Being and Thinking in the „Correctorium fratris Thomae" and the „Correctorium corruptorii Quare"

Schools of Thought and Philosophical Methodology

Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen (Nijmegen)

1. Introduction

The institutional setting of medieval philosophy and theology encouraged the establishing and inheriting of common patterns of reasoning originating in the set texts used and commented upon in the lecture hall of the universities and the *studia* of the religious orders. The interpretation of these texts was not uniform, but gave rise to conflicting views developed and passed on in different schools of thought. These schools were named after the master followed (*thomistae*, *albertistae*) or the opinions defended (*nominales*, *formalizantes*). Schools of thought can be observed throughout the late medieval period, sometimes being very prominent and dominating the intellectual landscape, as was the case at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries and through much of the fifteenth century[1]. The study of these school traditions provides insights into the dynamics of medieval thinking and reveals how philosophical thinking reacted to the changing of its institutional and educational settings. In this essay, I will examine the development of schools of thought by focusing on the earliest history of Thomism.

The course of events that gave birth to early Thomism has been extensively traced in recent research[2]. As has become clear, the „Correctorium fratris Thomae" compiled by the Franciscan William de la Mare before August 1277 caused the Dominicans to take a stand against the attacks of the Franciscans. In William's treatise, the theology of Thomas was criticized in no less than 118 arti-

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[1] On medieval schools of thought, see W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England, Princeton NJ 1987, and Z. Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et Realistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles (Quodlibet 2), Bergamo 1988. For the late medieval period, see also G.-R. Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts (Studien zur Geschichte der Universität zu Köln 13), Köln 1993.

[2] See F. J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque IA, 1964. A bibliography with a discussion of the literature on the subject is provided by C. Viola, L'École thomiste au Moyen Age, in: G. Fløistad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 6/1: Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages, Dordrecht 1990, 345–377.

cles[3]. The criticism was accepted by the Franciscans as their official answer to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. The Dominicans reacted by publishing a number of counter-attacks, in which they refuted the objections of William de la Mare and tried to show that the theology of Thomas Aquinas was philosophically sound and not against faith, as William had claimed[4]. Within the Dominican order itself, measures were also taken to defend Thomas Aquinas. It was forbidden to criticize his teaching or to bring forward objections without refuting them. Some years later, all lecturers were obliged to adhere to the teachings of Thomas and to order their students to do the same. Thomism had become the official doctrine of the Dominicans[5].

The actual putting into effect of the imposition to follow Thomas Aquinas still needs to be studied in more detail. It appears from the writings of the early Thomists that they did not all hold to the same views, even in their defense of the teachings of Thomas[6]. The official enforcement of the imposition itself seems to be ambiguous. Meister Eckhart criticized the views of Thomas without any disciplinary measures being taken against him, whereas Durandus of St Pourçain was heavily attacked because of his departure from Thomas[7]. This renders the question urgent of what actually makes a school of thought a ‚school of thought'. The example of early Thomism shows that the problem is complicated and needs to be investigated at different levels: the institutional and educational background, the political movements of the orders, the doctrinal views defended. Obviously, each of these factors played its part, but in different ways

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[3] The Correctorium fratris Thomae is edited in P. Glorieux (ed.), Les premières polémiques thomistes 1: Le Correctorium corruptorii Quare (Bibliothèque thomiste 9), Kain 1927. The dating of the Correctorium followed here is that of R. Hissette, L'implication de Thomas d'Aquin dans les censures Parisiennes de 1277, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 64 (1997), 3–31, esp. 6 n. 21. Shortly afterwards, William de la Mare composed a second enlarged version, but this version was not as important historically as the original treatise. On this second version, see R. Hissette, Trois articles de la seconde rédaction du Correctorium de Guillaume de la Mare, in: Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 51 (1984), 230–241. There existed also separate lists documenting the differences between Franciscans (Bonaventure) and Dominicans (Thomas Aquinas). See the references in F. Putallaz, Figure francescane alla fine del XIII secolo, Milan 1996, 36.

[4] The different counter-attacks, the so-called Correctoria corruptorii, are listed with further bibliographical references in L. Hödl, Korrektorienstreit, in: Lexikon des Mittelalters, Vol. 5, München 1991, 1448. These counter-attacks again provoked the criticism of the Franciscans. See Th. Schneider, Die Einheit des Menschen (BGPhThMA N. F. 8), Münster 1973, 94 n. 150.

[5] The relevant passages from the general chapters are quoted in Roensch, Early Thomistic School, 17 sq. and 25 sq.

[6] Cf. Roensch, ibid., 316; M. J. F. M. Hoenen, The Thomistic Principle of Individuation in Fifteenth Century Thomistic and Albertist Sources, in: Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 18 (1992), 327–357, esp. 330–337; F. Putallaz, Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Vestigia 15), Fribourg 1995, 119–123.

[7] Cf. Eckhart, Quaestiones Parisienses, ed. B. Geyer (Lateinische Werke 5), Stuttgart 1936, 43, and J. Koch, Kleine Schriften, Vol. 2 (Storia e Letteratura 128), Rome 1973 , 9–168 (criticism of Durandus of St Pourçain).

and with different effects. The institutional system was much more difficult to change than the adherence to a particular theory. Thus, within a stable institutional frame, theories could drift without changing the setting which carried them. To estimate adequately the developments within the school, it is therefore necessary to find the centers of gravity or the driving forces that constituted the unity even when things changed at different levels. This question can be answered satisfactorily only by studying the different aspects involved and how they were interrelated[8].

For the most part, modern research has concentrated on the doctrinal aspects of the schools of thought rather than on the different philosophical methodologies employed by them[9]. The methodological aspect, however, was of central importance in the discussion between Franciscans and Dominicans. In his criticism of Thomas Aquinas, it appears that William de la Mare had a distinct notion of sound philosophical methodology which he thought had been neglected by Thomas Aquinas. The main questions at issue were: what are the principles of philosophical reasoning, what are the basic principles of human knowledge about the divine, how are authoritative texts to be read, which authorities are to be quoted and when are they to be quoted[10]. The same goes for the Dominican replies to William de la Mare documented in the „Correctoria corruptorii". They, too, reflect assumptions about how to proceed properly in theology and philosophy, although different from those of William de la Mare[11]. To be sure, these notions were not always explicitly expressed. There was hardly any theoretical treatment of these principles. Rather, they were applied to the solution of specific problems and therefore need to be studied in their applications.

Within the limited scope of this essay, my focus will be on the different principles of philosophical methodology as they were applied in the earliest

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[8] For more discussion of the characteristics of late medieval schools of thought, see my: Thomismus, Skotismus und Albertismus. Das Entstehen und die Bedeutung von philosophischen Schulen im späten Mittelalter, in: Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 2 (1997), 81–103.

[9] An interesting but dated exception is Hufnagel, Studien zur Entwicklung des thomistischen Erkenntnisbegriffes im Anschluß an des Correctorium ‚Quare' (BGPhThMA 31/4), Münster 1935, 12. Important observations are also provided by M. Jordan, The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits of Metaphysics, in: Speculum 57 (1982), 292–314. For the fifteenth century, I touched on the methological aspects in my Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks. The Promptuarium Argumentorum (Cologne 1492), in: M. J. F. M. Hoenen, J. H. J. Schneider and G. Wieland (eds.), Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 6), Leiden 1995, 329–369, esp. 349–366.

[10] Cf. also B. Kent, Virtues of the Will. The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century, Washington DC 1995, 82–84.

[11] Cf. Schneider, Die Einheit des Menschen, 181–207, and Jordan, The Controversy of the Correctoria, 310–314.

documents of the history of Thomism, that is in the „Correctorium" of William
de la Mare and in the first Dominican reply to it, the „Correctorium corruptorii
Quare" by Richard Knapwell[12].

2. The „Correctorium fratris Thomae" and the „Correctorium corruptorii Quare"

Although the „Correctorium" of William de la Mare contains 118 separate
articles, there is a certain thematic coherence. Some points of criticism recur or
are discussed in more than one place[13]. They must have attracted the special
attention of William. The most important items repeatedly addressed are the
following: the nature of divine and human knowledge, the ontological status of
separate substances, the problem of the plurality of forms (*pluralitas formarum*)
and of the disposition of forms (*inchoatio formarum*), the eternity of the world,
the nature of the beatific vision, and the relationship between the intellect and
the will. The challenged views were selected from a large part of the theological
writings of Thomas, thereby underscoring the all-embracing nature of the criti-
cism: the first and second parts of the „Summa theologiae", the „Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate, de anima, de virtutibus", and „de potentia", the „Quaes-
tiones de quolibet" and the commentary on the „Sentences"[14]. There were no
passages discussed from the „Summa contra gentiles" or from the third part of
the „Summa theologiae", perhaps because these works were not available at the
time William was writing his treatise.

The views of Thomas were characterized as *error, contra fidem, contra auctoritates
sanctorum, contra Philosophum, contra philosophiam*, and they were deemed to give
rise to heretical opinions (*praebent occasionem errandi*)[15]. As it appears from this
list, William de la Mare considered the teachings defended by Thomas as against
faith and against the teachings of the Saints. But that was not the only criticism.
They contradicted human philosophical reasoning as well. By writing his „Cor-
rectorium", William aimed at eradicating the evil of these teachings by defending
faith and standing up for philosophy, since it was often the philosophical meth-
odology of Thomas which made him err in theology and matters of faith.

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[12] On the authorship of the Correctorium corruptorii Quare, see the introduction to Richard
Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, ed. F. E. Kelly (Bibliothèque Thomiste 44),
Paris 1982, 18–23.

[13] Related articles are listed in the table of contents added to the edition. See Glorieux, Les
premières polémiques thomistes 1: Le Correctorium corruptorii Quare, 433–437.

[14] Ibid.

[15] In most cases, these characterizations are given immediately after the incriminated passages
from the writings of Thomas; sometimes they appear in the counter-arguments developed by
William de la Mare. The first two articles illustrate this. See William de la Mare, Correctorium,
art. 1, 2: „*Ista positio* (sc. Thomae de visione beatifica) *videtur nobis falsa et contra auctoritates sancto-
rum*" and ibid., art. 2, 13: „*Hoc* (sc. dictum Thomae de cognitione singularium) *praebet occasionem
errandi (…). Praeterea, hoc est contra philosophiam (…)*".

As already mentioned, some items were attacked time and again. The question whether or not God had ideas of matter was discussed three times and each time the view of Thomas, who denied the existence of these ideas, was labeled as an error[16]. Obviously, William de la Mare was not only interested in the statements defended by Thomas. He also stressed that Thomas repeatedly erred on the same issue, thus highlighting the stubbornness and obstinacy of his mind[17]. In his opinion, Thomas did not depart from truth just occasionally: his errors were an inevitable result of the fundamentals of his philosophical approach.

The fundamental mistake in the approach by Thomas was not the use of Aristotle in theology, since William used Aristotle in exactly the same way. But he blamed Thomas for having misinterpreted Aristotle and for using his teachings incorrectly. The issue was not the authority of Aristotle, but how his writings should be understood[18]. Nor was the debate about the employment of philosophy in theology. William used philosophy as well. He divided his criticism between arguments based on authorities and those proceeding philosophically, the latter being much more elaborate than the former. He often tried to uncover philosophical inconsistencies or mistakes in the arguments of Thomas. For William, therefore, it was not just the conflict between reason and faith which was under discussion, but a specific philosophical methodology which he did not share with Thomas and which in his mind led to contradictions and errors in philosophy and theology[19].

The same goes for the Thomistic reply to William de la Mare in the „Correctorium corruptorii Quare". The author did not accuse William of following badly chosen authorities or of refusing to employ philosophical reasoning, but reproached him with persisting in fundamental philosophical mistakes. Most of these mistakes had the same roots: William did not sufficiently distinguish between substantial being and human understanding. He wrongly supposed that forms which could be distinguished in thinking as possessing an essence of their own had a corresponding separate nature in reality[20]. He thus confused the mode of speculative thinking with that of categorical being. Against this mistake, Richard Knapwell in his „Correctorium Quare" opposed the view of Thomas, who clearly had differentiated between the order of being and the order of thinking. For Thomas, distinctions made by the human mind did not always

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[16] Cf. ibid., art. 4 (Summa theologiae), 25; art. 79 (De veritate), 327; 97 (De potentia), 390.

[17] The notions of stubbornness and obstinacy (*pertinacia*) played an important role in the medieval concept of heresy. See W. Trusen, Der Prozeß gegen Meister Eckhart. Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Folgen, Paderborn 1988, 172 sq.

[18] Cf. also Schneider, Die Einheit des Menschen, 186, and Kent, Virtues of the Will, 81–84, and 247.

[19] Cf. also Hufnagel, Studien zur Entwicklung des thomistischen Erkenntnisbegriffes, 12 and 105 sq., and Jordan, The Controversy of the Correctoria, 313 sq.

[20] The examples discussed hereafter will illustrate this.

reflect essential or formal distinctions among individual things[21]. This belief led him to maintain and defend certain philosophical views, which helped to keep speech about God free from human errors. Richard adopted this distinction as his main methodological principle and used it to refute the attack of William de la Mare.

Against this background of the relationship between thinking and being, most of the views attacked by William strike one as being interrelated. The problems of the plurality and the disposition of forms, of the divine ideas of matter, and of the causation of accidental being (*ens per accidens*) revolve around the same methodological topic. According to William, Thomas did no justice to the essential pluriformity of real being as it appeared in human thinking, but only used the unity of the individual substance as a basic methodological precept. In his turn, Richard Knapwell accused William of reifying concepts and converting them into separate natures as part of reality, wrongly dividing up the nature of individual substances[22].

3. Human thinking and the multiplicity of essential predicates

The issue comes to the fore most prominently in the twelfth article, in which William discusses the view of Thomas that when speaking about immaterial substances, the difference between genus and difference does not exist in reality but only in the human mind, when man considers one and the same substance differently. If the substance is looked at generally (*ut quid indeterminatum*), the concept predicated of the substance is a genus or generic term. If the same substance is considered according to the property which distinguishes it from other substances (*ut quid determinatum*), the concept is called difference[23].

William de la Mare considered this view erroneous, since it was rooted in two other errors, namely that immaterial substances were not thought of as being compounded of matter and form, and that human beings necessarily had only one substantial form[24]. More importantly, however, he thought the position of Thomas to be wrong because it contained some serious epistemological difficulties. If the mind considers a separate substance generally, it cannot possibly consider the same substance distinctively at the same time. Therefore, if genus

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[21] This was especially the case when talking about the divine nature. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, quaest. 3, art. 3, ad 1: „*Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptatione intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei*".

[22] Similar observations were made by Hufnagel and Jordan in the studies cited above.

[23] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 12, 64 sq., esp. 64. Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, quaest. 50, art. 2, ad 1.

[24] William de la Mare, ibid., 64: „*Hic error oritur ex duobus aliis erroribus quorum unus est quod res spirituales, ut angelus et anima, non sunt compositae ex materia et forma; secundus est quod in homine sit tantum una forma substantialis (…)*".

and difference were to exist only as mental predicates, they could never be predicated together of the same separate substance at the same time[25]. Again, definitions and properties are not predicated of a thing because we think of it that way, as Thomas would have us believe, but because the thing has these properties itself. To make a proposition true, essential predicates asserted of the subject of the proposition have to correspond to mind-independent essential predicates of the thing the subject stands for[26].

In his „Correctorium Quare", Richard Knapwell reacted by giving a very interesting account of the nature of essential predicates. Genus and difference can only be predicated of the same thing essentially if they both stand for the same thing expressed by the nature of the individual substance[27]. In the proposition p ‚man is a living being with thinking power', the generic term ‚living being' and the difference ‚with thinking power' both refer to the same ‚man' denoted by the subject. Yet they do not refer to man in the same way. The generic term ‚living being' refers to him indeterminately. The meaning of the term is such that it can stand not only for him, but for other living beings as well. The difference ‚with thinking power', on the other hand, refers to him determinately. It highlights the property by which his nature is distinguished from that of other kinds of living beings. The distinction between genus and difference, therefore, does not reflect a distinction in the thing both terms stand for, but to a distinction between the meaning of the terms or concepts themselves[28].

To express the fact that genus and difference refer to terms or concepts, Knapwell calls them terms of second intention[29]. They do not refer to things in reality as terms of first intention do, but to mental concepts denoting how the mental concepts they refer to signify. The primary concepts concerning human knowledge of the outside world signify the nature of the individual. These concepts can be generalized by not allowing them to signify properties which are typical for the nature of the individual. Or they can be specified by allowing them to signify only the typical properties. These operations do not touch on the nature of the individual substance itself. They take place at the mental level

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[25] Ibid.: „(…) *si ita esset nunquam in rebus immaterialibus simul essent genus et differentia apud eumdem intelligentem*".

[26] Ibid., 65: „(…) *si considero angelum ut bonum vel ut malum, non propter hoc est bonus vel malus (…). Ergo si consideratio nostra non potest attribuere praedicata accidentialia, multo minus praedicata essentialia; talia autem sunt genus et differentia*".

[27] Cf. Knapwell, Quare, art. 12, 65 and 66: „*Si vero, ut isti* (sc. William de la Mare) *putant, genus et differentia dicant duas naturas reales diversas, impossibile foret quod de eadem natura specifica essentialiter dicerentur*".

[28] Ibid.: 66: „(…) *intellectus sic intelligens intentiones simplices generis et differentiae* (sc. indeterminate et determinate) *intelligit quod illae duae intentiones fundantur non super diversas naturas sed super diversos conceptus de una et eadem natura, aliter et aliter intellecta (…)*". Richard Knapwell is drawing here on the second and third chapters of Thomas's „De ente et essentia".

[29] Ibid., 65. On the notion of second intentions, see J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick (Problemata 10), Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1972, 90 – 92.

and concern the way the concepts signify[30]. The distinction between genus and difference is therefore only conceptual. There is no distinction in reality between different natures to which the conceptual distinction corresponds.

William de la Mare was blamed by Knapwell for postulating an immediate correspondence between different ways of signifying and different natures in reality. Because of his holding to this correspondence, he wrongly thought that the theory of Thomas was a threat to our understanding of the nature of angels and the human soul. According to William, angels and the human soul must have been composed of genus and difference, because they were composed of spiritual matter and form specifying the matter[31]. But for Knapwell there was no need to accept such a composition. The notion of ‚spiritual matter' was a ridiculous fiction born out of mixing thinking and being[32]. In alike fashion, Knapwell criticizes the theory of the plurality of forms. This theory was based on the wrong presupposition that the different aspects which could be distinguished when thinking about the nature of human beings, such as man's being and man's being an animal, exist as separate forms in the human being itself. By projecting mental structures on reality, the theory of the plurality of forms created more problems than it claimed to solve. For the author of „Quare", the real danger for theology lay not in the rejection but in the defense of this position[33].

As is clear from the references by William de la Mare and Richard Knapwell to the theories of ‚spiritual matter' and the plurality of forms, the issue of the relationship between being and thinking has repercussions for a number of other discussions. Some additional examples may further illustrate its importance: the theory of divine ideas, the notion of the disposition of forms, and the causation of accidental being.

4. Divine ideas and individual substances

William de la Mare criticized the view of Thomas that in the strict sense of exemplar, God only had separate ideas of the individuals which will be created in time, and not of the matter and the accidents involved[34]. This would be a

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[30] Ibid., 66: „(…) *intellectus tamen noster potest unam formam vel naturam vario modo intelligere, et vario modo conceptam variis nominibus ipsos conceptus notificantibus significare et sic plura praedicata eidem rei uno nomine, scilicet speciei, significatae attribuere*".

[31] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 12, 64.

[32] Quare, art. 10, 56.

[33] Cf. ibid., art. 31, 135–143, and art. 102, 397.

[34] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 4, 25 sq.; art. 79, 326 sq.; art. 80, 327 sq.; art. 81, 328–330; art. 97, 389 sq. Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, quaest. 15, art. 3; De veritate, quaest. 3, art. 5; ibid., art. 7; ibid., art. 8. On the theory of ideas in the works of Thomas Aquinas, see V. Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Sources and Synthesis (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 69), Leiden 1996, with a bibliography on pp. 333–344. A discussion of the medieval debate about the divine ideas is given in my Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 50), Leiden 1993, 121–156.

problem for theology and faith. If the extent of the divine ideas was limited and God had no separate ideas of matter and accidents, he would not be able to create matter and accidents separately and give separate existence to accidents apart from their subject, which would be a restriction of his power and would make transubstantiation impossible[35]. The view of Thomas was also unsound on philosophical grounds. Divine ideas are the principles of the spiritual and material essences of creation. The essence of matter, the essence of form, and the essence of the composition of the two are all different. Therefore they must be created by different ideas[36]. This means that the principle for distinguishing divine ideas is not the nature of the individual substance as it exists in the individual which will be created in time, but the essential parts which constitute the individual and can be distinguished by divine (and human) thinking, that is, matter, form, the composition of matter and form, and the accidents, which have an ‚accidental' essence of their own[37].

The reply of Richard Knapwell highlights the fundamental problem under discussion. In his view, William de la Mare argued in terms of pure thinking about essences, whereas Thomas argued in terms of created being. William examined into how many different essences reality could be divided, and then argued that the plurality of these essences must be rooted in a similar plurality of different divine ideas, which were at once the principles of thinking and of real being. He did not distinguish between the divine ideas in the broad sense as principles of knowledge and the divine ideas in the strict sense as principles of creation. Thomas, on the other hand, made such a distinction, which was

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[35] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 4, 25; ibid., art. 79, 327. Interesting observations on the methodological aspects involved in the debate about the separability of the accidents are given in R. Imbach, Pourquoi Thierry de Freiberg a-t-il critiqué Thomas d'Aquin? Remarques sur le De accidentibus, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 45 (1998), 116−129.

[36] Ibid., art. 79, 327: „(...) oportet quod omne quod habet essentiam distinctam habeat etiam ideam in Deo correspondentem; alias esset ponere aliud principium a Deo in quo esset principium illius, quod est erroneum. Cum igitur alia sit essentia materiae, alia formae, necesse est habere materiam aliam ideam distinctam ab idea formae, et e converso; et etiam aliam esse ideam compositi".

[37] Ibid., art. 80, 328: „(...) omnium quae distinxit (sc. Deus) erant distinctae ideae et sunt in Deo. Sed essentia accidentium est vere distincta ab essentia subiecti. Ergo necesse est quod sint distinctae ideae accidentium ab ideis subiectorum". In his commentary on the Sentences, William de la Mare defended the claim that God had separate ideas of matter and accidents as well. See William de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, ed. H. Kraml (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 15), München 1989, dist. 35, quaest. 7, 422: „(...) ideo omnia, scilicet materia et accidentia, universalia et singularia habent in Deo ideas perfectas et proprias quia producta sunt per modum artis". This position of William de la Mare had important affinities with the view defended by Duns Scotus. In the Reportata Parisiensia Scotus argued that God has separate ideas of the parts (matter and form) as well as of the whole. Because the conjunction of matter and form is a separate being, it must have an idea of its own. Again, God has distinct ideas of accidents, both those that can subsist without an underlying subject and those that cannot. As appears from his commentary on the Metaphysics, Scotus was familiar with the Sentences commentary of William de la Mare. (cf. the review by G. J. Etzkorn in Speculum, 72, 1997, 478). On the affinities between William de la Mare and Duns Scotus, see Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen, 128−130.

essential to his answer to the question: Of what things are there divine ideas? In the broad sense of principles of knowledge, the divine ideas correspond with the different ways in which God can think about reality and thus cover all distinct considerations of matter, form and accidents, as William de la Mare had rightly argued. In the strict and more appropriate sense, however, they are the principles of reality according to which God creates each individual creature with a being of its own[38]. In this way, the distinction between the divine ideas necessarily parallels the distinction between the individual creatures as far as they each have a being of their own. The individual man is the being and the living being God creates as individual man. To create him, therefore, God does not need separate ideas of being nor of living being besides the actual idea of man[39]. Nor does he need separate ideas of matter and form, which compound the essence of man, since the compositum as compositum already includes both matter and form. The principle according to which the divine ideas should be distinguished, therefore, is not divine or human thinking, but created being[40].

5. Forms and disposition

A further example of the issue of the relationship between being and thinking is the notion of the disposition or susceptibility of forms (*inchoatio formarum*), which was related to the problem of the plurality of forms. Under debate was

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[38] Knapwell, Quare, art. 4, 27, and ibid., art. 81, 330: „(...) *differt loqui de idea prout sumitur pro exemplari forma rei producibilis et prout sumitur pro ratione innotescendi uniuscuiusque secundum quod potest aliquo modo in propria ratione considerari*". William de la Mare did non distinguish between the divine ideas as principles of knowledge and the divine ideas as principles of creation. The same can be seen in the works of Duns Scotus, who criticized the restricted sense of practical ideas employed by Thomas in the Summa theologiae. Cf. Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, dist. 36, quaest. 4, nn. 7 sq., ed. Wadding 11/1, Lyon 1639, repr. Hildesheim 1969, fol. 208 b-209 a.

[39] See Knapwell, ibid., art 4, 28: „(...) *forma enim generis nec esse nec produci nisi in aliqua specie potest*". Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, quaest. 3, art. 8, ad 2: „(...) *si loquamur de idea proprie, secundum quod est rei, eo modo quo est in esse producibilis; sic una idea respondet singulari, speciei, et generi individuatis in singulari, eo quod Socrates, homo et animal non distinguitur secundum esse*". See also the following explanation of Augustine given by Knapwell to justify the position of Thomas, in which the distinction between the divine ideas in the broad and in the strict sense is mentioned, ibid., art. 81, 330: „(...) *non potest dici quod Augustinus intelligat quod hominis faciendi in sua communitate sine omni individuo seu supposito humanae naturae, sit idea una in Deo, cum homo non sic sit faciendus vel producendus; intelligit igitur quod ad hominem faciendum utique in aliquo supposito, correspondet aliqua idea prout sumitur in sua communitate abstracta ab illo et aliis suppositis; et hoc non secundum quod idea est exemplar hominis sub ea ratione qua faciendus vel producibilis, sed prout idea dicitur ratio innotescendi hominis, secundum quod potest in sua ratione propria sine conditionibus individuantibus considerari*".

[40] This approach is also clear from the definition of divine ideas in the strict sense put forward by Knapwell in defence of Thomas. Ideas in the strict sense are formed in the mind of God, when God compares his essence to the things he can grant existential being to. See Knapwell, Quare, art. 4, 27: „(...) *docet frater Thomas, idea in Deo dicitur ipsa eius essentia ab eo intellecta cum habitudine ad re creatas quae possunt intelligi (...) prout sunt ab eo in existentia producibiles (...)*". and ibid., art. 81, 330. Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, quaest. 15, art. 3.

the question whether or not the subject needed a certain disposition (*dispositio ad formam*) in order to be able to receive the form[41]. According to William de la Mare, the answer was in the affirmative. Only the existence of an active disposition could explain why a subject sometimes could be and sometimes could not be informed by a certain form. Man can only be generated by man, not by horses or cows, because the matter of the latter is not actively disposed to being informed by a rational soul. William argued, therefore, that it was necessary to adopt the existence of an active disposition in the subject, as was maintained both by saints and philosophers[42].

Thomas had rejected the existence of such dispositions. He had claimed that matter is actualized by being, and that this being is given to matter by means of the substantial form. In matter itself there is no active disposition to receive this or that form[43].

This line of reasoning was further developed by Richard Knapwell in „Quare". Matter has no innate active disposition, but is disposed to accept the form by the qualities of the form. Matter is passive and receives being; the form is active and confers being[44]. It is the acting of the form as it exists in the agent which enables matter to receive the form. The qualities of the form work into the matter and prepare it to accept something new, such as the warmth of the fire prepares the air to accept the fire. If the preparation is powerful enough, matter will be informed by form[45]. The different formal aspects which can be discerned when thinking about a substance such as man, for example, his being and his being an animal, where the more general (being) can be seen as a disposition informed by the more specific (living), do not exist in reality. They

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[41] The issue played an important role in the writings of Albert the Great and came to be hotly disputed in the debates between Albertists and Thomists in the fifteenth century. According to the Tractatus problematicus of Heymericus de Campo, the Albertists defended the idea that there was a certain disposition in the subject which enabled it to receive the form, whereas the Thomists rejected this idea. See L. Sturlese, Die deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert dem Großen 748–1280, München 1993, 358–360, and G. Meersseman, Geschichte des Albertismus Heft 2: Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen (Dissertationes historicae 5), Rom 1935, 76 sq.

[42] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 32, 143–145, and ibid., art. 85, 351–353, esp. 353: „*Unde manifestum est quod negare rationes seminales sive potentias activas est negare doctrinam philosophorum et sanctorum*". William referred to the theory of the seminal reasons (*rationes seminales*) as defended by Augustine and to passages from the works of Aristotle (among others Physics, II, cap. 8).

[43] Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, quaest. 76, art. 6, and De veritate, quaest. 28, art. 3, ad 16. The position of Thomas was determined by his thesis of the unity of the substantial form. Substantial being was conferred on the subject by the substantial from. If there were to exist different active forms in the subject, the subject would have different forms of being and as such not be a substantial and numerical unity, which would endanger the trancendental convertibility of being and unity. On the unity thesis, see Schneider, Die Einheit des Menschen, 12–63.

[44] Knapwell, Quare, art. 85, 359: „*Igitur omne quod fit, fit ex eo quod est in potentia tale, non quidem activa sed passiva*".

[45] Ibid., art. 32, 146. For a discussion, see F. E. Kelley in his introduction to Richard Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, 26.

only reflect the human way of thinking about reality[46]. In the existing individual itself, genus and species are in no way separated. They both refer to the same individual having only one substantial form; otherwise they cannot possibly be predicated of the same substance. In human thinking, however, they are separated, each reflecting a different aspect of human thinking about the substantial form of the individual substance[47]. Postulating pre-existing dispositions in matter means confusing being and thinking about being[48].

6. Causation of accidental being

Also related to the problem of the relationship between thinking and being was the question whether or not accidental being (*esse per accidens*) had a cause[49]. In his writings, Thomas distinguished two different kinds of causation, depending on the number of causes. On the one hand, there is causation which involves only one cause. In that case, the effect will take over the formal nature of the cause or of the form existing in the mind of the agent. It will have only one substantial form, which will determine its nature and substantial unity. Because of this unity, the effect will have substantial being (*ens per se*), since being and unity can always be predicated of the same thing. On the other hand, some kinds of causation involve multiple causes. If it comes to that, the effect will be the result of the coming together of different causes, none of which by itself intended to produce the effect. The effect, therefore, will be caused accidentally. It will have been formed by each of the different causes involved and consequently its nature will have been made up of different natures which do not form a unity but a complex. This complex cannot be derived from the nature of any one of the causes. It will depend on the whole and have no being of its own, but only accidental being[50].

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[46] Ibid., 151: „(...) *non sequitur quod inter formam magis universalem et minus universalem sit diversitas secundum rem sed secundum rationem solum*".

[47] Ibid., 152: „*Et sic dicendum est de generibus et speciebus sibi ad invicem ordinatis, quod non praedicantur de aliquo individuo per formas realiter diversas (...), sed per eamdem formam differentem solum secundum diversam considerationem rationis; et istud necesse est dicere*". Cf. Richard Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, 82 [17].

[48] A similar point was made by Richard Knapwell in his Quaestio disputata de unitate forma, 92 [38]: „(...) *ordo diversorum praedicabilium dictorum de eodem numero non concludunt realem diversitatem formae eiusdem. Alioquin, quot sunt rationes formales quae significantur nomine ‚substantiae', ‚corporis', ‚aequaliter', ‚elementalis', tot essent formae substantiales reales in eodem simplici realiter differentes, quod nullus iam ponit qui philosophiae principia dignoscitur attigisse*".

[49] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 45, 192–195. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, quaest. 115, art. 6.

[50] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio, ed. P. M. Maggiòlo, Turin 1954, Lib. 2, lectt. 6–10, nn. 187–240, and id., In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum, ed. R. M. Spiazzi, Turin 1950, Lib. 6, lect. 3, nn. 1203–1222. For a discussion, see K. Jacobi, Kontingente Naturgeschehnisse, in: Studia Mediwistyczne 18 (1977), 3–70. This theory of Thomas attracted the attention of the German Dominican Georg Schwartz, who extracted it from the Metaphysics

William de la Mare argued against this view. If some effects had no proper cause nor any proper being, they could not be created by God nor would they be God. Thus they could not possibly exist. The theory of Thomas was therefore wrong and against Faith[51]. This was especially apparent if the theory were to be applied to the creation of the universe. The universe is an ordered aggregate encompassing all kinds of natures. According to the theory of Thomas, it could not have been created by God and would have no being of its own, which is untrue. For this reason, his theory should not be maintained[52]. William, therefore, came up with an alternative. Things with a multiple nature can be considered as a unity, not in a strict but in a broad sense, and because of this unity, they will have a being of their own[53].

The author of „Quare" remained faithful to the position of Thomas. That the effect has a composite nature does not mean that it has no being at all, but that its being is dependent on the being of the parts of which it is composed or on the causes which have caused it. Its being, then, is accidental. The basic parts of reality are individuals, each of them having only one nature. Real being exists only on this level. Composites of these natures have no being of their own, but are contingent upon these fundamental natures and need to be understood and philosophically analyzed on the basis of these natures[54]. If, however, one begins from the point of how we think about reality, then things seem to be different. From this perspective, forms can be combined and considered as a unity. The idea of a house exists in the mind of the architect as a unity, but the real house is composed of different parts, each with its own nature. The same goes for the ideas of the universe as a whole and of the concurrence of all causes involved in the mind of God. For God, the concurrence of all causes is intended and seen as a unity, but on the level of the causes themselves there is only unintended coincidence[55]. The fact that in the mind there exists the idea of a unity, thus, does not mean that there is a corresponding unity in reality.

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commentary of Thomas. In his library, he also had a summary of the Correctorium fratris thomae and a number of writings of Albertists (Johannes de Nova Domo, Heymericus de Campo) and Thomists (Johannes Versor, Johannes Tinctoris). See my Speculum philosophiae medii aevi. Die Handschriftensammlung des Dominikaners Georg Schwartz († nach 1484) (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 22), Amsterdam 1994, esp. 32–35, 85 sq.

[51] William de la Mare, Correctorium, art. 45, 192: „*Contra fidem, quia ex hoc sequitur quod sit aliquid, immo quod sint plura quae nec sunt Deus nec a Deo*".

[52] Ibid., 193.

[53] Ibid.: „*(...) vere ens dividitur in unum et multa: et unum quod convertitur cum ente non est vere unum, sed unum est commune ad vere unum et multa*".

[54] Knapwell, Quare, art. 45, 194: „*Ex his patet quod unum eodem modo se habet ad unum et multa sicut et ens; propter quod optime sequitur, si aliquid non sit vere unum quod non sit vere ens; eodem enim modo deficiet ab entitate quod deficit ab unitate (...)*".

[55] Ibid., 195: „*Concursus vero causarum ad quem consequitur effectus qui dicitur per accidens, quamvis non accidat praeter intentionem Dei omnia disponentis, accidentalis tamen est in se consideratus et praeter intentionem agentis particularis secundum naturam vel etiam secundum propositum; propter quod huiusmodi effectus dicitur ens per accidens (...)*". The example of the house and the architect is ours.

Being in the extra-mental world is based on natural forms, which have a being
different from that of forms in the mind. Although the forms in the mind are
derived from extramental forms via sense experience, in thinking these forms
can be combined and divided and thus can constitute unities which in reality
do not exist, as in the proposition or the syllogism. Attributing real being to
them, William de la Mare wrongly converts conceptual unities into real ones.
This seems to have been the main point that Richard argued against in his
criticism of William de la Mare.

7. Different methodologies

The above examples illustrate the methodological differences between the
approaches of William de la Mare and Richard Knapwell in a number of impor-
tant issues. William started his investigations by reflecting on the possible essen-
tial structure when thinking about reality[56]. He tried to find those essences
which would make thinking about reality meaningful, and then postulated the
existence of natures in reality which corresponded to these forms. The theories
of the plurality of forms (*pluralitas formarum*) and of the disposition or suscep-
tibility of forms (*inchoatio formarum*) are cases in point. In defending his position,
he moved from thinking about essences to being and from essential concepts
to reality. His approach rested on the assumption of a close relationship between
thinking and being, and on the idea that essential distinctions uncovered in
human thinking did exist as distinct essential attributes in reality. The distinction
between genus and difference made in the mind corresponded with the distinc-
tion between matter and form in reality[57].

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[56] The notion of absolute divine power (*potentia dei absoluta*) played an important role in his argu-
ment. Cf. Hufnagel, Studien zur Entwicklung des thomistischen Erkenntnisbegriffes, 12. On
the issue of absolute power, see W. J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition. A History of the Distinc-
tion of Absolute and Ordained Power (Quodlibet 8), Bergamo 1990.

[57] As can be seen in his earlier Sentences commentary, this approach was limited to the created
world and did not apply to the infinite divine nature. The distinction between the divine attri-
butes and the divine ideas did exist only in the human mind thinking about the effects of
divine creation, not in the divine essence. See William de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum
Sententiarum, dist. 2, quaest. 2, 63–65, esp. 65, and dist. 35, quaest. 2, 412: „*Dicendum igitur
quod divina essentia per immensitatem suam quae est pelagus substantiae infinitae, est exemplar omnium
creaturarum praeter aliquam differentiam a parte sui*". As to the early dating of the commentary, see
the review by L.-J. Bataillon in: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 81 (1997),
188. Interestingly, however, in the anonymous Franciscan reaction to „Quare", entitled „Correc-
torium Summae sancti Thomae", preserved in Berlin, Cod. Elector. 460, the univocity of essen-
tial distinctions in thinking and reality was extended to the divine ideas, a position later defended
by the Scotists Francis of Mayronnes and Jean de Ripa. Note the following passage quoted in
Hufnagel, Studien zur Entwicklung, 58 sq.: „*Essentia divina non solum ut unum est ratio intelligendi
omnia ideata quia illa unitas convenit ideae materialiter etiam secundum eos (sc. thomistas), sed ut illa essentia
est cum diversis imitabilitatibus formaliter et ista est diversitas essentiae divinae secundum rationem*".

In his „Quare" Richard Knapwell steered a different course, which was dia-
metrically opposed to that of William de la Mare. For Richard, the nature as it
existed in the individual was the starting point of his philosophical analysis. The
genus and difference were only mental concepts, expressing different ways of
considering the substantial form of the individual thing in reality. The unity of
the individual corresponded with the unity of the substantial form. That man
could think about the individual substance differently, even as to its essence, did
not indicate that in the individual itself there was a corresponding plurality of
substantial forms. It only meant that man could analyze the different aspects of
the substantial form and relate them to those of individuals belonging to a
different nature, thus uncovering the formal order of reality. The nature of man
is related to that of a stone because both are beings, and to that of a horse
because both are living beings. The basis is the individual substance of man.
The being of man is his being-a-man and his being a living being is likewise his
being-a-man. There is no distinction in the individual itself between his being,
his being a living being and his being a man. Richard therefore rejected the idea
of a parallelism between distinct formal modes of understanding and distinct
formal modes of essential being[58]. Distinctions between essential concepts do
not always correspond to distinctions between natures. The basic unity of reality
is the individual substance, which cannot itself be divided into different natures
or essences. When William de la Mare argued from thinking to being in his
criticism of Thomas Aquinas, Richard Knapwell replied by arguing from being
to thinking and from the individual substance to general concepts, taking sub-
stantial being as the criterion of conceptual thinking[59].

8. The thomistic approach

The debate between Franciscan and Dominican (or rather, Thomistic) theol-
ogy as it is documented in the „Correctorium fratris thomae" and the „Correc-
torium corruptorii Quare" was not just a discussion about various questions,

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[58] The same position was defended in his De unitate formae, see Knapwell, Quaestio disputata
de unitate formae, 82 [17]: „(…) *non potest dici quod animal praedicetur de homine et asino univoce
propter unitatem alicuius animalitatis existentis in eisdem, sed propter unitatem rationis a qua sumitur unitas
generis. Quia enim illud unum unde ratio animalitatis vel forma utpote qua virus sensitiva in homine et asino
reperitur, hinc est quod ratio animalitatis consimili modo de homine et asino formatur. Ista tamen virtus in
homine consequitur formam unam specificam, scilicet humanam, et in asino formam specificam aliam, utpote
asininam*".

[59] William de la Mare and Richard Knapwell did not· make their different methodological presup-
positions into items of discussion. It was only in the early fourteenth century that the issue of
the relationship between the level of being and the level of thinking came to be treated as a
problem on its own terms. An important witness is Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super
Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. J. C. Wey (Studies and Texts 90), To-
ronto Ontario 1989, 183–188: „*Secundus articulus principalis quaestionis huius est videre quomodo debeat
intelligi illa propositio ,quemcumque ordinem realem habent aliqua ubi distinguuntur realiter, talem habent
secundum rationem ubi distinguuntur ratione'*".

the most important of which were mentioned at the beginning of the paper. It
was also a matter of which scientific methodology should be followed. It has
become clear that there was an intimate connection between the methodology
and the points of view put forward by each party. Philosophical approach and
philosophical ideas were related. This raises the question of the historical signifi-
cance of the methodology followed by Richard Knapwell in „Quare", whether
or not his approach was followed by other defenders of Thomas Aquinas and
therefore might be considered a characteristic of the Thomist school[60]. It is
beyond the scope of this essay to delineate the ‚fatum‘ of this approach in all
its details, but a few interesting observations can be made.

   In the early Thomistic school, the formal distinction of Duns Scotus was
heavily criticized. Important Thomistic texts were the (later) writings of Thomas
of Sutton and the „Liber propugnatorius" attributed to Thomas Anglicus[61]. In
these writings, Scotus was attacked because of his adherence to a mediate dis-
tinction between the real and the rational, which he considered to be formal.
The formal distinction was not dependent on the mind as the rational was, and
it did not express a distinction between different realities as the real distinction
did[62]. Scotus came to accept the formal distinction because otherwise such
propositions as ‚the divine wisdom is not the divine goodness‘ would be mean-
ingless. God is one and undivided. His wisdom and goodness therefore cannot
be really distinct. But the distinction between the two cannot be only rational,
that is, on the part of our thinking, since then the truth of the proposition
would depend on our thinking and not on the properties of the divine essence.
Consequently, there must be a distinction in God which accounts for the truth
of the proposition but which leaves the divine unity intact[63]. For Scotus, then,
this distinction on the conceptual level reflects a distinction between different
formalities or natures in reality (*ex natura rei*). He named this distinction ‚formal‘,
because it concerns a difference between formalities or quiddities: the formality
of goodness cannot be reduced to the formality of wisdom; both are formally
distinct[64].

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[60] On the characteristics of early Thomism, see Roensch, Early Thomistic School, and Courtenay,
   Schools and Scholars, 178−182.

[61] I discussed the Thomistic criticism of the formal distinction in my: Marsilius of Inghen, 45 sq.

[62] A classical study on the formal distinction is J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns
   Scotus, Washington DC, 1944. Interesting observations, especially on the development of the
   notion in the writings of Scotus, in F. Wetter, Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus
   (BGPhThMA 41/5), Münster 1967, esp. 74, and H. G. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity. A Clash
   of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300−1335 (Ph.D. Thesis 1974, University of Wisconsin), Ann
   Arbor MI 1981, esp. 101.

[63] Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. 1, dist. 8, pars 1, quaest. 4, n. 193 and n. 215 (Opera omnia 4),
   Vatican City 1956, 262 and 273.

[64] He also used other terms for referring to the formal distinction and to formally distinct things
   such as the attributes. See M. McCord Adams, Ockham on Identity and Distinction, in: Francis-
   can Studies 36 (1976), 5−74, esp. 31sq. and 33 n. 84.

The Thomists thought the notion of the formal distinction to be a philosophical and theological error. It endangers the divine unity, since it accepts the existence of distinctions in God, without taking into account that these distinctions are rooted in human thinking and not in the divine essence. It is impossible for man to have adequate knowledge of God, since the divine essence is infinite, whereas human thinking is finite. Man's thinking about God is based on creation. He knows God only a posteriori, by reflecting on the effects God created. Yet, there is no creature which expresses the divine infinity adequately and consequently no concept, since all human concepts are based on creation. Therefore man must use a plurality of concepts to refer to the divine essence, each denoting an aspect of his infinite being. This does not imply that there is a plurality in God. The divine essence remains undivided. Each distinct concept refers to the same undivided essence. There is no distinction in the essence to which the concepts refer, but only in the way in which the essence is referred to[65].

For Thomas of Sutton and the author of the „Liber propugnatorius" there were only two distinctions, namely those between different things in reality and those between different concepts in thinking[66]. There is no immediate correspondence between these two distinctions. The concepts used in thinking about the divine are rooted in material reality, but they can serve to differentiate or combine aspects which in reality are not differentiated or combined. It is therefore impossible to comprehend the nature of divine reality by reflecting only on the concepts or *rationes* in the human mind[67].

If we compare the criticism of Scotus put forward by Thomas of Sutton and by the author of the „Liber propugnatorius" with the arguments of Richard Knapwell against William de la Mare, an interesting parallel comes to the fore.

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[65] See Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta, ed. M. Schmaus and M. González-Haba (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 2), München 1969, Quodl. 3, quaest. 1, 339–345, esp. 340, and Thomas Anglicus, Liber Propugnatorius super primum Sententiarum contra Johannem Scotum, Venice 1523, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1966, Lib. 1, dist. 8, quaest. 5, fol. 70vb-72vb. For a discussion of Thomas of Sutton's view, see Thomas of Sutton, Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti, ed. J. Schneider (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 7), München 1978, 21–56. The (unknown) authorship of the Liber propugnatorius is dealt with in Thomas of Sutton, Quaestiones ordinariae, ed. J. Schneider (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 3), München 1977, 63*-66*.

[66] This was also maintained by Ockham and Robert Holcot, see Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen, 46 and 56.

[67] Cf. Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta, Quodl. 3, quaest. 1, 345: „*Et in hoc decipiuntur homines quod putant quod rationes attributorum, quae attribuuntur essentiae divinae, sunt in essentia divina. Et similiter imaginantur in aliis, quae habet rationes diversas, quod rationes sunt illis rebus (…). Sed ista imaginatio falsa est. Rationes enim rerum non sunt in rebus, sed sunt in intellectu concipiente earum rationes. Unde licet verum sit quod unus punctus sit principium unius partis lineae et finis alterius, tamen ratio principii et ratio finis non sunt in puncto, sed in intellectu. Et similiter est de rationibus attributorum quod sunt in intellectu nostro ut in subiecto non autem in essentia divina, cui attribuuntur tamquam illi, de qua sunt*".

In both cases, the issue of the relationship between being and thinking played a central role, and in both cases the notion that being and thinking were governed by univocity was defended by Franciscans and rejected by Thomists.

The problem of the relationship between thinking and being was a constant theme in the philosophical debates of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Besides the Thomists, the Nominalists also repeatedly attacked the parallelism between distinct formal modes of understanding and distinct formal modes of essential being as defended by Scotus and his followers. In the writings of William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini and Marsilius of Inghen, the formal distinction was heavily criticized[68]. This did not mean, however, that the rejection of the parallelism between distinct formal modes of understanding and distinct formal modes of essential being became an exclusively Nominalist affair in the later medieval period. The opinions of Thomas Aquinas still played a fundamental role in the attack on the formal distinction. The Parisian theologian Jean Gerson relied on the writings of Thomas in his rejection of the formal distinction and the notion of univocity as defended by Francis of Mayronnes and Jean de Ripa, not on those of William of Ockham or Gregory of Rimini. Gerson adopted the criticism of Thomas against the *platonici*. In his view, the *platonici* wrongly assumed that the abstractions made by the human mind were only meaningful when they corresponded to the same general natures in reality, the ideas. The followers of Duns Scotus, labeled as *formalizantes* by Gerson, made the same mistake. They did not distinguish between being and thinking, and therefore postulated the existence of formal natures in things which were undivided, such as the divine nature, which led to absurdities[69]. Gerson considered the writings of Thomas Aquinas as a weapon in the combating of the heretical opinions of the *formalizantes*. He recognized the specific value of the Thomistic methodology on this point. It was the same methodology followed by Richard Knapwell in his attack on William de la Mare and by Thomas of Sutton and the author of the „Liber propugnatorius" in their rejection of Duns Scotus.

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[68] See Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen, 56–61.

[69] John Gerson, Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii de caelesti hierarchia, as edited in A. Combes, Jean Gerson commentateur dionysien. Pour l'histoire des courants doctrinaux à l'université de Paris à la fin du XIVe siècle, second edition (Études de Philosophie Médiévale 30), Paris 1973, 28–47, esp. 42: „*Plato ponebat quiditates separatas eternas et vniuersales extra deum. Et hoc est error secundum thomam. formalizantes innituntur isti dicto, quod ab eodem in quantum idem non prouenit idem. Secundo quod intellectus dum vere concipit reperit ita esse in re sicut concipit, alius esset falsus*". This last statement is clear-cut formulation of the principle that there is a parallelism between distinct formal modes of understanding and distinct formal modes of essential being. I will discuss the Thomistic background of this criticism in my: Modus loquendi Platonicorum. Gersons Kritik an den Realismus, in S. Gersh and M. J. F. M. Hoenen (eds.), The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period. A Lexicographical Approach (forthcoming). The views of the *formalizantes* are dealt with in Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales, 138–143.

9. Conclusion

In an earlier publication, I argued that the adherence to a philosophical school was not determined by whether or not a whole system of theories was adopted, but only by a few basic rules or principles which functioned as intellectual co-ordinates[70]. In the foregoing discussion, we have uncovered one of the principles followed by Thomists: substantial being and human thinking each have their own mode of distinction. Consequently, distinct forms of understanding produced by the human mind do not necessarily refer to distinct forms of essential being in individual substances, whether created or uncreated. This principle played a role already in the earliest defense of the views of Thomas Aquinas and was still linked with his name well into the fifteenth century[71]. That not only Thomists but also Nominalists adhered to this principle is a historical fact, which at least for the late medieval period is less surprising than it might seem at first glance. At other points, the two schools defended the same views as well, for example concerning the nature of the universals, the highlighting of the individual, and the stressing of the contingency of creation[72]. In the fifteenth century, the opponents of the Nominalists were not so much the Thomists but rather the Scotists and Albertists, with their notion of the parallelism of being and thinking.

There was a long stretch of time between the rise of early Thomism and the school conflicts of the fifteenth century. The historical constellation had changed in many respects. But the rejection of the parallelism between distinct forms of understanding and distinct forms of essential being still played a central role as methodological principle. It must therefore be considered as an important aspect of Thomism, developed and used in the earliest debates about the thinking of Thomas Aquinas[73].

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[70] M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Thomismus, Skotismus und Albertismus, 81–103.

[71] To be sure, this does not mean that Thomists always and everywhere adhered to this principle. The use of certain methodological principles within a school of thought did not mean that there were no exeptions. Among the Scotists, there was much discussion about the nature of the formal distinction between the divine attributes and the divine ideas, and in early Thomism the theory of individuation, the distinction between essence and existence, and the notion of the *concursus Dei* were matters of debate. Further research may discover other evidence of the nature and application of these methodological principles.

[72] See my Late Medieval Schools of Thought, 365.

[73] For encouragement and criticism I thank Kent Emery Jr. and Jan Aertsen.