

THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO
MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
Study with an edition of the 'dubium' in II Sent. q. 1 a. 2

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The issue of the eternity of the world has given rise to profound and widespread controversies, especially in medieval and ancient times. We may think here of the late thirteenth-century (1277) and early fourteenth-century discussions that have come down to us not only in the various commentaries on the *Sentences* and *Quaestiones disputatae*, but also in the so-called *Correctoria*.¹

We are well acquainted with the development of the discussion during the thirteenth and first part of the fourteenth century, as well as with the various views and arguments that contributed to it.² Less is known about the development of the controversy in the second half of the fourteenth century. To be sure, there are a large number of fourteenth-century commentaries on the *Sentences* in which the question is raised.³ By way of introduction, we shall briefly review those fourteenth-century century

1 On the *Correctoria* - which are an interesting source of knowledge regarding the debates between Franciscan and Dominican theologians - see F. van Steenberghe, *La philosophie au xiii^e siècle*, Philosophes Médiévaux IX (Louvain-Paris 1966), 489-490; M.D. Jordan, The Controversy of the *Correctoria* and the Limits of Metaphysics, *Speculum* 57 (1982), 292-314, and M.J.F.M. Hoenen, The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas' View on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in De La Mare's *Correctorium* (1278-9) and the *Correctoria Corruptorii* (1279-1286), *The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries*, ed. J.B.M. Wissink, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 27 (Leiden etc. 1990), 39-68.

2 See, e.g., L. Bianchi, *L'errore di Aristotele. La polemica contro l'eternità del mondo nel xiii secolo*, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Università di Milano 104 (Florence 1984) (with an extensive bibliography) and R.C. Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 18 (Leiden etc. 1990).

3 This is already clear from the *incipits* in F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols. (Würzburg 1947). See, e.g., Vol. I nn. 78; 175; 336; 407; 454; 536; 559; 951.

views and arguments that are most relevant for our understanding of Marsilius of Inghen's position in the debate.

Marsilius lectured on the *Sentences* at the end of the fourteenth century, at the University of Heidelberg.⁴ Professor of Theology at this newly founded university (1386) was Conrad of Soltau († 1407), sometime professor at the University of Prague, and author of a concise and widespread commentary on the *Sentences*.⁵ In this work, Conrad defends the claim that it is impossible for a created thing to be eternal. His main argument in support of this contention, viz., that being eternal and being created are contradictory attributes, can also be found in Marsilius.⁶ Both authors are responding to the views of Thomas of Strasbourg († 1357), who, unlike Conrad and Marsilius, held that it is not contradictory to say that it is possible for a created being to be eternal.⁷

With Thomas of Strasbourg we may well have introduced one of the most influential theologians of the second half of the fourteenth century, and of some time after. In many commentaries on the *Sentences* of this period his influence is perceptibly present. This is especially true of the commentaries written at Central European universities, such as Cracow,

4 See G. Ritter, *Studien zur Spätscholastik I: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkarmistische Schule in Deutschland*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1921, 4. Abh. (Heidelberg 1921), 39, and the contributions of W.J. Courtenay and J. Miethke elsewhere in this volume.

5 On Conrad of Soltau and his commentary on the *Sentences*, see G. Ritter, *Die heidelberger Universität. Ein Stück deutscher Geschichte* (Heidelberg 1936), 60 and 330-331. On Conrad of Soltau see also H.-J. Brandt, *Universität, Gesellschaft, Politik und Pfründen am Beispiel Konrad von Soltau († 1407)*, *The Universities in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. by J. Ijsewijn and J. Paquet, *Mediaevalia Lovaniensia* I-6 (Leuven 1978), 614-627, and id., *Konrad von Soltau, Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Bd. 12 (Berlin 1980), 531b-532b (with bibliography).

6 See Conrad of Soltau, *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (Stuttgart, Württ. Landesbibl., Cod. Theol. Fol. 118), Lib. 2 q. 1, fol. 55vb: "Ista non sunt compossibilia quorum rationes formales contradicunt. Sed aeternum et creatum sunt huiusmodi, quia aeternum est quod non habet esse post non esse et creatum habet esse post non esse. Patet igitur quod implicat <contradictionem> 'aliquid creatum fuisse ab aeterno'. Igitur Deus non potest hoc facere." Compare the edition below 'Ad quartam, tertio', p. 141, lines 15-20, p. 142, lines 1-3.

7 See Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (Venice 1564, republished Ridgewood, New Jersey 1965), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb and 128rb. Compare also Conrad of Soltau, *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (Stuttgart, WLB Cod. Theol. Fol. 118), Lib. 2 q. 1, fol. 55rb-55va: "Quantum ad primum articulum doctor, quem ego communiter sequor, scilicet Thomas de Argentina, ponit duas conclusiones (...). Sed contrarium istius videtur mihi esse sustinendum." The *quidam*'s four arguments 'quod sic' refuted by Marsilius in the *quaestio* below, can be found in the commentary on the *Sentences* of Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 6; arg. 4; arg. 5 and arg. 8.

Prague and Heidelberg.⁸ The commentary of Marsilius is no exception to this rule.⁹

A third theologian with whom we should concern us here is Henry Totting of Oyta († 1396). When starting his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*, in Prague, 1370, this theologian defended in a *principium*¹⁰ the view that the world cannot possibly be eternal.¹¹ His argument is significant for our understanding of Marsilius' position. "It is impossible", he argues, "that a being, different from God, is infinite and immeasurable. Therefore no other being than God can be eternal."¹² The transition made here by Henry of Oyta from the impossibility of a creature's infinity and immeasurability to the impossibility of its eternity, also occurs in Marsilius. For Henry of Oyta it was the main argument on this subject. And the same goes for Marsilius.

Focussing more specifically on the opinions and arguments of Marsilius himself, let us try to ascertain to which tradition his line of reasoning belongs. According to him, it is impossible for the world to be eternal. What are his arguments, and on what assumptions are they based? In a *quaestio* of the *principium* of the second book of his commentary on the *Sentences*, where the question of Creation is broached, he introduces one

8 On Thomas of Strasbourg and the influence of his commentary on the *Sentences*, see A. Zumkeller, *Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre, Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964), 212-214. In the *quaestio* of his *principium* to the second book of the *Sentences* (written 1443/4 in Cracow) Matthias de Labiszyn quotes the view of Thomas of Strasbourg on the eternity of the world, a view with which he agrees, see Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 2234, fol. 61r-v (the name of Thomas of Strasbourg appears on fol. 59r). Compare Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, foll. 127vb-128vb. On Matthias de Labiszyn's life and works, see B. Chmielowska and Z. Wlodek, *Maciej z Labiszyna, Materialy do historii filozofii sredniowiecznej w polsce* iii(xiv) (1971), 3-55, esp. 14.

9 See, e.g., G. Ritter, *Studien zur Spätscholastik* I, 42.

10 On some general characteristics of a *principium*, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Einige Notizen über die Handschriften und Drucke des Sentenzenkommentars von Marsilius von Inghen, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 56 (1989), 117-163, esp. 123-124.

11 On Henry Totting of Oyta's life and views, see A. Lang, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitäten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spätscholastik*, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* XXXIII/4-5 (Münster 1937); F. Rosenthal, *Heinrich von Oyta and Biblical Criticism in the Fourteenth Century, Speculum* 25 (1950), 178-183 and A. Maierù, *Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria. Enrico Totting da Oyta, Studi sul xiv secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, a cura di A. Maierù e A. Paravicini Bagliani, *Storia e Letteratura* 151 (Rome 1981), 481-512. On Oyta's *principia*, see A. Lang, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta*, 53-4.

12 Compare A. Lang, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta*, 199, n. 180.

of his main assumptions, viz., that God is an immeasurable spiritual quantity.¹³ It is this crucial premiss, and its specific interpretation by Marsilius, on which the entire argumentation hinges. God is an immeasurable spiritual quantity; therefore, no creature can be equal to God, neither in duration nor in any other way. Hence, Marsilius concludes, no creature can be eternal.

In order to understand his argument, it is necessary to appreciate the meaning of the concept of an 'immeasurable spiritual quantity'. We shall start our investigation with an analysis of this notion.

The idea of God's quantity derives from the doctrine of the Trinity; it was used by many theologians other than Marsilius, among whom Bonaventure († 1274), Thomas Aquinas († 1274) and Giles of Rome († 1316), in dealing with the question concerning the equality of the three divine Persons.¹⁴ These theologians base their claims on the words of Aristotle, in support of the view that things can be distinguished as to their equality and inequality in virtue of their quantity.¹⁵ Things are equal if they have the same quantity; things are unequal if they are of a different quantity. Usually a further distinction was made between three aspects of this quantity, each being an indication of equality and inequality: viz., duration, extension, and power.¹⁶ One thing is unequal to another thing if it is e.g. older, or larger, or if it can produce a greater effect. As Marsilius

13 See our edition below, p. 137, lines 8-10.

14 See Bonaventure, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, Editio minor, Opera theologica selecta I (Florence 1934), Lib. 1 d. 19 p. 1 a. u. qq. 1-2, 273a-276a; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, Editio nova, cura P. Mandonnet, Tom. I (Paris 1929), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 1 aa. 1-2, 460-465; Giles of Rome, *In primum librum Sententiarum* (Venice 1521, reprint Frankfurt a/Main 1968), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 3 (p. 2 q. 1), fol. 105rb-105vb, and Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (Strasbourg 1501, reprint Frankfurt a/Main 1966), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, foll. 90vb-91rb. Compare Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, Editio tertia, Tom. I, Pars II, Spicilegium bonaventurianum (Rome 1971), Lib. 1 d. 19, cc. 1-3, 159-161.

15 Compare Aristotle, *Categoriae vel Praedicamenta*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus I/1-5, Union académique internationale, Corpus philosophorum medii aevi (Bruges-Paris 1961), translatio Boethii, [6], 17-8. See also Boethius, *In categorias Aristotelis*, MPL LXIV (Paris 1860), Lib. 2, col. 216c.

16 See Bonaventure, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 p. 1 a. u. q. 2, 275a; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 1 aa. 1-2 divisio primae partis textus, 459; Giles of Rome, *In primum librum Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 3, fol. 105va, and Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 90vb. Compare Fulgentius Ruspensis (= Pseudo-Augustine), *De fide ad Petrum seu de regula fidei*, cura et studio J. Fraipont, CCSL XCI/A (Turnholt 1968), n. 4, 714, and Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 c. 1, 159.

puts it, these three aspects are an exhaustive division of quantity. Every kind of equality and inequality can be reduced to one or more of these three aspects.¹⁷

The aspects in question, however, relate to *corporeal extended* quantity, and hence do not apply to God or the three divine Persons, at least not without due consideration. For this reason, the meaning of the three aspects was accommodated to fit the purpose. The corporeal aspect of 'duration' was changed into the spiritual aspect of 'eternity'; the corporeal aspect of 'extension' into 'perfection'; and the corporeal aspect of 'power' was changed into the spiritual aspect of 'power' - all in order to be able to speak of the aspects of a spiritual quantity.¹⁸

These three *spiritual* aspects also give an exhaustive division of quantity.¹⁹ The three divine Persons are equal in each of the three aspects, and are therefore equal to one another. As Marsilius puts it, "There is one eternity, one goodness, and one power for all three divine Persons."²⁰ Moreover, each of the three aspects coincides with the divine essence, whence they cannot be distinguished from God's essence.²¹

What does all this mean for our inquiry? From the responses Marsilius gives to the objections put forward at the beginning of the *quaestio* edited below, we know that he greatly stressed the difference between the divine essence's production of the Son and its production of Creation.²² The production of the Son cannot be compared to the production of Creation, he argues in the first response, because the Son is equal to the divine essence in all respects, except for those qualities that belong to Him as a Person of the Trinity. When the Son is brought forth by the Father, something is produced that is equal to the Father in all essential respects,

17 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 90vb: "Et omnem modum quantitatis corporalis et aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis ad aliquem dictorum modorum (viz., 'duratio', 'extensio' or 'multitudo' and 'virtus', *MH*) invenimus reduci."

18 See Giles of Rome, *In primum librum Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 3 (p. 2 q. 1), fol. 105 va, and Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 90vb.

19 Compare Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 1, fol. 176rb.

20 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 91ra: "(...) in divinis omnium trium personarum est una aeternitas, una bonitas et una potentia."

21 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 91ra: "(...) omnia haec (viz., 'aeternitas', 'bonitas' and 'potentia', *MH*) in Deo idem dicuntur quod essentia." See also, *id.*, *op. cit.*, fol. 91rb.

22 See our edition below, p. 139, lines 17-23.

because numerically the same essence is involved.²³ For that reason, he continues in the third response, the Son can be brought forth by the Father only in a natural way, that is, of necessity and of eternity. Creation, on the other hand, is different from God, not only in that it is not God, but also in that it cannot possibly be equal to God, either in duration, in perfection, or in power. Therefore it is not possible for God to bring forth Creation in any other way than freely and not of eternity. This means that two things are sharply contrasted by Marsilius, viz., the Son, being equal to God's essence, and Creation, being different from God's essence. The Son is equal to God's essence, matching it in duration, perfection and power. Creation, on the other hand, is different from God's essence, differing from God in duration and perfection as well as in power. Furthermore, we have seen that, in the first place, only what is equal to God Himself, He can produce necessarily and eternally; and secondly, that which is different from Him, He can only produce freely and not eternally.

Now it is necessary to know why, according to Marsilius, Creation should differ from God not only in perfection and in power, but in duration as well. For on answering this question, we shall know why, firstly, he thought it impossible for Creation to be eternal, and secondly, why Creation can only be produced freely by God.

Let us start with the first point: why should Creation differ from God in perfection, in power, as well as in duration? Why is it *simpliciter impossibile*, as Marsilius puts it, for God to produce something equal to Himself in either one or in all three of these respects? The answer is short; it can be stated in a three-word sentence: God is infinite. Because of the immeasurableness of God's essence, so Marsilius argues, there is no way in which God can produce something that is wholly (*simpliciter*) equal to Himself.²⁴ This conclusion, based on the assumption of God's infinity, is the starting-point of Marsilius' argument.

23 See also Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 3, fol. 92rb: "Nam cum in qualibet persona sit tota essentia, vel verius, quaelibet persona sit ipsa essentia, et quaelibet persona est in illo in quo est sua essentia, eo quod non deserit suam naturam, patet, quod quaelibet personarum sit in alia et non extra aliam." On Marsilius' doctrine of the Trinity, see W. Möhler, *Die Trinitätslehre des Marsilius von Inghen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie des Spätmittelalters* (Limburg/Lahn 1949).

24 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181ra: "(...) Deus propter immensitatem simpliciter nequit producere ei simile simpliciter." Compare the edition below, p. 137, lines 8-14.

The view expressed in the starting-point is not a novel one. The idea that no creature can be wholly equal to God was embraced by almost all theologians, including Thomas Aquinas. As the latter puts it, only God Himself is uncaused and *simpliciter* infinite. Everything produced by God is somehow caused and limited, thus not as infinite as God is. Therefore, nothing that is produced by God can be wholly equal to God.²⁵

Now on the basis of this starting-point Marsilius builds up his argumentation. He proceeds to make two consecutive steps in order to prove by means of a final third step that Creation cannot possibly be eternal. These three steps answer to the three aspects of spiritual quantity mentioned above. Each step is based on the previous one, whereas the first step is based on the starting-point itself, viz., the claim that nothing can be wholly equal to God. The method used here may rightly be called an *ordo mathematicalis*, as does the *incipit* of the 1501 impression of Marsilius' commentary on the *Sentences*.²⁶

The first step, based on the starting-point, is as follows. As God cannot possibly produce anything that is wholly equal to Himself (produce *ad extra*, that is), it is impossible for him to produce something that is able to produce the same effect as He can.²⁷ God is immeasurable in every aspect and in relation to every effect that He can bring forth, whence God cannot possibly bring forth an effect that is capable of the same as He is. Every effect produced by God is limited in power.²⁸ No effect has the same productive power as God has. For God is infinite, and hence He can always produce more than any creature whatsoever.²⁹

25 Compare, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medieualium Ottaviensis (Ottawa, Canada 1953), I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1um, 38a.

26 See Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), fol. 1ra: "<Commentaria> clarissimi viri domini Marsilii Inguen super libros Sententiarum edita in studio Heidelbergensi incipiunt feliciter, ordine optimo quasi mathematicali certissimo." This *incipit*, however, does not occur in the Mss of the first book of Marsilius' commentary on the *Sentences* (Isny, Bibl. der Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48; Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 1581, Leipzig, Universitätsbibl., 568 and Stuttgart, Württ. Landesbibl., Cod. Theol. Fol. 113).

27 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181ra: "(...) non plus videtur posse ei (viz., Deo, MH) producere simile respectu unius effectus producendi quam simpliciter; sed nequit ei simpliciter producere simile, ergo nec respectu particularis effectus dati vel dabilis." Compare the edition below, p. 137, lines 12-14.

28 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181ra.

29 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181va.

This first step has taken us to one of the aspects of quantity that express the difference between God and Creation, viz., the aspect of 'power'. It is impossible for God to produce an effect that is capable of the same as He is. Therefore, every effect differs from God in power.

But Marsilius takes us one step further. Not only is it impossible for God to produce an effect that is capable of the same as He is, but it is also impossible that He should produce an effect that is infinitely perfect. For if God were able to do so, Marsilius argues, He should also be able to produce an effect that is equal to Him in power. But the latter is impossible. Therefore so is the former.³⁰

Again we have come across an aspect of quantity that brings out the difference between God and Creation. If God cannot bring forth an effect that is infinitely perfect, every creature differs from God in perfection.

Marsilius has not taught us anything new so far. Both points can also be found in the works of other theologians. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, to name but two, are of the same opinion in holding that God cannot possibly produce a being that is capable of the same as He is. No creature can create another creature from nothing. This can only be done by God, who is the cause of every creature's being.³¹ And both Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg hold that God cannot possibly bring forth a creature that is as perfect as He is. Only God is pure act, as Thomas Aquinas says. Only God is not wanting in any perfection.³² These theologians, then, are of the same mind in holding that there is an unbridgeable difference between God and Creation, as to their power and their perfection. But what about the third aspect, that of duration?

30 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181va: "(...) videtur mihi sequi, quod Deus non possit producere aliquam speciem vel aliquod individuum sive spirituale sive corporale infinitae perfectionis. Patet, quia pari ratione posset producere infinitam virtutem in movendo, cuius contrarium dicit conclusio praecedens (= conclusio 4, *op. cit.*, fol. 181ra: Videtur mihi sequi, quod Deus non possit facere virtutem infinitam in movendo, *MH*).\" Compare the edition below, 'secundo praemitto', p. 137, lines 12-14.

31 Compare Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 43 q. 1 a. 2 c., 1005; id., *De potentia*, *Quaestiones disputatae* Vol. II, cura et studio P. Bazzi e.a. (Turin-Rome 1965), q. 3 a. 4 ad 15, 48a-b; id., *Summa theologiae* (ed. cit.), I q. 45 a. 5 ad 3um, 289a, and Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 1 a. 3, fol. 125va.

32 Compare Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* (ed. cit.), q. 1 a. 6 c., 21b; id., *Summa contra gentiles*, cura et studio C. Pera e.a. (Turin-Rome 1961), Lib. 1 c. 28, nn. 259-260, 40, and Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 44 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3, fol. 116rb.

Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg are both of the opinion that it is not impossible for God to have created something from eternity. "Everyone agrees on this", we read at the beginning of *De aeternitate mundi*, "that because of His infinite power, God was able to create something that has always been."³³ According to Aquinas, then, it is not contrary to God's infinity to produce something that is eternal. So, in this respect a creature may be equal to God. This is not to say, however, that a creature may be eternal in the same way as God is, for eternity proper can only be attributed to God. Only God is immutable. All creatures, on the other hand, are mutable, as Thomas says in the *Summa theologiae*.³⁴ Yet Thomas believes it to be possible for a creature to participate in God's eternity, and thus to exist from eternity.

The same view we find again in Thomas of Strasbourg. He, too, believes that it follows precisely from God's power that He is able to produce something from eternity. "To voice the praise of God's power", he says, "and notwithstanding the opinions of others, I maintain that God could have made something from eternity, and that not even the slightest contradiction is implied in this."³⁵ He, too, believes that a creature can be equal to God in duration, in spite of its mutability. For even though each creature has a beginning as to its origins (because each creature has been created), this does not mean that it must also have a beginning as to its duration.³⁶

Marsilius however is of a different opinion. God cannot produce a creature that is equal to Him in power, nor one that is as perfect as He is,

33 Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi*, ed. Leonina 43 (Rome 1976), 85a: "(...) omnes consentiunt, in hoc scilicet quod Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius infinitam (...)." On Thomas' view, see J.F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington D.C. 1984), 191-214.

34 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (ed. cit.), I q. 9 a. 2 c., 47a-b, and id., *op. cit.*, I q. 10 a. 3 c., 51a.

35 Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb: "Sed utrum Deus secundum huiusmodi potentiam (viz., potentiam activam creatricis essentiae, MH) ab aeterno potuerit effectum sine contradictionis implicatione producere? Quamvis sollemnes doctores se reputent oppositum demonstrasse, ad divinae tamen potentiae praeconium extollendum ad praesens teneo, quod Deus hoc potuit absque omni implicatione contradictionis."

36 Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2 ad primum, fol. 128rb: "Dato ergo, quod creatura ab aeterno fuisset, adhuc posset esse variabilis, quia esse simpliciter invariabile est solum de ratione eius, cuius propria mensura est aeternitas proprie dicta." and id., *op. cit.*, ad tertium: "(...) de ratione creaturae est habere principium originis, seu factionis; sed habere principium originis et factionis, et non habere principium durationis, ista non contradicunt (...)."

nor one that exists from eternity (as God Himself does). In order to establish this point, Marsilius takes a third step on top of the two already mentioned. "There is no reason whatsoever", he argues, "to assume that God is able to produce something that is equal to Him in duration, but that He is unable to do so as regards power or perfection." The latter two are impossible, and therefore so is the former.³⁷

Marsilius takes this third step to be justified in virtue of the following analogy. God can always make an individual or a species that is superior to any of the individuals or species created so far. For God is infinitely powerful, whence there are no limits to His power. Each creature can therefore be surpassed in perfection by some other creature produced by God.³⁸ An analogous case can be made for duration. Each creature can be surpassed in duration by some other creature produced earlier by God. Marsilius takes it that there is no reason to deny the latter possibility while affirming the former. If God is credited with the capacity of bringing forth a creature that is better or more powerful than any existing creature, then He should also be credited with the capacity of bringing forth a creature antecedent to any other existing creature. Consequently, it is impossible for a created thing to be eternal. For, given any created being whatsoever, say, the world, it is possible for God to have created the same or another world earlier. Hence the world cannot possibly be eternal, for otherwise it would be impossible for God to have created the same or another world earlier.

So, according to Marsilius, there is an absolute difference between God and Creation with respect to the third aspect of quantity, viz., that of duration. God is eternal, whereas Creation is not. This difference is properly called 'absolute', since it is impossible that God should have created such a world, that He could not possibly have created the same or another world earlier.

How should this argumentation of Marsilius be evaluated? In the first place it should be kept in mind that not all theologians agree with the premiss from which Marsilius takes his last step. Not all theologians, that

³⁷ See the edition below, 'tertio praemitto', p. 137, lines 15-18, p. 138, lines 1-9.

³⁸ See the edition below, p. 137, lines 15-18, p. 140, lines 1-16. Compare Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 43 a. 2, fol. 184ra-b: "Omni specie huius universi producti Deus in infinitum perfectiorem potest producere. Haec probatur sic, quia virtus infiniti vigoris omni finito quantumlibet maius potest producere, non solum in magnitudine, sed etiam in perfectione. Sed est notum fidei, quod Deus est infiniti vigoris et quod omne dependens est finitum, igitur."

is, share his belief that God can always create an individual or a species that is superior to any other individual or any other species. Henry of Ghent († 1293), for one, and with him e.g. Godfrey of Fontaines († after 1306) and Peter Aureoli († 1322), are reluctant on this point.³⁹ In the words of Godfrey of Fontaines, if we were to assume that God can infinitely continue to produce ever better creatures (as Marsilius' premiss takes it to be possible), then all essential order in the created world would collapse.⁴⁰ On the other hand, to be sure, there were also theologians who sided with Marsilius. We may think of Thomas Aquinas, Thomas of Strasbourg and Conrad of Soltau.⁴¹ They hold that there is no boundary to God's infinite power, and that God might therefore have made a creature that is better than any given creature. If this point is denied, so they argue, it should also be denied that God's power is infinite and that it cannot be limited. These theologians, then, agree with the premiss of Marsilius' third step. However - and this is quite interesting - Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg do not draw the conclusion that God might also have created a being antecedent to any given being. As we have already seen, they believe that God can in effect produce an eternally existing creature. The fact that God is hence unable to produce this same being or some other being earlier, does not interfere with His infinity. Rather, God's power to bring forth an eternal creature should be seen as the very expression of His infinity.

This survey may suffice to show that what seemed so obvious to Marsilius, to such an extent that it made the contrary seem irrational to him, was in fact not so very obvious at all. For theologians like Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, holding that because of His infinity

39 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* (Paris 1518, reprint Louvain 1961), Quodl. 5 q. 3, foll. 155vR-156rT; Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les quatre premiers quodlibets*, par M. de Wulf et A. Pelzer, *Les philosophes Belges II* (Louvain 1904), Quodl. 4 q. 3, 243-7; Peter Aureoli, *Commentariorum in primum librum Sententiarum pars secunda* (Rome 1596), d. 44 a. 4, foll. 1055aB-1056bD.

40 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les quatre premiers quodlibets* (ed. cit.), Quodl. 4 q. 3, 244. Same argument in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* (ed. cit.), Quodl. 5 q. 3, fol. 156rT.

41 Compare Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* (ed. cit.), q. 3 a. 16 ad 17, 90a; id., *Summa theologiae* (ed. cit.), I. q. 25 a. 6 c., 178a; Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 44 q. 1 a. 2, fol. 116rb: "Potentia Dei est infinita et simpliciter illimitata, ergo ultra omnem creaturam productam semper poterit producere perfectiorem." and Conrad of Soltau, *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (Stuttgart, Württ. Landesbibl., Cod. Theol. Fol. 118), Lib. 1 dd. 42-43, fol. 51va: "Potentia Dei est infinita. Hoc satis patet per Scripturam et dicta Sanctorum et probatur ratione sic. Deus non potest tam perfectum effectum producere, quin posset perfectiorem effectum producere. Igitur est infinitae potentiae productivae."

God could have made better species, are nevertheless of the opinion that God could have made the world from eternity. And conversely, theologians like Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli, holding that God could not possibly have made the world from eternity,⁴² are of the opinion that God could not possibly have continued infinitely to make better species. In other words, theologians sharing the premiss of Marsilius' last step do not share his conclusion; theologians sharing his conclusion do not share his premiss. Seen in this light, Marsilius' line of thought becomes all the more interesting. He argues that it follows from God's infinity that He is different from all creatures, not only in power and in perfection, but in duration as well. Each of the three aspects of quantity is brought to bear on this difference. Every creature is entirely different from God.

This line of reasoning in Marsilius is so intriguing because it draws quite radical conclusions from the concept of God's infinity. Moreover, we have seen just now that his argumentation is not as natural or intuitively plausible as he thought it to be. Does all this mean that his reasoning is unique? As may presently become clear, the argument is not unique. Let us look at some other thinkers who have used this same line of thought. At the beginning of this paper we have pointed out the relevance of Henry of Oyta's *principium* of 1370. In this *principium*, which has survived in only a few manuscripts,⁴³ the author argues that no other being than God could possibly have existed from eternity. He makes use of a line of reasoning similar to that of Marsilius. God is pure act, Henry says, and He is infinite and immeasurable, and it is impossible for any other being than God to be infinite and immeasurable. In every being but God there is a certain measure of potentiality, whence its being, its specifications and its action, can always be added to. Therefore, no other being could possibly have existed from eternity.⁴⁴

42 R.C. Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*, 165-70 (Henry of Ghent), and Peter Aureoli, *Commentariorum in secundum librum Sententiarum Tomus II* (Rome 1605), d. 1 q. 1 aa. 1-4, foll. 8aF-16bE.

43 Compare A. Lang, *Heinrich Tötting von Oyta*, 53.

44 Henry of Oyta, *Principium II* (Wien, Oesterr. Nationalbibl., Cod. Pal. Vind., 4004), fol. 134r: "Utrum possibile sit aliquam entitatem quae non est Deus fuisse ab aeterno. (...) Antequam dicam ad quaesitum principale, praemittam quasdam conclusiones ex quibus inducam responsionem ad quaesitum. Conclusio prima sit ista quod simpliciter est impossibile aliquod ens aliud a Deo infinite et immense [esse add. Ms, sed del.] fuisse vel futurum esse. Probatur. Supposito quod Deus sit actus purus qui simpliciter infinite et immense est, quod ad praesens non probo, sed suppono, quia omnes vocant illud Deum quod est purus actus et quod est immense, et etiam patet ex hoc quod est omnipotens, et ex

The similarity between the arguments of Henry and Marsilius cannot fail to be noticed. Like Marsilius, Henry of Oyta exclusively links up eternal being with perfection, immeasurability and infinity. Unlike Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, neither Marsilius nor Henry distinguishes between 'eternity proper' on the one hand, which in effect implies absolute perfection, and can only be attributed to God, and on the other hand 'being from eternity', which to our two Thomases does not imply absolute perfection, and can therefore also be attributed to creatures. According to Henry of Oyta and Marsilius, however, these two concepts are implied by one another, and should therefore not be distinguished. Both concepts express a single perfection, that of God's infinite perfectness. Over and against this infinite perfection stand created beings, necessarily finite, imperfect and unequal to God. Consequently, Creation cannot possibly be eternal properly speaking, nor can it be from eternity in the larger sense.

Linking up not only 'eternity proper' but also 'being from eternity' exclusively with God's perfection, is a rather remarkable manoeuvre; we should do well to inquire as to when and where the identification of the concepts of 'eternity proper' and 'being from eternity' makes its first appearance. As we shall see, Henry of Oyta and Marsilius of Inghen are part of an old tradition on this point.

For example, there are some remarks in the commentary on the *Sentences* by Albert the Great († 1280) (who also held the view that a created world cannot be eternal),⁴⁵ from which it is clear that the same line of thought was current at least as early as in the first half of the thirteenth century. As is stated by Albert, many thinkers were opposed to the view that it is possible for the world to have existed from eternity, in virtue of the argument that created being differs from God in all respects, hence

hoc quod ipse est quo maius cogitari non potest (...). Ex hoc arguitur sic. Deus est actus purus et est infinite et immense, et non est possibile quod cum ipso sit aliquis actus purus qui etiam sit infinite et immense, igitur non est possibile aliquod ens aliud a Deo esse infinite et immense. Consequentia patet ex hoc, quod non est possibile aliquid esse infinite et immense, nisi etiam ipsum sit actus purus, ex eo quod omne potentiale potest aliquid esse vel se habere vel agere qualiter nunc non est [agit in marg.], et per consequens imaginabile est ipsum recipere additionem suo esse vel in suo aliquid esse vel in suo agere, et per consequens non infinite et immense est (...)."

⁴⁵ On Albert's view, see, e.g., J. Hansen, *Zur Frage der anfangslosen und zeitlichen Schöpfung bei Albert dem Großen*, *Studia Albertina*, hrsg. von H. Ostlender, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband IV (Münster 1952), 167-188; and A. Zimmermann, *Alberts Kritik an einem Argument für den Anfang der Welt*, *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung*, hrsg. von A. Zimmermann, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 14 (Berlin-New York 1981), 78-88.

also in duration. Only God is without a beginning. Therefore, every creature has necessarily been created with a beginning in time; for else it would be equal to God.⁴⁶ As a matter of fact, this point of view is brought forward in the *Summa Halensis* (written before 1245), and in a form which is strongly reminiscent of Marsilius' argument. Like Marsilius, it stresses the difference between God's production of the Son and His production of Creation. Only that which is substantially equal to God, so the *Summa* argues, can have been produced eternally and without a beginning in time. All that is different from God, on the other hand, cannot possibly be eternal or without a beginning in time. For nothing that is not God can equal God's eternity and perfection. Therefore, the *Summa* concludes, no creature can exist from eternity.⁴⁷ Once again we come across the identification of perfect being and being from eternity, as well as the emphasis on the absolute difference between God and Creation. Both points have reappeared in Marsilius.

The *Summa Halensis* refers to the *De Trinitate* of Richard of St. Victor († 1173).⁴⁸ This twelfth-century theologian had argued in favour of the identification of 'immeasurableness', 'eternity proper', and 'being from eternity', and had consequently established that no creature can exist from eternity, but that it must necessarily be created in time. For there can only be one immeasurable eternal substance, and only this can be infinite, and

46 Albert the Great, *Commentarii in II Sententiarum*, ed. A. Borgnet Vol. 27 (Paris 1894), d. 1 B a. 10, 29a: "Obijciunt multi, quod in nullis creatura comparabilis est Creatori, ergo nec in duratione, ergo non debet esse sine principio durationis, sicut Deus." Albert was composing the *ordinatio* of the second book of the *Sentences* in 1246, see J.A. Weisheipl, *The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great, Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, ed. by J.A. Weisheipl (Toronto 1980), 22.

47 Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I (Ad Claras Aquas 1924), Lib. 1 p. 1 inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 4 m. 2 c. 1 contra: a., 90a; id., *op. cit.*, c. 4 ad quod obicit c., 93a; id., *op. cit.*, respon-
deo, 95b: "Cum ergo constet mundum et creata esse creaturas vel entia a Deo in diversitate substantiae, impossibile erit mundum et creata esse aeterna vel non habere principium suae durationis. Est igitur hic ordo rerum: est enim aliquid quod procedit ab alio in identitate substantiae et est coaeternum illi, sed non eiusdem personalitatis: sicut Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus est coaeternus Patri; et est aliquid quod procedit non consubstantiale et non est eiusdem personalitatis cum illo a quo procedit nec est coaeternum illi: talis est omnis creatura respectu Dei." Id., *op. cit.*, ad 1um, 96a; id., *op. cit.*, ad 10um, 97b (here the concept of immeasurableness is used); id., *Summa theologica* II (Ad Claras Aquas 1928), Lib. 2 inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 2 tit. 4 c. 1 a. 1 ad 11um, 87b and id., *op. cit.*, ad 12um, 88a. As is known, the first and second book of the *Summa halensis* are largely a compilation from writings of Alexander of Hales and Johannes de Rupella, see V. Doucet, *op. cit.*, Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libris I et II (Ad Claras Aquas 1948), ccxvi.

48 See Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 p. 1 inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 4 m. 2 c. 1 contra: a., 90a and id., *op. cit.*, c. 4 ad quod obicit a., 93a.

this is God.⁴⁹ As an interesting aside, we may mention here that Marsilius had in his possession a considerable number of works by Richard of St. Victor; he must surely have been acquainted with his thought.⁵⁰

One question is still open, viz., whether God can only produce a thing freely if the thing produced is altogether different from Him, especially also in duration. Here, too, Marsilius dissents from the views of many other theologians, most notably from those of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg. The latter two held that God's ability to produce an eternally existing creature does not interfere with His freedom. God's action is immediately effective, also in acting freely. For God is able to act freely and with perfect effectiveness without having to engage in time-consuming reflections. So there is no reason whatsoever, they argue, to assume that God's will must precede its effect in time.⁵¹ Marsilius, however, is of a quite different opinion. He holds it to be positively contrary to God's freedom to believe that God could have produced an

49 See Richard of St. Victor, *De trinitate*, Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, publié par Jean Ribaillier, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age VI (Paris 1958), Lib., 2 c. 7. p. 113-4: "Jam ex superioribus agnovimus et pro certo habemus quod substantia divina non sit aliud aliquid quam immensitas sua, quam eternitas ipsa. Unde et de immensitate et eternitate constat quod quevis earum sit idem quod altera. Constat itaque quia qui eternitatem habet, immensitatem utique non habere non valet. Sed si immensitate carere non potest qui est eternus, erit procul dubio simul utrumque eternus et immensus. Sicut ergo non possunt esse plures inmensi, sic esse non poterunt plures eterni." and id., *op. cit.* c. 8, p. 115: "Que igitur ab illo (viz., Deo, MH) fiunt, divinam illam et incorruptibilem et incommutabilem substantiam materiam habere non possunt. (...) Constat itaque, quod veraciter credimus, quod solus Deus sit increatus. Sicut ergo solus a semetipso, sic absque dubio et solus ab eterno."

50 See G. Töpke, *Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662 I* (Heidelberg 1884), Anhang IV, Accessionskatalog der Universitätsbibliothek, 679-80: "Item (407.) multi tractatus et sermones beati Bernardi, Anselmi, Richardi et aliorum in vno volumine. (...) Item (444.) plures libros Richardi de Sancto Victore in vno volumine." This and many other works were bequeathed by Marsilius to the university library of Heidelberg in 1396. Quotations from Richard of St. Victor's *De trinitate* can be found in Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 1 a. 1, fol. 3rb, and id., *op. cit.*, Lib. 1 q. 2 a. 3, foll. 14va and 16ra-b.

51 See Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi* (ed. cit.), 87a-b: "(...) uoluntas non est necessarium quod precedat duratione effectum suum; nec agens per uoluntatem, nisi per hoc quod agit ex deliberatione: quod absit ut in Deo ponamus. (...) Praeterea, uoluntas uolentis nichil diminuit de uirtute eius, et precipue in Deo. Sed omnes soluentes ad rationes Aristotelis quibus probatur res semper fuisse a Deo, per hoc quod idem semper facit idem, dicunt quod hoc sequeretur si non esset agens per uoluntatem; ergo etsi ponatur agens per uoluntatem, nihilominus sequitur quod potest facere ut causatum ab eo numquam non sit." The same argument can be found in Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria de IIII libros Sententiarum*, (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2 arg. 4, fol. 127vb.

effect from eternity. It is inconceivable, so he argues, that something is brought about freely without its not-being preceding its coming-to-be. Only if the effect does not exist at first, and the cause may hence precede its effect in time, is it possible for the cause to act freely, since only on this assumption the cause might possibly have produced a different effect.⁵² Therefore, eternal things cannot possibly have been produced freely, as they have always existed. If we are to assume that God acts freely, so Marsilius argues, then we should for consistency's sake deny the possibility of the world's eternity.

This does not mean that God needs time in order to act freely. Marsilius shares the opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, viz., that God can produce something freely without having to engage in time-consuming reflections (for otherwise God's simplicity and perfection would be compromised).⁵³ But he nevertheless holds that God can produce a thing freely, only if it is unequal to God in duration. If the thing produced were to be equal to God in duration, it would not be brought forth freely by God, but in the manner of a natural cause. And this is impossible in the case of Creation: if God were to produce something in a natural way, the thing produced would be equal to God not only in duration, but also in perfection and in power. This equality, however, can only be a property of the Son, and not of any of the creatures.⁵⁴ In short, what is different from God can only be brought forth freely and not from eternity.

Let us conclude here. As far as the problem studied above is concerned, Marsilius clearly stands in a different tradition from that of e.g. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg. Marsilius believes that the world cannot possibly be eternal. His view and his argumentation are associated with a line of thought that is to be found in Richard of St. Victor, the *Summa Halensis* and Henry of Oyta. In the arguments presented by Marsilius, all emphasis is on God's immeasurability and infinity, as well

52 See the edition below, p. 139, lines 6-14, p. 141, lines 2-5.

53 Compare Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 44 a. 1, fol. 186rb: "Sed quod esse liberum libertate oppositiones sit perfectionis simpliciter, patet, quia cum Dei immutabilitate stat." and id., *op. cit.*, ad 4um, fol. 187vb: "(...) voluntati divinae nihil resistit, et ergo statim ea posita ponitur effectus."

54 See the edition below, p. 138, lines 21-26, p. 139, lines 1-5, and p. 140, lines 16-23, p. 141, lines 1-5. Compare Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 44 a. 2, fol. 189ra: "(...) concedendum est quod aliquo modo Deus sit ad intra qualiter causare non potest ad extra, quia necessario est ad intra, et impossibile est quod necessario causaret ad extra."

as on the difference between God and Creation. The created world cannot possibly exist from eternity, since God alone is infinite and immeasurable.

APPENDIX

5

The present edition is based on the manuscript Isny, Bibliothek der Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48 (= J), Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 1268 (= K), Tübingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336a (= T) and on the edition printed by M. Flach at Strasbourg in 1501 (= F). As far as we know, J, K, T and F are the only sources preserving the text of the *dubium* edited below (II Sent. q. 1 a. 2).

J was written after 1415 by Gerardus Casterkem (master at the University of Heidelberg). K and T presumably date from the third or fourth decade of the 15th century. F has probably been corrected by Flach's corrector Matthias Schürer. Because J is the oldest manuscript, and was presumably written at Heidelberg (where up to 1489 Marsilius' autograph was available), J has been used here as the basic manuscript, although K also has a good text. J and T are somehow connected (see the critical apparatus).¹

We chose for an alternative reading or word order only where J goes against both K, T and F, and in the following cases:

6) nec] *om.* J T. 36) produceret] producere J T. 37) ad] *om.* J T. 42) mensuratur] mensurat J T. 43) est] *om.* J F. 57) intelligens] intellectus J T. 58) volens] voluntas J T. 70) maius] magis J K. 74) ipso] ipse J T; ipsum F. 88) voluntas] voluntatis J K. 89) esset] *om.* J T; est F. 98) equum esse bovem] hominem esse asinum J T. 106) maximam] maxime J K T.

In all these cases, the reading of J appears in the critical apparatus. Only once did it seem necessary to deviate from the reading of the four sources in favour of the logical structure of the text. 'Potuit' on p. 141, line 4, has been corrected by us from the original reading of 'ponit' in J, K, T and F. Orthographical differences and the alternative readings ille / iste and ergo / igitur have not been noted as variants. Ne^r in J, K and T has been read as

1 On these details, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Einige Notizen über die Handschriften und Drucke, 118-153.

'negatur',² although it cannot be ruled out that 'negetur' (as in F) was meant. The orthography, capitalization and punctuation have been adapted to modern usage.

SIGNS AND ABBREVIATIONS

J = Isny, Bibl. der Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48

K = Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 1268

T = Tübingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336a

F = Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Strasbourg 1501 (M. Flach)

J is the basic manuscript

add. = addidit / addiderunt

ed. = editor

om. = omisit / omiserunt

sup. lin. = supra lineam

<MARSILIUS OF INGHEN II SENT. Q. 1 A. 2:

UTRUM CATHOLICE LOQUENDO MUNDUS POSSIT ESSE
COAETERNUS DEO VEL POTUIT PRODUCI COAETERNE DEO>

[J fol. 365a; K fol. 17r; T unfoliated; F fol. 206vb] Hic consuevit moveri:³ Utrum catholice loquendo mundus possit⁴ esse coaeternus Deo, vel potuit⁵ produci coaeterne Deo. Ubi primo manifestum est, quod nec nunc nec⁶ deinceps in futurum potest mundus esse coaeternus Deo eo, quod iam in praeteritum transiuit ipsum habuisse esse post non esse, quod

2 Cf. A. Cappelli, *Dizionario di abbreviature latine ed italiane*, Sesta ed. (Milan 1985), 233b.

3 moveri] dubium *add.* F.

4 possit] potest J.

5 potuit] potuerit F.

6 nec] *om.* J T.

- Deus non potest facere non fuisse praeteritum. Sed utrum potuit⁷ produci coaeterne Deo, de hoc doctores nostri sunt diversi. Quidam^a dicunt quod sic, et moventur ex illo,⁸ quia Filius est aeternaliter productus⁹ a Patre. Quare ergo non posset¹⁰ Deus etiam¹¹ producere [F fol. 207ra] creaturam sine initio? Non¹² videtur maior implicatio¹³ in uno quam in alio.
- Secundo,^b quia si non, hoc maxime esset quia producitur libere et ex voluntate. Et in talibus videtur quod productum necessario habeat initium. Sed hoc non obstat, quia ubi produciens¹⁴ est aeternum et deliberatione non indiget quin coaeterne sibi posset¹⁵ producere.
- Tertio,^c quia non minus potest aliquid¹⁶ esse coaeternum Deo quam ignis, si esset aeternus splendor.¹⁷ Modo, beatus Augustinus^d dicit sexto *De Trinitate* c. 1: "Si ignis esset aeternus, splendor ab eo genitus esset coaeternus." Ergo etiam potuit Deus producere creaturam vel rem dependentem sibi coevam.
- Quarto,^e quia humanus intellectus potest intelligere vel apprehendere Deum fuisse ab aeterno rerum productorem. Sed plus potest Deus¹⁸ facere quam homo apprehendere, ergo etc. Maiorem probant per dictum beati Augustini^f decimo¹⁹ *De Civitate Dei* ex verbis Platonis dicentis: [K fol. 17v] "Mundus semper fuit [J fol. 365b] semper existente eo qui eum fecit".

7 potuit] potuerit F.

a Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (Venice 1564, republished Ridgewood, New Jersey 1965), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 6.

8 illo] quattuor motivis K.

9 productus] produciens J.

10 posset] possit J.

11 etiam] om. T.

12 non] ideo T.

13 implicatio] contradictionis add. F.

b Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 4.

14 produciens] productum F.

15 sibi posset] sibi possit K F; posset sibi T.

c Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 5.

16 potest aliquid] aliquid potest J; potest aliud K T.

17 splendor] om. K F.

d Augustine, *De trinitate*, cura et studio W.J. Mountain auxiliante Fr. Glorie, CCSL L Opera Pars XVI/1 (Turnhout 1968), Lib. VI, I n. 1, p. 228.

e Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 8 (almost *verbatim*).

18 potest Deus] Deus potest K.

f Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, ad fidem quartae editionis Teubnerianae quam a. 1928-1929 curaverunt B. Dombart et A. Kalb, paucis emendatis mutatis additis, CCSL XLVII Opera Pars XIV/1 (Turnhout 1955), Lib. X, c. 31, p. 309.

19 X] Io K T.

Etiam Philosophus et Avicenna^g et²⁰ fere omnes dicunt mundum fuisse ab aeterno, et tamen Avicenna^h ponit mundum a Deo factum.²¹ Minorem probant per beatum Augustinumⁱ *Epistula 3 ad Volusianum* dicentem: "Demus igitur Deo aliquid posse, quod nos fateamur²² investigare²³ non posse. In rebus enim mirabilibus tota ratio est voluntas facientis."

Sed salva reverentia hanc opinionem defendendam²⁴ mihi non videtur.²⁵ Pro cuius declaratione primo suppono, quod immensitas quantitatis spiritalis maiestatis divinae stat in tribus, scilicet in aeterna duratione et²⁶ interiori perfectione et in²⁷ exterioris effectus possibili²⁸ productione. Dictum est de hoc satis quaestione 23 respiciente distinctionem 19 et 20.^j Secundo praemitto, quod Deus ad extra non potest facere effectum maximum in perfectione vel extensione. De hoc satis²⁹ dictum est ut probavi³⁰ eo modo quo potui quaestione 42 circa³¹ distinctionem 42 et 43.^k Tertio praemitto, quod non videtur rationale quod plus possit magis facere sibi aequale in duratione aeternitatis, quam in maximo quod potest producere suae productivae potestatis. Volo dicere, quod non³² plus est rationale quod possit sibi³³ aequare aliquid in duratione sic quod antierius

g Cf. J. Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, Philosophes Médiévaux XVII (Louvain-Paris 1974), p. 156 (202) and Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, Édition critique de la traduction Latine médiévale par S. van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain 1977-80), Tract. IX, c. 1, p. 446.

20 et] *om.* K.

h Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (ed. cit.), Tract. IX, c. 1, p. 443.

21 factum] et *add.* F.

i Augustine, *Epistolae* cl. III, ep. 137 c. 2 n. 8, MPL 33 col. 519.

22 fateamur] *fatemur* J.

23 investigare] *investigari* F.

24 defendendam] *defendentium* K F.

25 videtur] sic *add.* F.

26 et] in F.

27 in] *om.* T.

28 possibili] *possibilis* J.

j Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (Strasbourg 1501, reprint Frankfurt a/Main 1966), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 3, foll. 90vb-91rb.

29 satis] *om.* K F.

30 ut probavi] et *probatum* F.

31 circa] *om.* K.

k Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, foll. 180va-182vb.

32 non] *solus add.* K.

33 sibi] *illo* K.

in duratione nunquam potuisset³⁴ producere, quam³⁵ in vigore potestatis sic quod aliquid produceret³⁶ quo maius nihil possit ultra vel potuisset maius producere. Probo sic, quia sicut ad³⁷ agens naturale perfectum sequitur aequalitas in effectu quoad simultatem temporis, ita etiam
 5 sequitur extremum potestatis, sic scilicet, quod nihil ultra secundum illum statum potest producere. Ergo etiam eodem modo, si potuit producere maximum in duratione [F fol. 207rb] a parte ante, quare non posset³⁸ producere maximum³⁹ in potestate vel extensione? Nulla est ratio.

10 Ex his infero conclusionem negativam, quod Deus non potuit producere creaturam sibi coaeternam. Probatur sic, quia non plus potuit producere sibi maximum in duratione, quam sibi maximum⁴⁰ in potestate vel extensione, per suppositionem tertiam. Sed non potest producere sibi
 15 maximum⁴¹ in extensione vel in vigore sive virtute, per suppositionem secundam. Ergo conclusio vera.

Secundo, quia de natura creaturae est esse sub tempore. Sed nullum tempus potest esse aeternum eo, quod tempus aeternum non mensuratur.⁴² Ergo de ratione creaturae est⁴³ nullo modo aequari Deo. Non
 20 deduco partes brevitatis causa.

Tertio, quia Deus nullo modo potest facere eo modo quo faceret si ageret per modum agentis naturalis. Sed si ageret per modum agentis naturalis, tunc produceret creaturam coaeternam sicut et maximam. Ergo repugnat⁴⁴ maiestati posse producere coaeternam.⁴⁵ Tenet consequentia.⁴⁶ Et patet maior, quia si posset⁴⁷ agere per modum agentis naturalis, [K fol. 18r] tunc posset facere maximum [J fol. 366a] quod posset,⁴⁸ et sic tantum, quod ultra

34 potuisset] produxisse vel *add.* T.

35 quam] quod K.

36 produceret] producere J T.

37 ad] *om.* J T.

38 posset] possit J.

39 maximum] in duratione a (...) posset producere maximum *om.* K.

40 in duratione quam sibi maximum] *om.* T.

41 maximum] in duratione quam sibi maximum in potestate vel extensione per suppositionem tertiam *add.* (*underlined*) K.

42 mensuratur] mensurat J T.

43 est] *om.* J F.

44 repugnat] repugnaret F.

45 coaeternam] aeternam J; sicut et maximam *add.* (*underlined*) K.

46 tenet consequentia] consequentia tenet J.

47 posset] possit J.

48 posset] possit J.

nihil⁴⁹ possit⁵⁰ nec extensive nec intensive, cum sit agens infinitum cui omnia oboediunt. Minor patet, quia agens naturale non faceret plus quam coaeterne. Confirmatur, quia non potest⁵¹ plus produxisse⁵² coaeterne quam iuxta extremum potentiae. Sed secundum non potest, per dicta in

5 42 distinctione,¹ ergo nec primum.

Quarto quaero a te:⁵³ Utrum dependens coaeternum emanasset per intellectum et voluntatem libere, vel non?⁵⁴ Si dicis quod non, tunc Deus non potuit ad extra sic agere, quia catholice⁵⁵ non potest ad extra⁵⁶ agere nisi intelligens⁵⁷ et volens⁵⁸ etiam libertate oppositionis. Si dicis quod libere emanavit, tunc utique habet esse sic, quod prius non fuit. Ergo non est coaeternum. Et patet consequentia. Probatur⁵⁹ antecedens, quia imaginatio non capit, quod aliquid ab aliquo producat libere ad esse quin ante habuit non esse. Secus est de agente naturali in quo productum adaequatur producenti.

15 Ad rationes alterius opinionis.⁶⁰

Ad primam conceditur antecedens, et negatur⁶¹ consequentia quod ideo potuit creaturam sine initio producere. Et ad probationem,⁶² non est simile de Filio et de creatura, quia Filius est natus aequalis in omnibus, ubi non est relationis oppositio. Creatura autem in nullo potest aequari

20 Deo nec in duratione nec in perfectione nec extensione, non solum in non esse Deum, sed etiam in non esse maximum quod Deus⁶³ potest, ut dictum est in quaestione 42.^m

49 ultra nihil] nihil ultra J.

50 possit] posset K T.

51 potest] potuisset T.

52 produxisse] se *add.* K.

1 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, foll. 180va-182vb.

53 a te] *om.* J.

54 vel non] necne F.

55 catholice] loquendo *add.* F.

56 extra] sic *add.* (*underlined*) K.

57 intelligens] intellectus J T.

58 volens] voluntas J T.

59 probatur] patet T.

60 opinionis] viae T.

61 negatur] negetur F.

62 probationem] quod *add.* F.

63 Deus] *om.* J.

m Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (ed. cit), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, foll. 180va-182vb.

Ad secundam conceditur maior quod⁶⁴ in libere productis productum est necessario omni modo⁶⁵ finitum duratione a parte ante, perfectione et [F fol. 207va] virtute. Tu dicis, quod hoc non oportet ubi produciens est aeternum vel infinitum quod deliberatione non indiget; eodem modo
 5 dicere posses quod ad producendum maximum effectum quem posset⁶⁶ producere⁶⁷ se extendere posset,⁶⁸ quod in dicta quaestione est improbatum. Dico itaque, quod contra naturam agentis infiniti est producere maximum sive in duratione sive in extensione sive⁶⁹ in potentia sic, quod maius⁷⁰ illo producere nunquam potuisset. Et imaginatio tua hic
 10 non valet, quia tu supponis quod sicut Deus potest⁷¹ producere sibi coaevum a parte post, quod ita potuit producere sibi coaevum a parte⁷² ante. Et non est simile, quia quod est coaevum a parte post, est sibi coaevum ex gratia⁷³ sic quod potest ipsum non conservare et aliud eo diutius. Quod autem esset coaevum sibi a parte ante, esset sibi sic
 15 coaevum quod ipso⁷⁴ nihil prius producere potuisset. Ad tertiam conceditur⁷⁵ maior, et negetur⁷⁶ minor. Et ad probationem dicitur, quod ignis non potest esse aeternus nec aliquid⁷⁷ sibi coaeternum. Sed ad beatum Augustinum dicitur, quod voluit declarare⁷⁸ quod rationabiliter Filius est coaeternus Patri, quia Pater eum producit naturaliter,
 20 sicut⁷⁹ ignis calefacit. Modo, si per impossibile esset ignis coaeternus⁸⁰ et esset lucidus, si esset medium susceptibile, splendor eius esset [K fol. 18v] aeternus eo, quod naturaliter produceret [J fol. 366b] sibi⁸¹ splendorem. Et ideo⁸² non posset⁸³ poni differentia inter durationem ignis et splendoris.

64 quod] *om.* T.

65 omni modo] omnino J.

66 posset] possit J.

67 posset producere] producere posset K.

68 posset] possit J.

69 sive] etiam *add.* K F.

70 maius] magis J K.

71 Deus potest] potest Deus K.

72 parte] post quod ita (...) coaevum a parte *om.* K.

73 coaevum ex gratia] ex gratia coaevum K.

74 ipso] ipse J T; ipsum F.

75 conceditur] concedetur K.

76 negetur] negatur K.

77 aliquid] aliquid *vel* aliud K.

78 declarare] declamare K.

79 sicut] sic K.

80 coaeternus] aeternus J.

81 produceret sibi] sibi produceret J.

82 ideo] *om.* K.

83 posset] possit J.

Et ita Pater ad intra coaeterne generat sibi⁸⁴ Filium, quia naturaliter sicut ignis calefacit, ita Pater generat Filium. Secus est de productis ad extra quae generantur libere, ubi necessario praecedit⁸⁵ producens productum eo, quod aliud⁸⁶ potuit⁸⁷ ante velle producere, et quia voluntas⁸⁸ immense prior est eo. Item, quia necessario eius esse esset⁸⁹ in tempore possibili vel imaginario, cum mutabilis sit, quod aeternitati convenire non posset.⁹⁰ Ad quartam, quod humanus intellectus saltem in ista vita aeternitatem positive⁹¹ non potest intelligere eo, quod est infinita. Infinitum autem secundum quod⁹² infinitum est ignotum, ut habetur primo *Physicorum*.ⁿ Sed negative apprehendit eam, ut Deum fuisse sine⁹³ initio.⁹⁴ Sic intellexerunt Philosophus,⁹⁵ Commentator,⁹⁶ Avicenna^o,⁹⁷ quod mundus esset aeternus et non habuisset initium. Secundo, cum dicitur quod etiam sic potest intelligere de creatura, dicitur quod hoc est, quia apprehendit Deum naturaliter agere, qualiter tamen agere non potest ad extra. Et in hoc deficit argumentum. Tertio dicitur, quod creaturam esse coaeternam Deo intellectus hominis non potest intelligere plus quam equum esse bovem,⁹⁸ quamquam conceptus equi⁹⁹ et bovis affirmative possunt combinari¹⁰⁰ dicendo 'Equus¹⁰¹ est bos'. [F fol. 207vb] Et ideo sicut non potest Deus facere quod¹⁰² equus¹⁰³ sit bos, nisi forte assumendo utramque naturam secundum unam opinionem, ita non potest facere creaturam

84 generat sibi] sibi generat J; sibi om. F.

85 praecedit] procedit F.

86 aliud] eo quod aliud add. T.

87 potuit ed.] ponit J K T F.

88 voluntas] voluntatis J K.

89 esset] om. J T; est F.

90 posset] possit K.

91 positive] saltem add. J.

92 quod] est add. J.

n Cf. Aristotle, *Physica*, Lib. I, c. 4, 187b7-8.

93 sine] sup. lin. J.

94 initio] sui esse add. F.

95 Philosophus] philosophi K F.

96 Commentator] et add. J.

o Cf. J. Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 156 (202) (= Aristotle); Averroes, ubi? and Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (ed. cit.), Tract. IX, c. 1, p. 446.

97 Avicenna] Aristoteles add. K F.

98 equum esse bovem] hominem esse asinum J T.

99 equi] hominis F.

100 possunt combinari] potest combinare F.

101 equus] homo F.

102 quod] ut F.

103 equus] homo F.

sibi coaeternam. Nec¹⁰⁴ beatus Augustinus voluit quod Deus omnia illa potest quae¹⁰⁵ homo false potest combinare, ut naturam humanam esse naturam divinam, vel independentem. Quarto, quod philosophi erraverunt credentes Deum naturaliter agere ad extra. Et ideo posuerunt
5 sibi rem dependentem coaeternam et maximam¹⁰⁶ in perfectione quam possit facere. Et sicut unum est impossibile ita et aliud. Sed in rei veritate, sicut unum non est possibile ut quod faciat unum tam perfectum quod perfectius facere non possit, ita et aliud¹⁰⁷ ut quod potuerit¹⁰⁸ sic aliquid¹⁰⁹ facere quod prius isto¹¹⁰ facere nunquam¹¹¹ potuerit.¹¹² Quod autem
10 beatus Augustinus dicit quod Deus aliqua potest quae nos intelligere non valemus, hoc est verum ut quod Deus est homo vel quod natura humana divinae est unita in unitate¹¹³ suppositi, quod sufficit. Hoc tamen est¹¹⁴ respectu possibilium simpliciter, sed quod coaeterna sit producta res Deo vel aequalis suae producibilitati in virtute, magnitudine vel duratione est
15 simpliciter impossibile. Et ergo hoc Deus non potest. Hoc de quarto et de toto.¹¹⁵

104 nec] haec F.

105 quae] quae *add.* K.

106 maximam] maxime J K T.

107 aliud] sed in rei (...) ita et aliud *om.* K.

108 potuerit] potuit T.

109 aliquid] autem K.

110 isto] ista K.

111 nunquam] non J.

112 nunquam potuerit] non potuit T.

113 unitate] unione T; unitatem F.

114 est] *om.* T.

115 toto] secundo articulo *add.* K F.