is concerned, a theory which must make allowance for three kinds of equivocation, namely between (A) and (B), within (A), and within (B), does not really explain anything. At best, it makes one aware of a problem. His critique is bitingly sarcastic, but will not be reviewed here.²² He rejects every attempt to distinguish verbs from nouns according to meaning. It is possible to form both a noun and a verb for every semantic content within each category. Aristotle did propose the proper criterium to distinguish them: nouns and verbs differ only in that verbs bear a definite time reference along with their meaning (*con-significatio temporis*).²³ Every noun can thus be transformed into a verb by the addition of a tense indicator. But sometimes it can only be determined in the context whether a word is being used nominally or verbally, that is, without or with temporal co-signification.

For 'amans' is either a noun or a participle, and both of these signify the same activity. It is only the temporal connotation which allows one to distinguish when it is a noun and when a participle. Likewise, 'ens' can be either a noun or a participle, both in the meaning of existence, when it is used without or with temporal connotation.²⁴

In cases where no verb has been invented for a specific semantic content, one can form a substitute by combining a noun with a finite form

of 'to be'. (It should be noted that Abelard's understanding of 'nouns' included nouns, adjectives, and pronouns.) One proceeds in this way with the conjugation of verbs in Latin (but in English and German, too): some passive forms and other finite forms are not constructed by adding a suffix but by using a participle together with a finite form of 'to be'.²⁵ Abelard similarly regards verbs as a whole. There is no difference between '*sedere*' and '*sedentem esse*' or between '*sedisse*' and '*sendentem fuisse*', neither in the principal meaning, nor in the temporal connotation. Language could function in this way in all kinds of matters: Verbs could be formed such as '*substantiam esse, fuisse, fore*', '*quantitatem. . .*', '*corpus. . .*', '*hominem. . .*', '*albedinem. . .*', '*album esse, fuisse, fore*'.²⁶ 'Esse' bears no semantic content of its own here. It functions simply as a time word, as a substitute for a conjugational form.

In comprehensive and precise analyses of the logic of tenses Abelard shows that an expression constructed from a noun or participle and a helping verb must be conceived of as a single unit of speech.²⁷ Assuming, for example, that we say of someone who is not walking at the moment '*erit ambulans*', a contradiction would result if '*erit*' alone indicated the future and the participle '*ambulans*' retained present significance. Thus 'this person who is not walking now (as postulated), will be a person who is now walking'. On the contrary, the view that the whole is a single unit of speech is correct, so that the participle loses the meaning of being in the present.²⁸ This analysis applies not only to the use of present participles but also to all sentences dealing (*sensu diviso*²⁹) with past or future states of a present subject, as Abelard demonstrates in discussions about the conversion of temporally definite statements and their use in syllogisms.³⁰

Abelard emphasizes that every significative word can be made into a verb, that is, it can be given an additional temporal meaning by the employment of 'to be'. "Just as some nouns signify things as concretely and independently existing and others signify them by one of their properties, so is it with verbs also."³¹ Abelard's thesis can be restated precisely with symbols: Let ' t_0 ' symbolize the time of the statement (' t_0 ' is 'now'), '<' the relation 'before', and '>' the relation 'after'. ' ψ ' is a predicate. Then the following results:

- (4.1) ' X is ψ ' is equivalent to ' $X \psi - t_0$ ';
- (4.2) ' X was ψ ' is equivalent to ' $X \psi - t_m \wedge t_m < t_0$ ';
- (4.3) ' X will be ψ ' is equivalent to ' $X - t_n \wedge t_n > t_0$ '.

Just as ' $\psi - t$ ' the equivalent forms are units of speech.

The use of 'esse' to signify existential import (*verbum substantivum*)

is to be kept strictly separate from its use as a time word. In the meaning of existence, 'esse' is a full and independent verb. Thus in the symbols chosen, it does not merely correspond to the conjugational form '-t', but to the full unit ' $\psi-t$ '. Abelard emphasizes that one may assert the existence not only of substances ('*homo est*'), but of substantivated accidents as well ('*albedo est*'). Differing from the grammarians with whom he is disputing, Abelard does not consider the verb of existence to contain a semantic ambiguity. For him, 'est' does not have the force of 'exists as a substance' or 'exists as a quality' or 'exists as a quantity'. It "has in all cases the same meaning", that is "is something from among the multitude of things which exist".³²

Now the thesis:

(5) 'Esse' as a full and independent verb signifies 'existence'

does not harmonize with thesis (2) formulated above. 'Existence' is not a categorial content. It seems that thesis (2) will have to be reformulated for 'esse' also to be counted among the significative words. But then isn't thesis (3a) more natural than (3b)? Or if (3a) is too unclear, would it not be better to come to a thesis (3a'), according to which 'esse' has existential import even in copulative use? Why does Abelard consider it necessary to maintain such a sharp distinction between the use of 'esse' as a full verb from its use as a copula, to the extent that all significative function of the copula is denied?

B. Temporal Co-signification and the Predicative Function

According to Aristotle in *Peri Hermeneias* the *consignificatio temporis* allows the verb to be distinguished from the noun and thus serves to define the verb. Aristotle adds to this definition a remark on the predicative function of verbs: the verb "is always a sign for something which is predicated of something else".³³ From Abelard's statements on this passage it can be concluded that the sentence had caused earlier commentators considerable difficulty. Its location in the text was felt to be inappropriate. If Aristotle indeed intends to devote Chapter 2 to the noun and Chapter 3 to the verb in order to reserve for Chapter 4 the proposition as composed of noun and verb, then the location of the sentence cited above in Chapter 3 is quite difficult to justify. This peculiarity disturbs all the more when one discovers the sentence repeated shortly thereafter.

Abelard reports no fewer than eight attempts to interpret the passage.³⁴ He does not get involved in an exhaustive discussion, nor does he betray which interpretation he considers best. Apparently, the

systematic structure of *Peri Hermeneias* interests him less than the individual theses which Aristotle advocates. The correctness of the content of Aristotle's remark is scarcely a subject of contention among the interpreters, however: "Verbs were above all invented to be predicated, nouns that something be predicated of them". The "complete" proposition consists of at least a noun and a verb.³⁵

In *Dialectica* the function of verbs to couple a predicate with a subject is given even greater emphasis. In his commentary to *Peri Hermeneias* Abelard said that this function is characteristic for verbs,³⁶ but it was the temporal co-signification which served as the criterium for the definition. Not so in *Dialectica*. Here the copulative function, on account of which verbs were 'invented', is reckoned to be part of the 'concept' of the verb,³⁷ but temporal co-signification seems not even to be accorded the recognition of being one of the verb's characteristic features. This thoroughly new idea stands in sharp contrast to the long tradition preceding it and must be investigated with great care.

In the section on nouns, Abelard first relates Aristotle's view on the specific differences between the noun and the verb.³⁸ Then he starts to argue against this view, the same he had defended in his commentary on *Peri Hermeneias*. He asks if it is really so that only verbs, but not nouns, bear a temporal connotation "so that they assign their main meaning to the persons serving as subject in accordance with their tense".³⁹ Just as one understands in '*curro*' and '*currens*' that running (*cursus*) is to be attributed to a person in the present, one understands in '*album*' something "which is determined by whiteness as an (accidental) form in the present",⁴⁰ and also when 'man' is used to denote something it is because "a mortal animal substance endowed with reason is present", so that "'man' amounts to 'is a mortal animal endowed with reason which exists in the present' ".⁴¹ "Thus Aristotle seems to have been wrong in distinguishing nouns from verbs by saying that nouns are without temporal connotation. For nouns are shown to indicate tense, too, namely that of the verb, that is, the present."⁴²

Does Abelard actually intend to contest all distinctions between nouns and verbs? Does he take the extreme extensionalistic point of view that nouns signify nothing more than their present *denotata*? The care which Abelard devotes again and again to non-denotative words (that is, those which have meaning, although they do not refer to anything which exists)⁴³ speaks against such a view. Then how are his remarks to be interpreted?

'*Album*' does not mean 'white' here in the sense of a dictionary entry.

It means 'something white', 'something that is white'. Abelard does not treat '*homo*' as a word to be regarded in isolation, either, but as a word which is attributed to someone, that is, one which is said of a particular person: 'he is a man'. Accordingly nouns have temporal co-signification if and only if they are predicated.⁴⁴ Of course the predication is only implicit when nouns are applied to things. A thing *X* is given the name ψ , but the ψ -ness of *X* is not asserted expressly. To this extent there remains a difference between verbs and nouns "in the manner of signifying": the noun serves to name *X* as something to which a definite substantial or accidental form (for example, the quality 'whiteness') is to be ascribed. But only when a verb is joined to the noun is a proposition created. It is in the proposition that the inherence of something is asserted.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, a predication lies at the base of any naming. If the question is asked whether a word ' ψ ' does in fact presently name something, that is, whether the word is properly attributed, the answer consists of a proposition in which the description ' ψ ' moves to the predicate position. ' ψ ' is then joined to the subject with a conjugational form of a verb in the present or with '*est*'.

In *Dialectica*, the relative importance given to the copulative function of the verb exactly reverses to that in the commentary to *Peri Hermeneias*. It is no longer recognized as a mere feature of the verb, as in the commentary, but as the criterium which defines the verb. Verbs have copulative function and with it also temporal connotation.⁴⁶ Nouns receive temporal connotation when they are used in such a manner as to assert that a categorial content (their sense) subsists in a thing.⁴⁷ When this use of nouns to name is made explicit, it is revealed to be predication. The temporal significance does not belong to the *significatio* of a word but to a specific function. When one refers to something by means of a noun, one does predicate. The temporal co-signification is the result of the implicit or explicit predication. If Abelard's line of thought were to be followed to its ultimate consequences, one can imagine him giving up the difference between nouns and verbs altogether and continuing to observe only the functional difference between subject position and predicate position. But this would have meant turning the whole structure of logic upside down. The Aristotelian tradition had sought to synthesize the proposition from the various units of speech. Now one would have had to start from predication as the foundation of logic and then work one's way back to that which the individual units of speech, such as nouns and names, signify. It would hardly have been possible for Abelard, who had developed his theses in the course of an exposition of

traditional texts, to free himself from this tradition to such an extent as to be able to recognise the far-reaching consequences of his line of thought. It is doubtless easier for the interpreter of a later generation to see them.

C. 'Est' as a Verb of Full Value and as a Copula

Abelard notes several times in the course of his discussions that propositions can be formed in two ways. First, a finite form of the verb serving as predicate is joined to a noun, the subject. Second, a subject term and a predicate term are linked together by a finite verb placed between them.⁴⁸ When the verb serves as a predicate it has a double function: it is both copula and that which is being predicated, that is to say, it joins itself, its own meaning, to the subject. Only two verbs are capable of linking subject and predicate terms, that is of joining a meaning other than their own to the subject. These are 'est' ('S is P') and 'nuncupatur' ('S is named P').⁴⁹

Now for Abelard, as shown above, propositions of the type 'S ψ - t' and those of the type 'S copula-t ψ ' are identical in their semantic deep structure. Why then does Abelard devote such great attention to the difference in surface structure? De Rijk has correctly recognized the target of Abelard's interest: the difference allows Abelard to discuss the problem of "the basic ambiguity of the verb 'est' ".⁵⁰

'Petrus est' is as much a complete proposition as 'Petrus currit'. 'Est' has a double function: it is both that which is predicated of Petrus and that which links the predicate with the subject.⁵¹ When 'est' is thus "predicated in the essential sense (*proprie*)",⁵² it links its own content to the subject. Thus 'Petrus est' means 'Peter is something which exists'.⁵³

The question so heatedly disputed in Abelard's time (but before his time, too, and afterwards again and again) was whether 'est' retains existential import when used as a copula. In his expositions on this matter Abelard grants 'est' a special status, showing that no other verb (except 'nuncupatur') can be used as a connecting link between the subject term and the predicate term. Contrary to first impressions, propositions such as 'iste fit bonus' and 'iste videtur bonus' have a completely different structure from 'iste est bonus'.⁵⁴ In the first two examples, Abelard regards 'good' as a means to define more precisely the predicates 'fit' and 'videtur'. 'Bonus' functions in just the same way as the object 'Socratem' in the sentence 'iste videt Socratem', where 'Socratem' limits the predicate 'videt'. The proof can be arrived at by making a conversion, for here the complete verbal expression goes to the subject position. (For example, 'Many an evil doer seems to be good' $\longleftrightarrow$ 'Many a man

who seems to be good does evil.'). The point is that 'to be' cannot be regarded simply as a predicate which is defined more precisely by a predicate noun. The meaning of the other example sentences can be made clearer by seeing the limitation on the predicate as a namely-rider: 'This is becoming something, namely good'; 'This seems to be something, namely good'; 'He sees something, namely Socrates'. One may not, however, interpret linkages using the copula '*est*' as meaning 'This is something, namely ψ '.

Can we thus safely conclude that '*est*' in copulative function does not retain the existential meaning it has as a verb of full value? Abelard exhorts to caution in his further discussions. One thing has been clearly established: that the copulative use of '*est*' should not be confused with its use as a predicate. The copula is not "predicated in the essential sense (*proprie*)". Its function is to link not its own semantic content but that of the predicate term to the semantic content of the subject term. Nonetheless, even if the copula is not predicated *proprie*, it is indeed predicated *per accidens*.⁵⁵ And although its principal function is to link subject and predicate terms, it may be that the meaning 'existence' plays a certain role when '*est*' is used as copula.

In speaking of '*esse*' Abelard points out that "there is always an existential import in its linkage" and "it allows us to determine that another thing exists", even when it is used as a copula.⁵⁶ But he says this with regret.⁵⁷ It would be ideal if the copula had absolutely no semantic content and functioned as a purely syncategorematic connecting symbol.⁵⁸ '*Est*' remains the word which comes closest to this ideal. Any other verb would convey a specific categorematic content. This content would make the verb unsuited to serve as a link between the subject and yet another such content as found in the predicate term.⁵⁹ '*Est*' is suitable for use as a copula because its own meaning preoccupies least of all and can be most easily kept in the background or, one could even say, suppressed by the subject and predicate terms.

One can find passages in which recognition is granted to the existential import of the copula near other passages which emphasize that the existential meaning by no means belongs to the copulative function. My understanding of this peculiarity derives from the role Abelard accorded to the science of argumentative discourse, this being to reflect on and explain language and yet not to shy away from correcting it and bringing to it a greater precision. The discussions carried on in these passages need not be summarized individually here. Nonetheless I consider it important at least to show briefly which semantic types of propositions play a special role in them.

In a first special case, the name of a person stands in the subject position of the proposition as an expression for a concrete substance. An expression for an accident stands in the predicate position. Take for example '*Socrates est albus*'. This predicate joins two items to the subject, first the whiteness (*albedo*) as an accidental form (*in adiacentia*), and secondly something white (*album*) in existence (*in essentia*).⁶⁰ Abelard is himself unsure how the two should be weighted. In *Logica 'Ingredientibus'* he considers the speaker's real intention to be to predicate the attribution or inherence of whiteness in the actual subject. The use of the concrete term 'white' seems to be misleading here due to the existential import which the copula bears. Because Socrates exists as something white, not as whiteness, the abstract term cannot be used here, contrary to the speaker's intention. In *Dialectica*, which was written later, Abelard defended the form of the proposition which is naturally given in the language, '*Socrates est albus*' as being a sensible one.⁶¹ The proposition asserts that Socrates is one of the things which are white. In the first chapter of *Categories* Aristotle makes a distinction between accidental predicates, which "are in a substance" and substantial predicates, which "are said of a substance". In reference to Socrates, 'white' belongs to the former group. But the "inherence of attributed whiteness" is merely "intimated" in this proposition. To make the meaning of this intimation explicit is a task for a categorial analysis of predicates; it is not a task for an analysis of the meaning and functions of predication.

A second special case, one which plays a considerable role in Abelard's investigations, is that of propositions whose subject terms signify something which in principle or in fact does not exist. A few classic examples: '*chimaera est opinabilis*', '*chimaera est non-existens*' and '*Homerus est poeta*'.⁶² It is obvious that such propositions are not to be understood as though the copula were asserting — even merely *per accidens* — that such creatures as chimaeras ever existed or that Homer were alive at the moment the proposition was uttered. Abelard and the logicians whose writings he uses as groundwork try out a long series of transformations in search of a clear understanding of the meaning of the sentences given as examples. Thus the sentence '*chimaera est opinabilis*' should be reworded as a sentence about someone who can imagine a chimaera.⁶³ The true meaning of the sentence about Homer requires it to be transformed into a sentence about a still existing poem written by him or about a memory of him which has not died out.⁶⁴ The purpose of the transformations is to return to sentences in which the verb 'to be', in both in its full meaning and its copulative use, is dealing only with

items which exist. Alternatively, the possibility is considered that such sentences show best of all that '*est*' in copulative use is fundamentally non-literal and devoid of all inherent meaning. It depends on the semantic content of the predicate term, and not on the existential import of the copula, whether one will or will not be in a position to infer that the subject term names something which exists.⁶⁵ For example, it can be inferred from '*Petrus est homo*' that Peter exists, but it cannot be inferred that a chimaera exists from '*chimaera est opinabilis*' or '*chimaera est non-existens*'.⁶⁶ Once "the heart of the semantic question of being has been transferred from the meaning of the copula to the meaning of the predicate noun used in the proposition", ⁶⁷ it is only a short step to the theory that the copula is not an independent part of the proposition at all, but that it, together with the predicate noun, should be regarded as one single verbal expression. Abelard finds this step to be a daring one, because it is so novel, but a solidly reasonable one.⁶⁸ The imposing arguments found in the analysis of verb tenses which follows in *Dialectica* provide a strong recommendation for it.

3. *The Theory of the Proposition and the Question of the Exact Meaning of the Assertive Formula 'ita est in re'*

In Abelard's time, the following terminological distinctions were regarded by logicians and grammarians as being fundamental: Every grammatically well-formed combination of several *per se* significant words (*dictiones*), with or without the addition of co-significative words, is called a word string (*oratio*).⁶⁹ A word string is called 'incomplete (*oratio imperfecta*)' when the person hearing the sequence of words cannot help but expect to hear an additional word or words. When such an addition is not absolutely necessary, that is, when the combination of words is such as to enable a (relatively) full understanding, the word string is called 'complete (*perfecta*)'.⁷⁰ Some kinds of minimal complete word strings are questions, wishes, orders, and propositions.⁷¹ Their distinguishing sign is normally the presence of an inflected verb form. When this form is absent, as in many orders and questions, the listener takes it as implied. The proposition (*oratio enuntiativa, propositio*) is defined as a "sentence signifying something which is either true or false".⁷²

With great pertinacity Abelard uncovers the problems hiding behind these common distinctions and definitions. His treatment of the theory of the proposition is particularly painstaking. He begins with questions arising out of very simple observations. In understanding any word

string, a person not only comprehends what is signified by each word, he also, not less important, joins together the meanings which he has comprehended.⁷³ Thus, for example, the difference between '*homo currens*' and '*homo est currens*' cannot consist of the copula's telling us to join together the two already comprehended words '*homo*' and '*currens*', for this joining has already been attained in the course of coming to understand '*homo currens*'. Abelard goes even further: '*homo currens*' conveys precisely the same joining of 'run' and 'man' as '*homo est currens*' and '*homo curri*'.⁷⁴ The copula or, as it were, the inflectional ending of the verb brings no new understandable content to the terms which are to be joined, when the *consignificatio temporis* is left out of consideration.⁷⁵

The difference between a proposition and other "incomplete" or "complete word strings"⁷⁶ does not lie in the content of what is comprehended. But then how is the traditional definition of the proposition to be interpreted? Abelard answers⁷⁷ that the proposition signifies the truth or falsity of something by stating (*proponendo*) what is the case or what is not the case. An affirmative proposition differs from an "understanding which connects various elements" and a negative proposition differs from an "understanding which separates various elements" not in respect to content but in the way the content is "proposed" ("stated", asserted or contested). "For that reason declarative sentences (*enuntiationes*) or propositions (*propositiones*) are expressly named from the manner of proposing (*proponendo*)."⁷⁸ Abelard supports his analysis by reformulating the propositions in such a way that their assertive meaning is made explicit. In the sentence,

'it is true that Socrates is sitting (*verum est Socratem sedere*)', the phrase in the subject position, 'that Socrates is sitting', produces the same understanding as 'Socrates is sitting', and yet the phrase in the subject position cannot be called a 'proposition' because it is not formed in a way which would enable it to be stated affirmatively or negatively.⁷⁹

The *dictum propositionis* is not a proposition; it merely comprises the contents of that which can be proposed. A proposition is the assertion of the truth or falsity of these contents. The meaning of 'is true' is explained as 'it is so in the thing'.⁸⁰ But as further analysis shows, this explanation can be misleading.

Simple words are normally not just signs for mere concepts but for concepts of things existing in reality.

Nouns and verbs are. . . namely signs in a twofold sense, for things on the one hand and for concepts on the other. They are signs for things in that they constitute concepts belonging to the things, that is, concepts which heed a particular characteristic feature or peculiarity of the things.⁸¹

When Abelard later distinguishes between "valid" and "empty concepts", he does not deviate from his basic assumption: "valid" concepts are those in which the basic intention to mean a thing is fulfilled. Abelard explains the meaning of 'valid (*sanus*)' in relation to 'concept (*intellectus*)' as follows. "Every concept, whether simple or complex, through which we heed how the thing behaves, is valid."⁸² This explanation is illustrated with an example: the word 'man' "yields a valid concept as long as (at least) one man exists". '*Chimaera*' and '*hircocervus*' are examples of words the concepts of which do not denote any existing thing; if there were no such thing as man, the concept of 'man', too, would be empty. The same holds for complex expressions and that of which they are concepts.⁸³

Simple words or incomplete word strings such as '*homo currens*' fulfil their naming or descriptive function when there is at least one thing which is (in a specific respect) as the word or word string conveys. Now it is of great importance to Abelard that a distinction can be made between

- (6.1.) *the truth criterium*, 'the thing is in reality so as the proposition says', and
- (6.2.) *the validity criterium*, 'there is some real thing which falls under this naming or description'.

His arguments are apagogic for the most part. He finds a theory among contemporary logicians according to which the content of a proposition is to be identified with the content of its components.⁸⁴ He shows in a penetrating analysis that this theory is unsatisfactory: it cannot explain what is asserted in propositions of necessary consequences such as '*si est rosa, est flos*'⁸⁵ or in tautologies such as '*Socrates est Socrates*'.⁸⁶ Abelard's critical deliberations cannot be presented here individually.⁸⁷ The existence of the proof that (6.1.) must be differentiated from (6.2.) will have to be taken for granted. But what exactly is the difference between the two?

In the first chapter of *Peri Hermeneias*, anticipating the more thorough discussion to come, Aristotle touches on the difference between (simple and complex) nouns and propositions. The noun alone does not signify anything which can be true or false, he says, unless "being or not-being, whether absolutely or with a definite tense, is added."⁸⁸ Boethius interprets this passage as a reference to the deep structure of every proposition. He reformulates such subject-predicate-propositions as '*homo vivit*' and '*Socrates ambulat*' into '*homo vivens est*' and '*Socrates ambulans est*'.⁸⁹ The word order is surely not arbitrary; it is re-

tained in such examples as '*Socrates philosophus est*' and '*Socrates philosophus non est*'. The terms within each of the propositions '*A est B*' and '*A non est B*' are joined together here into a single complex term '*AB*'. In Boethius' view, being or not-being is to be predicated of this complex term occupying the subject position.

Abelard starts to develop an opposing theory. 'It is so' and 'it is not so' are impersonal expressions and are not what one normally understands as predicates. 'That *A* is ψ (*hominem vivere; Socratem ambulare*)' is not a noun in the normal sense or function, even if it can be reformulated as 'the ψ -ing of *A*'. It is at best a *quasi-nomen*.⁹⁰

That which is said in a proposition, ' $\psi(A)$ ', is not a thing.⁹¹ It can be called the proposition's content,⁹² but then positive and negative contents, or states of affairs, would have to be admitted. 'Negative things' are an impossibility. There are only negative descriptions of things. This consideration makes it clear that contents are not instantiations for propositions in the same way that things are instantiations for descriptions.

'... is true (... is the case)' and '... is false (... is not the case)' as well as '... is possible', '... is necessary', and their negations are impersonal expressions.⁹³ Grammatically they seem to be predicates for the *dicta* which seem to be their subjects, but differently from other predicates, they are not used denotatively.⁹⁴ The denotative function of predicates can be explained by substituting a 'something' in the subject position as a realization (or a 'nothing' as a sign of the lack of realization): 'Something $\psi - t$, namely ...' (or, as the case may be, 'nothing $\psi - t$ '). If 'is the case' were to be predicated personally, the explanation by 'something, namely ...' would be appropriate here, too. The difference would merely be that not individual things but rather a particular content would stand for 'something' here. The formulation 'something is true, namely that. ...' may as a matter of fact appear in linguistic, logical, or epistemological contexts,⁹⁵ but Abelard contests resolutely that this formulation, in which 'true' is used denotatively, functions faithfully in the same way as '... is true (... is so in the thing)'.⁹⁶ 'True' and 'false' should not be understood as general terms which could be applied to particular cases.⁹⁷

But then how can the meaning of 'it is so in the thing' and 'it is not so in the thing' be explained positively? Before attempting a solution, one must take care not to be misled by the question. To a related question on the words 'possible' and 'necessary', Abelard answers that these

co-signify (*consignificare*) more than they bear a meaning in and of themselves. For we can conceive of something in them only when they are applied to a word string in the subject

position. And then they bring about that the things signified by the word string in the subject position are conceived of in a certain way, just as an interposed verb ('*est*') or a conjunction ('if. . . , then') whose coupling indicates necessity serve to do so.⁹⁸

' . . . is the case' and ' . . . is not the case' are syncategorematic expressions. Their meaning is nothing other than their function in a word string. The content which Abelard mainly has in mind in his analyses are events. The truth value of propositions about events is dependent upon the point in time at which the proposition is asserted. It is the case in a certain 'now' that Socrates is running, just as this is not the case in a different 'now'. The *dictum* as the content of a proposition does not receive a specific truth value before it is actually asserted to be true or false. Whoever understands the assertion comprehends the asserted content as existing (or not existing, as the case may be) at the time the proposition is asserted.

II. POSITIONS

The inquiry into the logic and semantics of '*est*' was developed by medieval authors as the inquiry into the nature of predication. It can be seen from Abelard's discussions that the theory of propositions and predication was a matter which provoked deep controversies. The discussion centers for the most part around the paradigm for all individual analyses and does not occupy itself merely with puzzle solving within a theory or the further development of an accepted one. The fact that all parties appeal to Aristotle and Boethius only contradicts what I have said at first glance. The deliberations of these authorities on semantics prove on closer scrutiny to be less than firm, for they allow widely varying interpretations.

(A) The common ground of all parties to the discussions consists of the following assumptions:

(1) The search for a theory of the proposition is seen as a search for a theory of predication. Following Aristotle, the basic structure of the proposition is thus held to be that something is said about something else. Relational propositions are put into predicative form. In '*A* sees *B*', for example, the object '*B*' is considered to be a more precise determination of the predicate. The first beginnings of a reorientation can be found with William of Ockham: he investigates the supposition of both the term preceding and following the relational word in relational propositions. The thought of constructing a theory of predicative propositions on a necessarily more comprehensive theory of relations and thus of

regarding concepts, that is functions with one empty position, as borderline cases of relations, that is functions with several empty positions, was foreign to the Middle Ages.

(2) What is sought is one single structural description of the proposition which works for all forms of language without exception, that is, a theory of the uniform logical deep structure of all kinds of predication. Simple propositions can be observed in two different grammatical forms. In the one, a noun in the nominative case is brought together with an inflected verb (*Socrates currit*). In the other, a predicate noun is coupled to the subject with 'est' (*Socrates est homo*; *Socrates est albus*). Now Aristotle had already accepted the equivalence of '*hominem ambulare*' and '*hominem ambulans esse*'.⁹⁹ The validity of this view is taken for granted by all logicians who sought a unified theory of predication. The manners of constructing a sentence are interchangeable in principle. '*Socrates currit*' has the same meaning and the same truth value as '*Socrates est currens*'.

(B) Widely differing theories can be constructed on the basis of the two assumptions listed above. The spectrum of discussion is exhaustive in Abelard's time. The basic features, if not the finer details, of all kinds of positions are developed and considered.

The equation '*Socrates currit*' = '*Socrates est currens*' can be read in both directions as an instruction on how to reformulate. This never caught anyone's attention before Abelard. Nor did anyone after Abelard, as far as I have been able to discover, consider the decision controversial whether the theory should be based on the two-part or the three-part structural description. Even Abelard does not seem to recognize the importance of this decision. He alternates between statements which work from the three-part description and statements which take the two-part description to be logically more transparent. I consider his discovery that tensions between the two theories of predication begin to develop at this point to be of great significance.

(1) Normally, the three-part form is held to be an explanation of the two-part form. The authority of Aristotle is not the only source of support for this view. For the structure of language also seems to suggest it: to resolve an inflected verb into a temporally definite copula and a participle seen as a predicate noun, just as language does to make certain tenses and passive forms, is manifestly easier than to conceive of all combinations made with the copula as substitutes for verb forms which the language has failed to "invent".

Accordingly, the explicit logical standard form of an affirmative proposition has three parts: a subject term (about which something is predicated) is coupled to a predicate term (which is predicated) with an interposed '*est*'.¹⁰⁰ The theory of predication then presents itself as the theory of the coupling capacity of this interposed '*est*'. Now linguistically, '*est*' is a form of the verb '*esse*', which signifies 'to exist'. '*Est*' has this meaning in all cases when it is used as *secundum adiacens* in such propositions as '*Socrates est*'. It signifies here the existence of that of which it is predicated. The question arises whether '*est*' also has existential import when it is used as *tertium adiacens*, that is, as the copula. In the answer to this question two contradictory stand-points part company: The first position (1.1.) maintains that the two uses of '*est*' are not related; '*est*' is equivocal. The second (1.2.) maintains that the two uses are interrelated.

(1.1.) According to the equivocation theory, the copula has no semantic content, it simply functions as a coupling device. Thought out to the last consequence this would mean including the copula among such conjunctions as '*si* (if. . . , then)'.¹⁰¹ The justification for this thesis is to be found approximately as follows:¹⁰² '*est*' as *secundum adiacens*, that is, as a complete predicate, joins its own semantic content, namely existence, to that of the subject term. The copula has, however, a different function. Its function is to join the semantic content of the predicate term to that of the subject term. The copula can exercise this function only when it has no semantic content of its own, for it is not possible for a word to join itself and something else to the subject simultaneously. This last sentence, which is crucial to this line of argument, is supported by a comparison with other *per se* significative verbs: Just as one cannot add a further predicate to '*Socrates currit*' or '*Socrates est currens*', say '*homo*', one can add no further predicate to '*Socrates est*' or '*Socrates est aliquid existens*'. Consequently, '*est*' does not mean '*est aliquid existens*' in the sentence '*Socrates est homo*'. By varying it a bit, one can use this argument to attack the opposing thesis.¹⁰³ If '*est*' always meant '*est ens*', then the predicate term in '*Socrates est ens*' would be superfluous, seeing that it would already be contained in '*est*'. To say '*Socrates est ens*' would amount to saying '*Socrates est ens ens*', etc. Another argument with critical intent refers to propositions in which the subject term signifies something which does not exist.¹⁰⁴ The proposition '*chimaera est opinabilis*' would be false if the copula had existential import. Further, the proposition '*chimaera est non-existens*' would provide ground for the paradoxical inference that the chimaera exists (by virtue

of the existential import of the copula) and does not exist (by virtue of the semantic content of the predicate term). Consequently, '*Petrus est*' cannot be inferred from '*Petrus est homo*', at least not by virtue of the alleged existential import of the copula.¹⁰⁵

(1.2.) The point at which parties to the opposing position can assail the equivocation theory is the following: the theory leaves one puzzle unsolved, namely why we use one and the same word, '*est*', on the one hand (as *secundum adiacens*), as both significative *per se* and copulative, and on the other (as *tertium adiacens*), as merely copulative. This difficulty weighs heavily on the logicians of linguistic analysis of the time. If someone were to succeed in constructing a theory which explained the relationship of the two uses to each other convincingly instead of deriding the double use of '*est*' as a misleading accident of language, such a theory would clearly be more comprehensive than the equivocation theory.

What must be demonstrated is that the word '*est*' can join a term other than itself to a subject and yet retain existential import. The opponents of the equivocation theory want to do so by arguing for a stronger thesis: the compatibility of existential meaning with the copulative function has been established when one successfully derives the copulative function from the existential meaning. And inasmuch as '*est*' means everything in being (*essentia*) indiscriminately, so it is said, it is capable of joining together any and all content¹⁰⁶ and of being the sign of the "existence of the thing"¹⁰⁷ in affirmative propositions. '*Socrates est*' means 'Socrates is one of the things which exist'. When '*est*' is used copulatively, so that a predicate term is added to it, what is thus determined is that as which the subject exists, thus, for example, 'Socrates is (as) a man' or 'Socrates is (as) a person who is presently reading'. In the argument brought to bear by the adherents of the equivocation theory that no word can simultaneously join both itself and another term to the subject, they overlook the special character of the semantic content of 'being': the predicates added are not principally different from this semantic content but are, rather, complementary predicative determinations of it. Thus, in '*Socrates est ens*' the speaker merely makes clear that he does not wish to make a narrower determination of what Socrates is. Furthermore, propositions whose subject terms stand for things which do not exist are "non-literal" formulations. What they intend must be clarified by reformulating them. 'Homer' is the name of a person who no longer exists. The proposition '*Homerus est poeta*' is to be reformulated into 'the renown of Homer is kept alive in human memory by his poetry'.¹⁰⁸ Propositions about the chimaera are to be interpreted as treating something

which is in the mind of the person thinking the proposition at that moment.¹⁰⁹

(2) Instead of regarding the three-part structure 'subject term – copula – predicate term' as the explanation for the two-part structure 'subject – inflected predicate', one can also regard constructions with '*est*' and a predicate noun simply as substitutes for verbs which have yet to be "invented". The equation '*Socrates currit*' = '*Socrates est currens*' is now to be read backwards, for the two-part construction of the proposition is the logically more transparent one – the predicate is considered to be a complete unit.

In numerous passages in his works Abelard shows decided preference for the two-part analysis of the proposition (with the one-part theory of the predicate) over the three-part analysis of it (with the two-part theory of the predicate). That here we have to do with more than a flash of inspiration to solve some special problems in the logic of tenses follows from a passage of *Dialectica*: these discussions must be recognized as the groundwork for a new theory of predication. In the book of *Dialectica* entitled 'On the Parts of the Categorical Proposition', Abelard reviews the three-part analysis but notes that he is writing here "following general opinion", because he considers it important that the many people who adopt this thesis will be able to support it with arguments. He does not fail to use this opportunity to refer the reader back to his own two-part analysis as discussed in his book 'On Words with Definite Meaning', which, he says, does not conflict with the material discussed here but does offer a more elegant solution to the problem.¹¹⁰

What distinguishes Abelard's theory from theories (1.1.) and (1.2.) can best be described negatively. An analysis of the meaning and function of '*est*' does not lie at the heart of the theory which regards the structure 'subject - inflected predicate' as the explicit logical standard form of propositions. Propositions having '*est*' as predicate ('*Socrates est*') are not accepted as being in principle different from propositions with other predicates (such as '*Socrates currit*').¹¹¹ It may be that the understanding of the existential predicate poses special problems, but this does not constitute the key problem. Constructions such as '*Socrates est homo*', '*Socrates est albus*' and '*Socrates est currens*' are, as it were, "non-literal" forms of predication.¹¹² In these constructions '*est*' is not the member by the exclusive means of which the terms may be joined to one another, it is reduced more to functioning as a helping verb.

(C) It is necessary to distinguish between the broad question which

general structural description of the proposition is most suitable and the questions which are encountered in the course of the logical analysis of particular propositions. Supposition theory as a theory of the interpretability of the terms of the proposition and modal theory as a theory of the determinability of the linkage of subject and predicate are not bound exclusively to any one of the theories of predication distinguished here and are compatible with all of them. The distinction both of the kinds of supposition and of modalities is indeed suitable for a differentiating analysis, independent of the position one takes on the controversy of predication theory, one which belongs to the philosophy of logic. One may suppose that this contributed to the modest estimation among logicians of the time as to the importance of the discussion of underlying principles. All interest was drawn by the *ars sermocinalis* then being developed.

In scholarly writings on medieval predication theory, the inherence theory and the identity theory are mentioned time and again as the two competing models for predication theory.¹¹³ According to the identity theory, in an affirmative proposition one asserts that the subject term and the predicate term stand for the same individual (or individuals); thus both terms are interpreted extensionally. According to the inherence theory, however, the predicate term must be understood intensionally: it is asserted that the "universal nature" (form) signified by the predicate term inheres in at least one (or in all) of the individuals denoted by the subject term,¹¹⁴ or, to say it another way, that the individuals denoted by the subject term are of the universal form signified by the predicate term. As has been shown,¹¹⁵ Abelard is familiar with the question whether the predicate term indicates the form literally or the bearers of the form. He discusses it in his analysis of propositions in which an accident is predicated of individuals, but the discussion is conducted in such a manner that it can be applied only to this type of proposition or contents. So Abelard is by no means concerned to lay the groundwork for a new theory of predication with this discussion. He is merely dealing with a minor problem which was bound to come up in the course of reflections on the deep structure of a particular type of proposition, regardless of the position one started from.

III. REFLECTIONS

After Abelard, the two-part analysis of the proposition won no further adherents. Subsequent logicians of the twelfth century did not feel com-

pelled to refute it, either. Abelard's theory was simply not to be found in the universe of discourse. It was considered obvious that it is the copula which forms the proposition inasmuch as it relates the subject and predicate terms to each other. Now as long as the equivocation theory (II. B. 1.1.) and the theory maintaining the semantic and functional interrelation of the verb of existence and the copula (II. B. 1.2.) competed with each other, the thought of ending the dispute by taking up the position counter to both (II. B. 2) would not have been far-fetched. But the actual resolution came from an unexpected source.

In the thirteenth century the reception of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' took place in the European schools. This is the theory of being as such. One of the methodological instructions given by Aristotle in order to open up a new area of research is to pay attention to the various aspects of the meaning of words and to investigate the interrelations between them.¹¹⁶ The semantics of the word '*est*' inevitably became the central theme of discussion now. Since the equivocation theory did not satisfy the second part of Aristotle's instruction, the theory quickly came to be regarded as obsolete. The opposing theory, on the other hand, fitted the theoretical requirements of the time perfectly.¹¹⁷

Is "the logic of being" a theme which ontology brings to logic? Is this theme of central importance to logic only when logic is understood as being bound up with a metaphysical "theory of being"? The readers of this volume will be in a better position to reflect on the question than an author who has presently but a single voice in the concert.

When surveyed from the distance of history, Abelard's contributions, as reported on here, show a common tendency. From the discussions of his contemporaries, Abelard was familiar with the problems which confront someone trying to answer the question whether '*est*' is semantically ambiguous. His strategy was first to remove the word '*est*' from the limelight in which it had stood for his predecessors and contemporaries. The logic and semantics of the word '*est*' did not necessarily constitute the central problem at the basis of a theory of the proposition and the *sermocinalis scientia*. Abelard's question was no longer why 'to be' was the verb used to form the proposition. The question he had to answer was why 'to be' could be substituted for inflected verb forms. Unlike the adherents of the equivocation theory, he sought to account for this linguistic phenomenon. Unlike the opponents of the theory, he attempted to do so not by offering a broadly encompassing theory,¹¹⁸ but by offering one which bore a minimal burden of argumentation. 'To be' meant that something is simply given, that it exists, has existed, or will

exist. And because it meant nothing more than this, it lent itself to functioning as an auxiliary verb to indicate the time for which the truth of a proposition was to be asserted.

The theories of predication introduced in Part II of this essay are all tenable and also flexible enough to come to terms with the material of which such theories treat, namely with the proposition in normal language. Abelard realized this. Although he is one who normally does not let any opportunity for apagogic argumentation pass by, he makes no attempt to demonstrate that the three-part analysis of the proposition is inconsistent or not appropriate for the description of all types of propositions. Problems of the logic of tense and of propositions whose subject terms signify something which does not exist can also be resolved within the framework of the copula theories. To this end it must be shown that the meanings of the terms of a proposition are displaced or amplified in a specific manner when the copula is put into the past or future tense or when it is supplemented by a modal expression or an expression of knowing or being of an opinion.

Abelard is able to adopt the terminology of the copula theories without reservation. When he refers to his theory as being "more elegant", he is thinking of the problems just reviewed. But one must bear in mind here that the logic of occasional sentences was accorded a much greater relative weight in medieval systems of logic than in modern ones. For Abelard, the occasional sentence is not a special case requiring the development out of general logic of a special branch to be called the logic of tenses. The occasional sentence is truly the normal case in his eyes, so that logical theory must come to terms with it right from the beginning, at its foundations. Thus a tense indicator is to be counted as a basic feature of the predicate. It specifies the relationship between the point in time at which the proposition is made and the content of the proposition. Is the two-part analysis indeed more elegant when seen in the context of logical theory as a whole and not merely of particular detail problems, assuming that the occasional sentence and a logic of tense corresponding to it play a central role?

What kind of a structure would a logic have to have which did not from time to time merely bring in the two-part analysis to help clarify specific problems but which took the two-part analysis as its foundation? Up to now I have described the logical standard form of the proposition rudimentarily as ' $X \psi - t$ '. When, instead of a personal name, a general term is placed in the subject position, distributors must be added specifying whether the predicate is to be asserted for all or only for some of the

individuals which fall under the subject term. Now the denotative use of a noun is based on a predication.¹¹⁹ 'A man' amounts to 'some thing that is a man'. 'All men' amounts to 'every thing that is a man'.¹²⁰ 'Is' serves here, as in all other cases, as a replacement for the tense indicator as contained in the verb ending. Abelard shows this to be the case in passages on the proper conversion of temporally specific propositions.¹²¹ He gives the sentence, 'Every old man was once young (*Omnis senex fuit puer*)', as an example. By interchanging subject and predicate, a universal affirmative proposition can be transformed into a particular affirmative proposition. Abelard emphasizes in his discussions that the tense indicator of the predicate must also be transferred to the subject position: 'Some of the men who were once young. . .'. Likewise, the original subject must be given a tense indicator when it goes to the predicate position: '. . . are now old'. The original proposition can be reformulated in the same fashion: 'All men who are now old were once young'. The form of a proposition explained with the help of quantors and tense indicators is then as follows:

'All/some which $\psi - t, \varphi - t'$.

It should be clear that a negating word can be added to the first predicate as well as to the second. The tense indicator must also be given. Thus:

'All/some which [not] $\psi - t \langle \psi - t_0 \vee \psi - t_m \vee \psi - t_n \rangle$,
[not] $\varphi - t \langle \varphi - t_0 \vee \varphi - t_m \vee \varphi - t_n \rangle$ '.

The transition from occasional propositions to propositions whose truth value does not change with time, as, for example, in '*(omnis) homo est animal*', can be made without difficulty. Since one merely needs to abstract from the time of the utterance of the proposition, the transition consists of nothing more than an act of simplification. The tense no longer needs to be indicated specifically, for this function will now be absorbed by a quantor which is to stand before the proposition. Thus we have: 'Whenever some thing is a human being, it is an animal'.¹²² Expressed formally, this becomes:

'For every point in time t : All/some which $\psi - t, \varphi - t'$.

APPENDIX

After the completion of my paper, the editors have kindly given me the opportunity to call the reader's attention to Kretzmann's article 'The Culmination of the Old Logic in Peter Abelard' (in R. L. Benson and G.

Constable (eds.), *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, pp. 488–501). Kretzmann's admirably clearly written contribution shares to a considerable extent the themes which I have dealt with here. At the centre of his discussion is Abelard's theory of predication, more specifically the logic of 'is'. Kretzmann distinguishes between three-piece predication and two-piece predication, and discusses the various theories in whose terms Abelard examines the role of the copula in three-piece predication and that of the substantive verb in two-piece predication.

I cannot accept Kretzmann's attempt to prove that a development took place in Abelard's thinking on these matters, one which started from an "*Ingredientibus* theory", then a "*Dialectica* revision" and a "*Dialectica* theory", ending with a "*Dialectica* suggestion". As Kretzmann indicates, the "*Ingredientibus* theory" was not, even at the time when it was written, Abelard's last word on the problems connected with the theory of predication. The "*Dialectica* theory", like the "*Dialectica* suggestion", can be documented by reference to the *Logica 'Ingredientibus'* (see above, I.1.; I.2.b., Note 52 and Note 55; I.2.c. resp. I.2.a.). The array of different theories in Abelard's work is not to be explained in chronological terms. As the title of his article shows, Kretzmann sees Abelard as an autumnal figure, a man reaping the harvest which had been grown on the ground of the 'old logic'. I see Abelard as more flexible and more restless. In his discussions, he neglects no question which has once been asked nor any suggested answer; but it is just through this placing in juxtaposition of a variety of suggestions that he allows himself to be led along quite new paths. And a theory which challenges the whole of previous tradition as emphatically as does Abelard's two-piece theory of predication must be placed more decisively in the foreground of his work than appears in Kretzmann's paper.

The fact that it is possible precisely to describe the points of disagreement between us shows at the same time to what a great extent we are in accord. In fact it is not only the manner of our approaches which is very similar, nor do we merely both discover different theories of predication in Abelard's thought; we also name, describe, and evaluate them in ways which are largely similar. Such broad agreement encourages me to believe that in our attempts to understand this author, we find ourselves moving in the right direction.

NOTES

Parts of the following essay have been published in German; see Jacobi (1980) and Jacobi (1981). The invitation to contribute to the present volume has given me a gratifying opportunity to reexamine my earlier research, to incorporate supplementary material, and to strive toward greater precision and clarity. I wish to thank C. Sam Farler for preparing the English translation.

¹Cf. Jolivet (1969), Chapter IV; de Rijk (1980). Also compare Häring (1975), who explains the meager transmission of Abelard's works as at least partially attributable to Abelard's style of thinking and writing. His philosophical "works" were not written as books intended to be recopied and handed down but as records of his own thinking to be used in teaching. A thesis which he adheres to with conviction at one point in his writings may reappear later or even in a reworking of the first source as being subject to doubt or in need of revision.

²Petrus Abailardus, *Logica 'Ingredientibus', Super Peri ermenias*, 336,27 – 340,18. Compare the notes of textual criticism in Jacobi (1981) pertaining to the edition of Abelard's commentary on *Peri Hermeneias* from which I quote.

³ Cf. Petrus Abailardus, *Dialectica*, 118,1 – 120,20.

⁴ *Super Peri erm.*, 337,11 – 32.

⁵ Loc. cit. 337,41 – 338,7.

⁶ Loc. cit. 336,24 – 37; 337,33 – 40. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 140 – 141.

⁷ *Super Peri erm.*, 338,21 – 339,4; cited 338,39 – 339,4: 'Si' vero vel 'et' sive aliae multae, quid significant, non est promptum assignare vel cuius rei imaginem eorum intellectus habeat subiectam. Si enim significant, utique intellectum constituunt, ad quod necesse est esse vel rem vel imaginem rei, in qua nitatur intellectus. Sed cuiusmodi rem vel cuiusmodi figmentum imaginis per 'si' sive per 'et' concipimus, numquid ad modum substantiae vel qualitatis vel ad quem modum, ut sanus consistat intellectus?

⁸ Loc. cit., 339,5 – 7.

⁹ Loc. cit., 339,7 – 11.

¹⁰ Loc. cit., 339,11 – 19.

¹¹ Loc. cit., 339,20 – 32; cited 339,24 – 32: Licet ('est' et 'non est') intellectus non constituent, quandam tamen coniunctionem vel disiunctionem intellectarum rerum in anima haberi faciunt, quam tamen coniunctionem vel disiunctionem non significant, licet haberi faciant, quia intellectum non dant in se, sed intellectorum coadiunctionem vel separationem habere nos faciunt. Sunt itaque tres actiones in intellectu propositionis, intellectus scilicet partium, coniunctio vel disiunctio intellectarum rerum. Nec est incongruum, si ea actio, quae intellectus non est, sit pars intellectus totius propositionis. Cf. 339,32 – 340,2. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 141 – 142; Tweedale (1976), pp. 231 – 234.

¹² *Super Peri erm.*, 340,2 – 6: Sicut autem 'est' vel 'non est' coniunctiva vel disiunctiva sunt, non significativa, ita 'si' vel 'non si' significativas voces copulant vel separant, ut ipsa tamen non significant, cum nullius rei in se conceptiones teneant sive verae sive fictae, sed animum inclinant ad quandam concipiendi modum.

¹³ Cf. Tweedale (1976), p. 234.

¹⁴ Cf. Kretzmann (1982).

¹⁵ *Super Peri erm.*, 346,1 – 351,22.

¹⁶ *Dial.*, 130,6 – 8; 130,26 – 131,3; 132,21 – 133,28.

¹⁷ Priscianus, *Inst. gramm.*, II 18, t. I, p. 55,8 – 9; VIII 1, t. I, p. 369,2 – 3; XVII 14, t. II, p. 116,26 – 27. Cited by Abelard, *Super Peri erm.*, 346,1 – 2; *Dial.*, 132,38 – 133,2.

¹⁸ *Super Peri erm.*, 346,1–4; *Dial.*, 130,6–7.

¹⁹ *Super Peri erm.*, 346,4–12. Cf. de Rijk (1981a), p. 30.

²⁰ *Super Peri erm.*, 346,13–24: *Verbum etiam substantivum 'sum, es, est' dupliciter accipi dicunt, cum modo in vi verbi sumitur, modo in vi substantivi. In vi quidem verbi sumitur, cum aequivoco pro quibuslibet verbis sumitur tam actionem quam passionem significantibus, ut scilicet tantumdem valeat quantum 'amo' vel 'lego' vel 'curro' vel 'amor' vel 'legor' etc. Cum vero in ea significatione sumitur in qua est substantivum, tunc omnia in essentia significat. Unde secundum aliam significationem est verbum, cum videlicet quaslibet actiones vel passiones ut adiacentes significat, et secundum aliam institutionem substantivum, cum scilicet quaelibet in essentia significat tam actiones vel passiones quam res alias, et tunc quoque aequivoco sumitur, ut tantumdem valeat quantum vel 'substantia' vel 'quantitas' vel 'qualitas' etc. quae in essentia significant res.* Cf. the excerpts from *Glosule super Priscianum maiorem*, which de Rijk (1967), p. 102, gives.

²¹ Cf. de Rijk (1981a), p. 30.

²² *Super Peri erm.*, 346,36–347,22; 348,2–14; cf. *Dial.*, 132,36–133,28.

²³ Aristoteles, *De int.* c.3, 16 b 6–9, Arist. lat. 7,1–5; Petrus Abailardus, *Super Peri erm.*, 346,25–36; 347,38–348,2; 348,15–28; 350,40–351,2.

²⁴ *Super Peri erm.*, 346,32–36: *Nam 'amans' in designatione eiusdem actionis et nomen est et participium, nec differt nisi in significatione tantum temporis, quando nomen est et participium. Similiter 'ens' et nomen et participium esse potest in eadem significatione essentiae, si modo cum tempore modo sine tempore sumitur.* Cf. 347,2–6; 348,15–28.

²⁵ Loc. cit., 348,28–349,1.

²⁶ Loc. cit., 348,21–28: *... singula nomina secundum proprias significationes verba requirunt, si essent, qui imponerent, substantiva quidem, ut 'esse substantiam, fuisse, fore' vel 'quantitatem' vel 'qualitatem' vel 'corpus' vel 'colorem' vel 'hominem' vel 'albedinem', sumpta vero verba ut 'esse quale' vel 'fuisse' vel 'fore' vel 'coloratum' vel 'album', sicut 'ambulare' vel 'ambulasse' vel 'sedere' vel 'sedisse' dicimus pro 'esse' vel 'fuisse ambulante' vel 'sedente'. Nil enim, inquit Aristoteles, differre 'hominam ambulare' et 'ambulante esse'.*

²⁷ Loc. cit., 349,1–350,39; 351,10–22; cf. *Dial.*, 138,11–141,3. Cf. Tweedale (1976), pp. 285–292; 298–302; de Rijk (1981a), p. 28.

²⁸ *Super Peri erm.*, 349,6–19; cf. *Dial.*, 138,26–139,3.

²⁹ *Super Peri erm.*, 350,19–39.

³⁰ *Dial.*, 139,12–140,14.

³¹ *Super Peri erm.*, 346,25–28: *Nobis autem placet omnia verba dici ab Aristoteles quaecumque cum aliquo tempus habent significare, et sicut nomina quaedam res in essentia significant, quaedam ex adiacenti proprietate, ita etiam verba.* Cf. the passage cited in Note 26. As shown there, substantives signifying properties on the one hand ('qualitatem. . .', 'colorem. . .', 'albedinem esse/fuisse/fore') and properties as attributable on the other hand ('quale. . .', 'coloratum. . .', 'album esse/fuisse/fore') can be made into verbs by using the helping verb 'esse'. Cf. further 347,38–348,2: *Sicut ergo nomina substantialia inveniuntur, ita et verba, et sicut nomina quaedam sumpta sunt, ita etiam verba non solum ab actionibus vel passionibus, verum etiam ab aliis formis, ut 'sedeo' a 'sessione' sumptum est.*

³² Loc. cit., 347,23–26: *Volumus itaque verbum substantivum in eadem significatione retentum, scilicet qua omnia significat in essentia, et substantivum esse et verbum et idem semper notari in ipso. Veluti cum dicitur 'homo est' et 'albedo est', eundem ubique sensum 'est' verbum tenet, ac si diceret 'est aliquid de numero existentium'. The explanation of 'est' by 'est aliquid de numero existentium' is to be found at this point only in manuscript*

B, not in manuscript A, upon which B. Geyer's edition is based. Compare also 362, 20–23, which is also to be found in Geyer's edition.

³³ Aristoteles, *De int.* c.3 16 b 7; 16 b 9–10. *Translatio Boethii*, Arist. lat., 7,2–3; 7,5–6: *et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota. . . et semper eorum quae de altero dicuntur nota est, ut eorum quae de subiecto vel in subiecto.*

³⁴ *Super Peri erm.*, 351,23–354,5; cf. 357,16–363,24.

³⁵ Loc. cit., 352,4–7: *In quo innuit (Aristoteles) verba maxime propter praedicationem inventa, nomina vero propter subiectionem, ut ex his integram propositionis constitutionem doceat.*

³⁶ Loc. cit., 351,23–31: *“Et est semper”. Data definitione, qua omne verbum includit tam copulativum praedicati quam non, tam rectum quam casuale, tam finitum quam infinitum, quandam proprietatem verbi supponit, ex qua vim maximam in propositione praedictiva, de qua intendit, verbum habere monstrat. Unde in sequentibus dicit nullam enuntiationem absque verbo consistere. Haec est autem proprietas, quod verbum semper est nota, id est copula, praedicatorum de altero, id est copulativum est praedicatorum, quae praedicata de altero quam de ipsis verbis copulantibus necesse est praedicari.*

³⁷ *Dial.*, 129, 21–26: *Quod itaque dixit verbum semper esse notam eorum quae de altero praedicantur, omne verbum monstravit habere officium copulandi praedicatum subiecto nec illud “semper” ad temporem, immo ad verborum comprehensionem referendum est. Potest enim verbum per se proferri nec aliquid copulare; semper tamen secundum inventionem suam copulativum est.*

³⁸ Loc. cit., 121, 28–29; 122, 13–21.

³⁹ Loc. cit., 122, 17–21: *Nomina. . . non. . . sicut verba tempus consignant, ut scilicet, quemadmodum dictum est, primam significationem subiectis personis secundum tempus distribuere dicantur. Sed cur non?*

⁴⁰ Loc. cit., 122, 22–29: *Sicut enim ‘curro’ vel ‘currens’ cursum circa personam tanquam ei praesentialiter inhaerentem demonstrat, ita ‘album’ circa substantiam albedinem tamquam praesentialiter inhaerentem determinat; non enim album nisi ex praesenti albedine dicitur. Unde et tantum ‘albi’ nomen dicere videtur, quantum quidem praesentialiter albedine est informatum, sicut et ‘currens’ in quodam praesentialiter cursum participat. Sicut enim substantivi verbi significatio, cui quoque tempus adiunctum est, verbis adiungitur, sic et nominibus videtur. Cf. Tweedale (1982), p. 144.*

⁴¹ *Dial.*, 123,9–15: *Quod itaque tempus verbis accedit, hoc etiam nominibus congruit, praesens scilicet, sive ea sint substantiae sive adiacentiae vocabula. Sicut enim ‘album’ ex praesenti albedine datum est, ita etiam ‘homo’ ex praesenti substantia animalis rationalis mortalis, et quem hominem dicis, iam animal rationale mortale ipsum ostendis et tantumdem ‘hominis’ vocabulum sonat, quantum quidem praesentialiter ‘est animal rationale mortale’. Cf. de Rijk (1981b), pp. 29–30.*

⁴² *Dial.*, 123,2–5: *Male ergo per “sine tempore” nomina, quae etiam temporis designativa monstrantur, Aristoteles verbis disiunxisse videtur; eiusdem, inquam, temporis consignificativa cuius et verba, idest praesentis.*

⁴³ Cf. Jacobi (1981), pp. 56–59; 67–68.

⁴⁴ Tweedale's (1982) interpretation is different. He understands Abelard as associating a tense with the isolated noun, generally the present (p. 146; cf. p. 144). In this case the noun must change its meaning when it comes after a copula in past or future tense (p. 146). In this interpretation the wording of the passage has not been attended to with sufficient care. Nor is it clear how a noun in isolation is to convey a time connotation in addition to its main meaning. Moreover, in *Super Peri erm.*, 349,31–33, Abelard speaks out against the very theory which Tweedale attributes to him: *Si quis autem dicat ‘homo’ per adconiunc-*

tionem verbi 'fuit' transire in significationem praeteritorum, quia verbum adconiunctum tempus praeteritum significat, non videtur recto. Compare the further discussions at 349,33–350,5.

⁴⁵ *Dial.*, 123,15–25: Non tam igitur in significatione temporis nomen a verbo recedere videtur quam in modo significandi. Verbum enim, quod solum inhaerentiam facit, in eo tempus quoque designat quod inhaerentiam rei suae ad subiectam personam in tempore denotat. Nomen autem inhaerendi significationem non tenet nec aliquid quemadmodum verbum inhaerere proponit, etsi rem aliquando ut inhaerentem determinet, ut 'album' albedinem tamquam adiacentem atque inhaerentem significat, non tamen vel adiacere vel inhaerere proponit, sicut verbum facit, quod etiam substantivi verbi copulationem adiunctam propriae significationi continet; tantumdem enim 'currit' verbum proponit quantum 'est currens' dicit. Cf. 148,26–30; 149,20–26. Cf. Tweedale (1982), pp. 144–145.

⁴⁶ *Dial.*, 129,18–21: In quo quidem ipse (Aristoteles) monstravit omne verbum cum officio copulandi vel ea quae tantum dicuntur de subiecto – nec scilicet sunt in subiecto – ut 'homo' et 'rationale', vel ea etiam quae sunt in subiecto, temporis quoque significationem continere.

⁴⁷ Loc. cit., 123,20–21, cited in Note 45.

⁴⁸ Within the context of a different theme, Abelard gives great attention to impersonal propositions. Compare Tweedale (1976), pp. 244–272; the same (1982), pp. 147–148.

⁴⁹ *Super Peri erm.*, 359,9–363,24; *Dial.*, 134,28–141,3; cf. *Super Peri erm.*, 351,31–34; 351,37–40; *Dial.*, 159,11–160,13; 161,24–165,9; 167,6–168,10; 170,21–30. Cf. Tweedale (1976), pp. 228; 242–244; 292–297; the same (1982), pp. 145–147; de Rijk (1981a), pp. 21–28; the same (1981b), pp. 33–38.

⁵⁰ De Rijk (1981b), p. 33, section heading; cf. the same (1981a), p. 21, section heading.

⁵¹ *Dial.*, 134,30–32; 161,28–32; *Super Peri erm.*, 359,22–28; 362,7–10.

⁵² *Dial.*, 134,28–31; 135,6; *Super Peri erm.*, 362,7–8.

⁵³ *Dial.*, 135,6–8; *Super Peri erm.*, 362, 20–23.

⁵⁴ *Super Peri erm.*, 359,32–360,2.

⁵⁵ *Dial.*, 134,28–34; *Super Peri erm.*, 362,4–7. In *Dial.*, 138,17–20, this thesis is ascribed to Aristotle; cf. *De int.* c.11, 21 a 26–28, *Arist. lat.* 25,15–17.

⁵⁶ *Super Peri erm.*, 360,15–18: cum in essentia quaelibet significet, numquam ei copulatio essentiae deest, quia ubique per ipsum proponitur aliquid aliud esse, etiam quando adiectivis adiungitur, veluti cum dicitur: 'iste est albus'. cf. 361,12–25; *Dial.*, 131,4–6; 131,23–25; 138,7–10.

⁵⁷ Cf. de Rijk (1981a), pp. 21–24; the same (1981b), pp. 33–35. In both places de Rijk is speaking about *Super Peri erm.*, 360,9–361,3.

⁵⁸ Cf. *Super Peri erm.*, 362,23–34; *Dial.*, 135,11–13; 136,37–137,6; 162,10–12.

⁵⁹ *Super Peri erm.*, 362,13–20.

⁶⁰ Loc. cit., 360,18–361,3; see de Rijk (1981a), pp. 21–24; the same (1981b), pp. 33–35. The background for this thesis is formed by the distinction between *esse in subiecto* and *dici de subiecto*, which Aristotle makes in *Categories*, Chapter 2. Cf. Petrus Abailardus, *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*, *Super Praedicamenta*, 126,27–133,31; 145,25–146,18; *Super Peri erm.*, 352, 13–22; 352,35–353,2; *Super Top.* (ed. dal Pra), 274,10–275,29; see de Rijk (1967), pp. 204–205.

⁶¹ *Dial.*, 131,33–132,13.

⁶² *Super Peri erm.*, 361,12–25; *Dial.*, 135,9–138,26; cf. de Rijk (1981a), pp. 24–28; the same (1981b), pp. 35–37; Tweedale (1976), pp. 292–297; *Dial.*, 162,16–18; 167,6–168,2; 168,11–169,28.

⁶³ *Super Peri erm.*, 361,22–25; *Dial.*, 136,32–36; 168, 21–25.

⁶⁴ *Dial.*, 135,24–25; 135,36–136,36; 168,11–17.

⁶⁵ *Super Peri erm.*, 362,21–25: 'Est' verbum. . . secundo praedicatum id ex propria inventionione tenet, ut tam existentia quam non existentia copulet. Copulet inquam quod intelligitur tantum ex supposita voce. Loc. cit., 362,32–34: Unde interpositum tertium nil significationis in se tenet, quod in intellectu copulet, sed tantum rem praedicati suppositi.

⁶⁶ *Dial.*, 136,37–137,8: At vero mihi omnis illa verbi praedicatio per accidens atque impropria videtur, quando ipsum, ut dictum est, tertium adiacens interponitur, cum non rem, ut dictum est, praedicatam contineat, sed solius copulae officium habeat, ut in ea quoque qua dicitur: 'Petrus est homo' vel '. . . albus'. Nec quidem quantum ad eius interpretationem pertinet, ex eo quod dicitur: 'Petrus est homo', inferri potest 'Petrus est', sed fortasse quantum ad praedicationem 'hominis', quod existentis rei tantum nomen est. Si enim, quia verbum copula interponitur, simpliciter praedica(re)tur, et ex eo quod dicitur: 'chimaera est opinabilis' vel 'non existens', chimaera esse concederetur.

⁶⁷ De Rijk (1981a), p. 27.

⁶⁸ *Dial.*, 138,11–17.

⁶⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *De int.* c.4, 16 b 26–27, *Translatio Boethii*, Arist. lat., 7,20–21: Oratio autem est vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatum. Cf. Petrus Abailardus, *Dial.*, 146,34–148,16.

⁷⁰ Cf. Boethius, *In Peri herm.*, II, 8,30–9,5; Petrus Abailardus, *Dial.*, 148,18–151,4.

⁷¹ Cf. Boethius, loc. cit., 9,6–15; Petrus Abailardus, loc. cit., 151,5–153,2.

⁷² Aristoteles, *De int.* c.4, 16 b 33–17 a 4, Arist. lat., 8,6–10. The formulation cited stems from Boethius, *De diff. top.* I, 1174 B 7–8. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 132–135.

⁷³ *Super Peri erm.*, 330,11–18; cf. 325,24–326,15; see also Nuchelmans (1973), p. 143.

⁷⁴ *Super Peri erm.*, 327,1–4: Nam 'homo currens' vel 'homo non currens' nil intellectu discrepare videtur ab 'homo currit' vel 'homo non currit', quia eadem est animi conceptio hic et ibi, in coniunctione scilicet cursus ad hominem vel disiunctione.

⁷⁵ Loc. cit., 327,7–13; cf. 329,29–330,36.

⁷⁶ Cf. loc. cit., 327,27–40.

⁷⁷ Loc. cit., 327,14–23.

⁷⁸ Loc. cit., 327,40–41: Unde ex modo proponendi enuntiationes sive propositiones maxime dicuntur. Cf. *Dial.*, 149,11–16: Sed dico hoc ad perfectionem orationis non sufficere, ut quasi adiacentem homini albedinem vel cursum determinemus, nisi etiam adiacere dicamus, quod sine verbo fieri non contingit. In hoc enim verbum a participio abundat quod non solum personam per impositionem demonstrat aut ei cohaerentem actionem vel passionem significat, verum etiam cohaerere dicit.

⁷⁹ *Super Peri erm.*, 327,23–26: Similiter et cum dicimus 'verum est Socratem sedere', oratio subiecta, quae est 'Socratem sedere', eundem intellectum constituit, quem 'Socrates sedet', nec tamen modum enuntiandi habet affirmando vel negando, ut propositio dici possit.

⁸⁰ Cf. *Dial.*, 154,4–29; 204,29–205,30; see also Tweedale (1976), pp. 217–219; 265–266.

⁸¹ *Super Peri erm.*, 307,26–30: Nomina... et verba duplicem significationem habent, unam quidem de rebus, alteram de intellectibus. Res enim significant constituendo intellectus ad eas pertinentes, hoc est naturam aliquam earum vel proprietatem attendentes. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 139–140.

⁸² *Super Peri erm.*, 326,30–31: Sanus autem est omnis intellectus tam simplex quam compositus, per quem attendimus, ut res se habet.

⁸³ Loc. cit., 326,31–37, cited 326,33–34: . . . ut 'homo' quamdiu homo subsistit, sanum intellectum generat. Cf. 321,21–36; also 332,30–334,17. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), p. 144.

⁸⁴ *Super Peri erm.*, 365,21–30; *Dial.*, 157,17–22.

⁸⁵ *Super Peri erm.*, 366,6–27; 367,2–9; 368,1–8; *Dial.*, 160,14–21.

⁸⁶ *Super Peri erm.*, 366,27–40; *Dial.*, 157,23–158,3.

⁸⁷ Cf. Jolivet (1969), pp. 77–85; 201–203; de Rijk (1975), pp. 549–555; Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 150–161; Tweedale (1976), pp. 216–278.

⁸⁸ Aristoteles, *De int.* c. 1, 16 a 17–18, *Arist. lat.*, 6,1–2.

⁸⁹ Boethius, *In Peri herm.* I, 44,9–10; 44,15–16; II, 48,32–49,4; 49,18–21.

⁹⁰ *Dial.*, 150,13–20; cf. *Super Peri erm.*, 366,37–40; *Dial.*, 160,26–29.

⁹¹ *Super Peri erm.*, 365,31–38; 367,9–20; 368,1–30; *Dial.*, 160,14–15; 160,23.

⁹² *Dial.*, 160,23–26.

⁹³ *Super Peri erm.*, 361,30–36; 370,4–22; 390,11–393,27; *Super Peri erm.* B, §§ 22–31.

⁹⁴ Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 149–150; 153–154; Tweedale (1976), pp. 244–272.

⁹⁵ *Super Peri erm.*, 370,11–15; cf. Nuchelmans (1973), p. 155; Tweedale (1976), pp. 264–265.

⁹⁶ *Super Peri erm.*, 370,15–22.

⁹⁷ *Super Peri erm.* B, § 30; see also Tweedale (1976), pp. 263–264.

⁹⁸ *Super Peri erm.* B, § 31, p. 20,19–25: *Dicimus itaque 'necessarium' sive 'possibile' in huiusmodi enuntiationibus magis consignificare quam per se significationem habere; nil quippe in eis est intelligendum nisi subiecte orationi applicentur, et tunc modum concipiendi faciunt circa res subiecte orationis sicut facit verbum interpositum vel coniunctio, si que ad necessitatem copulat.*

⁹⁹ Aristoteles, *De int.* c. 12, 21 a 9–10, *Arist. lat.*, 27,3–4.

¹⁰⁰ *Dial.*, 161,8–15: *Est autem categoricarum natura secundum membra sive species demonstranda. Sunt autem membra ex quibus coniunctae sunt, praedicatum ac subiectum atque ipsorum copula, secundum hoc scilicet quod verbum a praedicto seorsum per se accipimus, veluti in ea propositione qua dicitur: 'homo est animal', 'animal' praedicatur, 'homo' vero subicitur, verbum vero interpositum praedicatum subiecto copulat; et in his quidem tribus categoricae propositionis sensus perficitur.* Most of the substantiating quotations used here and below are taken from Abelard's writings. The writings of Abelard's contemporaries have been preserved and edited only fragmentarily. It is in any case interesting and characteristic of the disputative style of Abelard's thinking that he takes on the whole gamut of possible positions in his writings.

¹⁰¹ *Super Peri erm.*, 339,20–32; 340,2–6; see above, pp. 147–148.

¹⁰² *Super Peri erm.*, 362,14–34; *Dial.*, 159,11–18; cf. above I.2.c.

¹⁰³ *Dial.*, 162,18–21.

¹⁰⁴ *Dial.*, 162,16–18; compare above, p. 157.

¹⁰⁵ *Dial.*, 137,3–8, cited above, Note 66.

¹⁰⁶ See the interpolation in *Glosule super Priscianum maiorem* (ed. by R. W. Hunt, 'Studies on Priscian in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, I: Petrus Helias and His Predecessors', *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* I, (1943), 194–231; here: 226,28–227,14) which de Rijk (1967), p. 103, quotes: *Cum. . . dico 'Socrates est', si consideremus 'est' in vi verbi, actiones quas significat, idest lectionem et alias, sub disiunctione copulat cum Socrate; si autem in vi substantivi, Socratem existentibus annumerare, idest quod Socrates est unum de existentibus dicere, intendo. . . . Nam illud (verbum substantivum) positum in propositione diversas essentias convenienter ad se invicem iungere affirmamus. Nam ex hoc quod omnes res in essentia significat, aptum est ad hoc ut quaslibet res sibi coherentes copulare possit, verbi gratia cum dico 'Socrates est animal', excluso respectu verbalis significationis, non prorsus tamen verbi proprietate separata, copulat enim ipsum 'est', quantum ad officium quod exercet in oratione in vi substantivi con-*

sideramus. Unde aperte rem animalis cum re hominis copulat. Non tamen negamus idem 'est' consideratum in ipsa oratione vim verbi obtinere; sed aliud est agere de vocibus per se consideratis, aliud de eisdem ad vim et officium quod habent in oratione posite relatis. Nam quantum ad vim huius orationis 'homo est animal', 'est' non per se tantum sed cum aliis hoc solum significat, quod illa res que est homo sit illa res que est animal. Hoc autem ex vi verbi habere non potest, immo ex vi substantivi. For Abelard's view compare *Super Peri erm.*, 347,23–27; 360,13–18.

¹⁰⁷ *Super Peri erm.*, 357,36–358,3.

¹⁰⁸ *Dial.*, 135,23–35. In *Dial.*, 168,11–169, 28, these interpretations are introduced as being the opinions of Abelard's teacher V. (Ulger).

¹⁰⁹ *Super Peri erm.*, 361,19–25; compare above, p. 157.

¹¹⁰ *Dial.*, 165,3–8; compare the further reference to the earlier discussion 170,21–31; compare also the formulation at 167,7–8: *secundum eos qui 'est' tertium adiacens praedicato non componunt, sed dictionem per se sumunt.*

¹¹¹ *Super Peri erm.*, 359,22–28; 362,7–10; 362,20–23; *Dial.*, 134,28–32; 161,28–32; compare above, p. 155.

¹¹² *Super Peri erm.*, 361,33–362,7; 362,23–36; *Dial.*, 134,32–135,6; 136,37–137,6; 138,11–17; compare above I.2.c.

¹¹³ Cf. Moody (1953), pp. 32–38; de Rijk (1967), pp. 102–106; 183–186; 203–205; 561–562; the same (1956), pp. XXXVIII–XL; Pinborg (1972), pp. 46; 53–55; Maierù (1972), pp. 199–206.

¹¹⁴ Aristotle's explication of the proposition based on the word 'hyparchei' surely forms the background here.

¹¹⁵ See above, p. 157.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Aristoteles, *Top.* I cc. 13 and 15.

¹¹⁷ Cf. William of Sherwood, *Syncategoremata*, pp. 70–71; Thomas Aquinas, *In Peri herm.*, L.I, I.V, §§ 70–73; see also Zimmermann (1971).

¹¹⁸ The countertheory to the equivocation theory is easily joined with metaphysical theorems about transcendentals and the *actus essendi* in the thirteenth century.

¹¹⁹ See above p. 154.

¹²⁰ Cf. Tweedale (1982), p. 149.

¹²¹ *Dial.*, 139,12–140,14; cf. *Super Peri erm.*, 350,35–39.

¹²² Cf. *Dial.*, 160,17–19. At *Dial.*, 279,8–282,33, Abelard distinguishes between the case that no more men exist and the case that none have as yet existed. In the latter case, '*animal*' would have a different meaning, namely no *impositio* for men.

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